


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

A CLOSE LOOK TO THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS

by

Ufuk AYDIN

September 1994

Thesis Advisor:

Ralph K. Magnus

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A Close Look to the Future of Turkish-Iranian Relations

by

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First Lieutenant, Turkish Air Force
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of the requirements for the degree of

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
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
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine relations of Turkey and Iran under the perspective of their cultural biases and security prerequisites. It is important to evaluate both countries and their foreign policies, which face many challenges after the post cold war era, in understanding possible futures of both countries. This thesis provides historical background of their relations and major current issues between the two countries. An analysis of factors shaping the decision-making process in Turkey and Iran gives the reader tools to speculate about their future relations. Several possible scenarios of conflict are developed and their probable outcomes examined. General results of this thesis reveal the necessity of cooperation between the two countries. Mutual understanding and cooperation will also have an impact on the stability and development of the region. The Economic Cooperation Organization may provide a mechanism for the two countries to improve their relations and increase regional stability.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study is concentrated on the question relating the future relations of two great regional actors of the area we prefer to call South West Asia. These countries, Turkey and Iran, have their own respective national identities and great histories.

It is important to evaluate both countries and their foreign policies which face many challenges after the post cold war era to understand possible future relationships between both countries. It is hoped to find some clues to determine the future of their relations. This thesis will be helpful in finding mutual agreement between two countries which is essential for peace in this very sensitive region.

This thesis will focus on the relations of Turkey and Iran and their view point on different issues that affect their relations. The first priority will be given to their security prerequisites and their current foreign policies. Domestic problems and the stability of their regimes will be another focal point used to estimate the future of their relations.

This thesis will follow the systematic approach of using different tools to find a solution to the research question outlined in the contents table. The longitudinal approach will be used to understand the development of relations between two countries. The method of agreement will be used to find common points on their relations. To understand what may cause a problem or cooperation between two countries, this thesis will examine the current issues of the two countries. The two countries will be compared by making the analysis of political, economical, social and security factors to understand their decision-making process.

Both countries have long histories, their first interactions were recorded as early as third century B.C. However, there are some turning points in the relations of both countries.

The thesis will look for the periods in which they established good relations and cooperated as well as periods which caused struggle between these countries. The historical relations of the two countries will be studied beginning from their early history. The history of Shiism also requires attention.

It is crucial to know that although nations behave according to the flow of events in their era, their history

shows an interpretive system or paradigm to analyze and respond to these events. So, it is important to give adequate attention to the study of history to understand basic characteristics of their relations.

There are several severe problems between the two countries that may destroy peace in the region. The policy of Iran to influence Central Asia and the Turkish response to this challenge must be studied. The Iranian policy on the Kurdish problem in the region is tremendously important for Turkey. The chaos in Iraq after the Gulf War is another problem between the two countries. The security of the Gulf region has an impact on the Turkish economy. An aggressive alliance of Iran and Syria may endanger the security of Turkey.

The ongoing attempts to export Islamic fundamentalism by Iran is a threat to the secular regime of Turkey. The attempts of Iran to influence Shiite populations in the region are another problem between Turkey and Iran. The increasing nationalism in the Azerbaijan may also be seen as a threat to Iran. Armenia's expansionist policies and Iran's close ties with Armenia may be another dispute between two countries. The extensive military build-up and nuclear proliferation of Iran may seem as a threat to Turkey.

If the geopolitics of the region is studied, the influence of the two countries over region and current events will be understood. Developments in the 1990s have revealed the potential conflict between Turkey and Iran. The collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of independent countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus have become an area of challenge for Turkey and Iran.

To understand how Turkey and Iran will determine their policies on these problems, their cultural biases that affect their policy making process will be evaluated. The analysis of their economic, political, social structures and national security policies will give us their capabilities and limitations on their decision-making process.

The research and analysis involved in this thesis will contribute to an understanding of Turkish-Iran relations and may give tools to the reader to speculate about the future relations of both countries. It will be important for institutions and readers to be familiar with the historical background, present situation and future of Turkish-Iran relations in creating their own policies toward these countries.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. EARLY HISTORY

Iran's history as a nation of people speaking an Indo-European language did not begin until the middle of the second millennium B.C. In the beginning, three major groups were identifiable-the Scythians, the Medes, and the Persians. The Scythians established themselves in the northern Zagros mountains. The Medes settled over a huge area reaching as far as modern Tabriz in the north and Esfahan in the south. The Persians were established in three areas: to the south of Lake Urmia, on the northern border of the Kingdom of the Elamites; and in the environs of modern Shiraz, which would be their eventual settling place and to which they would give the name Parsa.¹

During the seventh century B.C., the Persians were led by Hakamanish, ancestor of Achaemenid dynasty. A descendant, Cyrus II led the combined forces of the Medes and the Persians to establish the most extensive empire known in the ancient world. Alexander the Great of Macedon came to power in his early age and his vision forced him to conquer unknown lands and create an empire.

After establishing his rule over the Greek cities in 336 B.C., he conquered Asia Minor, and quickly advanced to Mesopotamia. In quick succession he captured Egypt, Babylonia, and in two years he demolished the Achaemenid Empire. Alexander established his empire but could not live long enough to conquer India and died in 323 B.C.

When Alexander the Great died without any heir, his empire divided among his four generals. Seleceus, one of his generals, gained power in Iran and established his dynasty. However, Parthians-another nomadic tribe, under the leadership of Mithradates overthrew the Seleucid rule and created a unified rule from India to Asia Minor. The Parthians were a polyglot people adopting Greco-Persian culture.² However, they accepted Zoroastrianism^a as their religion.

The Sassanids, a revived Persian dynasty, held power between 224-642 A.D. During this era, Rome became a major threat for the Sassanids. The Sassanids and Byzantium wars lasted many years and eventually the Sassanid's power declined.

^aZoroastrianism or Mazdaism is a religion based on the struggle between the forces of Good led by Ahura Mazda and the forces of Evil. It was first preached by Zarathustra in the sixth century B.C. REFERENCE 2: pg 6

The world was introduced to a new religion- Islam in 612 A.D., and it became powerful in Arabia. The Prophet Mohammed proclaimed his mission and finally won a great acceptance from his people. Before Islam became a religion, Arabs were nomadic and pagan people. The new religion transformed these people from a segmented cabal to a unified, devoted, and disciplined army of believers ready to deliver the message of God everywhere. Arab forces defeated the enemies of the faith all over the region including the Byzantine armies and the Sassanidian armies.

The conquest of Iran by Islamic armies begun with the defeat of the Byzantine army in 635 and the capture of the capital of the Sassanid Empire in 637. The corruption and mismanagement of the country by the Sassanids were contributing for the people's readiness to accept a new religion. They did not heavily resist Arab forces and adapted themselves to the new style of life. By 652, Arab forces captured all of Iran and Khwarazm, a city on the Oxus river.

This advance of Arab forces opened a new world to Islam: Central Asia, homeland of the Turks. Turkish people were nomadic and they created several confederations of tribes. Each of these confederations established their rule in the vast lands of Central Asia, from the borders of prehistoric

China to Persia and Transoxania to the Carpathians. The Turkish people were strong and brave warriors. The migrations of Turkish clans were always directed to the West.

Although Turkish clans existed long before, the first historical references to the Turks appear in Chinese records of about 200 B.C.³ These records are related to the Hun Empire, who established their rule in an area bounded by the Altai Mountains, Lake Baikal, and the northern edge of Gobi Desert. Later, the Hun Empire divided into several states as North and South Hun Empires.

Turco-Iranian relations began with the early contacts of the tribes. Both sides attacked each other frequently and created alliances against their common enemies. Iranian poems known as Sehnames^b mention Turkish people and their land as Turan, and address the struggle between Turks and Persians from the beginning of the third century B.C.⁴ The contacts between of the two nations continued during the Sassanids period, additionally the Sassanid kings used Turkish warriors in their armies.

Turkish clans used the Sassanids in their internal power conflicts too. In 552 A.D., another Turkish Empire was

^bThese poems were collected in the 'Shahnama' by the Persian poet Ferdousi and presented to the Turkish Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna in the early eleventh century A.D.

established, known as Gokturk Empire, by Bumin Hakan and his brother Istemi Yabgu. In a few years they created a strong structure and began their power struggle with another Turkish Empire, the Ak-Huns (White-Huns). Bumin Hakan and Anushirvan-the Sassanid ruler, established an alliance against the Ak-Hun Empire.⁵

This alliance did not last long and the Gokturks eventually dominated the silk trade after the collapse of the Ak-Hun Empire. This provided a good reason for the Sassanids to attack the Gokturks. As a result of the attempts of the Sassanids to take over the control of the silk trade, the Turks created an alliance with the Byzantines against the Sassanids for the first time in the history.^{6,7}

The introduction of Islam to Turkish tribes began with the Conquest of Persia by Arab armies. In this period some of the Turkish tribes served as warriors in the Arab armies. These groups became a catalyst for the transformation process. Another event that effected this process was the Talas War between the Chinese and Islamic armies in 751 A.D.

The main threat for China came from its western borders in the form of Turkish clans. So, China, in addition to building the Great Wall with its chain of castles along its western border, always interfered in the power struggles of

different Turkish clans and tried to prevent the establishment of a powerful federation or empire. When the Uyghur Turks became powerful, the Chinese armies concentrated their attacks on them.

Meantime, the Islamic armies entered Central Asia from the west by capturing Khawarzm. The Chinese armies changed their target and both armies met in Talas. The Turkish clans sided with the Islamic armies and this changed the balance of power. The victory of the Islamic armies accelerated the process of conversion to Islam. Acceptance of Islam as a religion by Turks is a major event in history because Turks became a dominant figure or leader of the faith and carried the flag of Islam to three continents.^{8,9}

After this victory, the Sultanate of Ghazna established in present Afghanistan in 969 A.D. The Sultanete of Ghazna was the first Islamic state that was established by Turks. Mahmud, the Sultan of Ghazna, conquered India and northern Iran. He put an end to the Samanid rule in 999 which was established in 819 in Iran.¹⁰

However, the Ghaznavid power did not last long. Another Turkic clan ended their rule and gained control over their territories. This new clan was a branch of the Oghuz Turks, named the Seljuks. In 1055, their leader, Tugrul occupied Baghdad and established his rule in Persia and Mesopotamia.

The Great Seljuk Empire was a federation of different tribes under the banner of Seljuks. The Selcuks used Persian people as administrators and civil servants while Turkish tribes concentrated on the expansion of the Empire. These tribes devoted themselves to conquering new lands and delivering their faith to new people.

Their attention was concentrated on the West, and they launched attacks to Anatolia, against the Byzantine Empire. In 1071, Alp Arslan confronted the Byzantine army in Malazgirt.¹¹ The defeat of the Byzantine army opened the doors of Anatolia to Turks permanently. Many tribes entered Anatolia and established settlements.

The Mongol invasion ended Turkish domination of Iran in 1258.¹² The Great Seljuk Empire divided into several states under the Mongol influence. Although the Mongol rule became useful for Persian people, Turkish tribes suffered many loss. The Mongols also used Persian people in their administration and protected Persian culture.¹³

The influence of the Mongols lasted until the 1330s and they were eventually obliged to adopt the Islamic faith. On the other hand, their loss of control caused a power vacuum in the region and this vacuum was filled by several petty dynasties in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Persia. The Salghurid,

Muzaffarid, Inju, and Jalayirid were the ones that were established in Iran by Mongol commanders, old Seljuk retainers, and regional chiefs. The Ottomans became powerful in western Anatolia by the 1330s, and some other Turkish emirates divided the remainder of the Seljuk Empire amongst themselves.¹⁴

Although Mongol influence disappeared in the 1330s, another wave of Turkic-Mongol tribes, led by Tamerlane, became powerful in the region. He established his rule in Transoxiana in 1381, and conquered Iran within a few years. The rivalry between Tamerlane and the Sultan Bayazid, the leader of the Ottomans, caused a confrontation at Ankara. Tamerlane defeated the Ottomans and captured Bayazid in 1402. This caused a pause in the rise of the Ottomans, and the four sons of Bayazid struggled for the throne for a decade.

B. THE HISTORY OF SHIISM

It is important to mention Shiism before continue with the Ottoman period. The reason is that, being a Sunni leader of the Islamic world, the Ottomans felt themselves in the position to protect the faith against the enemies of the faith including the Shia elements. On the other hand, being a Shia nation, Iranian leaders felt themselves in a position to

overthrow the *munafiqeen*(hypocrites) and *non-Tawhidi ulemas* and create the rule of *imamiyat*^c. This rivalry has affected the relations of both countries since the acceptance of Shiism by Iran.

Although there are differences between Shia and Sunni thoughts, they are all the same in the common ground. They believe in the same Prophet, Mohammed, and the same faith, Islam. The differences are mainly political and partially religious.

The Prophet Mohammed was selected as a messenger from God to deliver his new Book, the Holy Quran. In the early stage of Islam, the Prophet was a spiritual and temporal leader of his people.

When he died in 632 A.D., the leaders of the Muslim community divided in the election process of the new leader. One school of thought believed that the leader should be elected. Another one believed that the descendants of the Prophet should assume the leadership. Meantime, one school of thought proposed the leadership of the Umayyad dynasty.

^cIn the Shia doctrine, *munafiqeen* were the Caliphs of Umayyad and Abbasi dynasties because they surpassed the power of Imams. *Ulema* means clergy that can interpret the meaning of the book. *Tawhidi* means accepting the dominance of God only, and *Non-Tawhidi* means accepting human dominance in the Shia doctrine.

Finally, the Muslim community accepted the election process and chose his father-in-law and one of the first followers of the Prophet, Abu Bakr as a caliph (the political leader of Muslims) by a consensus. Some people continued to accept the descendants of the Prophet their leader. They favored Ali, who was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. They called themselves as *Shi-ah-i Ali* (the partisans of Ali) and refused Abu Bakr's caliphate. Besides, they believed that Ali also resumed the spiritual role of the Prophet. However, eventually Ali accepted the decision of the community.

When Abu Bakr died in 634, Omer^d had been selected as caliph. Later, Osman^e took power in 646 as caliph of the Muslim community. Osman initiated some reforms in the community, such as codification of Quran. His rule caused dissatisfaction among some groups, especially for groups that had an interest in the status quo. The dissatisfaction led to the resistance of these groups and these people begun to ask for Ali's rule.

When Osman was killed by assassination in 656, fighting occurred between Ali's supporters and Osman's. This is known

^dIn some sources Umar used as Omer.

^eIn some sources Uthman used as Osman.

as *fitnah*(trials) era, and also the end of having four sequential and universally accepted caliphs as single head of Islam.

Muawiyah, the governor of Syria and a member of the Banu Umayyah, called for revenge for his kinsman, Osman. Ali's and Muawiyah's armies fought several times without clear result. So, both sides agreed on arbitration and each side selected an arbitrator.

In this point, some of Ali's supporters refused arbitration on the basis that the caliph should not be subject to the decision of his followers. They left Ali and chose their own leader. This group, known as *the Kharadjites*(those who seceded) believed that Ali was motivated by personal interest rather than principle. Ali lost arbitration, refused to accept it, and continued his struggle from Iraq with Muawiyah and the Kharadjites. He was killed by the Kharadjite Abd ar Rahman ibn Muljam al Muradi in 661.¹⁵

Muawiyah declared himself caliph and Ali's son Hasan did not resist him. However, the partisans of Ali, the Shia, refused to accept his caliphate. Yazid, the son of Muawiyah, proclaimed himself as a caliph without waiting for his father's death. This event caused opposition to him and Ali's young son, Hussein refused to accept his rule. Before Hussein

could gain wide support and gather his forces, Yazid attacked him and killed Hussein along with his 400 men at Karbela, in 680. This day became a mourning day for the Shia in the following years. Yazid established his dynasty and kept the Caliphate within the Ummayyad dynasty.

It is important to note that the Shia believe that Osman passed the leadership to Ali and Ali became an *Imam*^f for the Muslims. Since then, they accepted twelve *Imam*^g who are the descendants of Ali as their leaders.¹⁶ The Shia believe that except for the twelfth *Imam*, all of the *Imams* were killed by the Sunni Caliphate.

They believe that the twelfth *Imam*, Mohammed el-Mehdi, known as a *Imam-e-Asr* (the *Imam* of the period) and the *Sahib al-Zaman* (the Lord of the age) is in hiding and he will eventually reveal himself to save humanity and the believers. When Mehdi became *Imam*, he disappeared and only his messengers knew his hide-out. There were four messengers, and last messenger died in 940. The period of messengers is known as *Gaybet-i Sugra* (minor occultation), and the period of the total

^f *Imam* means successor to the Prophet, Caliph according to Shiite doctrine, however in Sunni doctrine it means only prayer leader.

^g It must be noted that some of the Shia believe that there were only five *Imams*. Some of them believe that there were seven *Imams*. These groups are called the Fiver and Sevener Shia respectively. There is a struggle within the Shia because of this discrepancy.

disappearance of Mehdi after 940 is known as *Gaybet-i Kubra* (greater occultation).¹⁷

The first Shia state was established in Yemen in 901 by Yahya el Huseyin. The second Shia state was the Ismaili Fatimi which was established in Egypt in 909. Meantime the Shia increased their power in Iraq and Syria. The Samanid rule let the Shia gain power in Iran also.¹⁸ Especially in the tenth century, the Shia gained tolerance and were able to collect their ideas as a set of books.

However, this movement lost tolerance to continue their studies during the rule of the Seljuks. Following the Mongol rule, on the other hand, a good opportunity occurred for them to develop several sects and gain political power. Among them, the sect of Hodja Ali (1392-1429) and his son Ibrahim (1429-1447) became powerful in Iran and later in eastern Anatolia.

In this period they developed new supporters from the Turkomans in Anatolia. Tamerlane, the Mongol ruler, gave Erdebil and its provinces to Hodja Ali and let some Turkoman prisoners free by his request. This made Turkomans feel great loyalty to him and they began to work for Hodja Ali. Tamerlane's victory over the Ottomans permitted the Shia to establish their belief in Anatolia also.

The leadership of Shia passed to Sheikh Cunejd in the following years and he reorganized the structure of the sect. He asked permission from Murad the second to settle in the Ottoman's Sultanate but was refused. Cunejd temporarily settled down in Konya by permission of Karaman Emirate. However, because of his work to develop Shia in this area, he was forced to leave Konya. Cunejd traveled in the region for a while, and finally settled in Ak-Koyunlu^h Sultanate. Uzun Hasan, leader of the Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate tried to use his influence and let him marry his sister. At the same time, Cunejd established an army among his followers and tried to conquer new lands. However, he died in the war in 1460.¹⁹

His son, Haydar became the new Sheikh and he continued to follow the same policies as his father. He strengthened the organization of the sect and tried to recruit more followers among the Turkoman tribes. He asked his Turkoman followers to wear a red turban with twelve knots on it. The number of twelve represents the twelve Imam of Shia. For this reason, their followers begun to be called 'Kizilbaslar' (red heads). Haydar also got married to Uzun Hasan's daughter to empower his position in Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate.

^hIn some sources, White Sheep is used as Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate.

Meantime the Ottomans became powerful in Anatolia and conquered Istanbul, all of the Balkans, and many areas in the West. The Ottomans also began to gain new territories in Anatolia including the Karaman Sultanate and the Kingdom of Trabzon.

Uzun Hasan, on the other hand, began to challenge the Ottomans and helped the Kingdom of Trabzon. He also tried to gain territory from the Karaman Sultanate. This led to the confrontation between the Ottomans and Uzun Hasan, and eventually he was defeated by the Conqueror of Istanbul, Mehmed the Second. Although Uzun Hasan managed to survive, his Sultanate lost most of its territories and power. Uzun Hasan died in 1478 and his brother, Yakub became the Sultan of Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate.²⁰

In 1488, Haydar died in the battle with the Sultan of Shirvan. His family was first protected and later put under custody by Yakub. When Yakub died, his successors began to rally for the control of the Sultanate. Rustem tried to use the influence of Haydar to gain advantage in this struggle and let them free in their activities. Ali, the elder son of Haydar, became the new Sheikh and Ismail became his successor. Ali reestablished his sect and gained so much power that Rustem decided to get rid of him. Rustem's army defeated Ali's

followers, and Ali died in this battle. On the other hand, Ismail, another son of Haydar, escaped and managed to gather his sect together. Later Rustem died in an assassination in 1497.²¹

Ismail became a powerful Sheikh and also one of the leaders of Sufismⁱ. He became a very powerful spiritual leader and his followers venerated him not only as the *Mursid-i Kamil* (the perfect guide), but also as an emanation of the Godhead.²² He enjoyed the support of several Turkoman tribes, and the Shia and Sufi believers. He created a strong army of believers and defeated the Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate in 1501. He captured Tabriz and declared his rule over Iran and Mesopotamia. Thus Ismail established the Safavi dynasty in Iranian history^j and came to be called "Shah".

Ismail accepted Shiism as a state religion and tried to influence other Muslim areas as well. He attacked the Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate once again and demolished this Sultanate. Following his success over the Ak-koyunlu Sultanate, Ismail captured Iraq and came closer to the Ottomans.

ⁱ Sufism is an Islamic mysticism, which accepts that worldly pleasures distract from true concern with the salvation of the soul.

^j Some sources claim that Ismail used his grandfather's name, Sheikh Safi ad Din, who was the founder of their order and claimed descent from Shia Islam's Seventh Imam, Musa al Kazim as a name for his dynasty.

He sent his followers to conduct Shia propoganda in Anatolia. He especially concentrated on the Turkoman tribes of Anatolia. His rule became the flash point of the Shia, the Shia became very powerful in Iran and established their hegemony over the society. During this era, they created their first institutes of the Shia in the society. To suppress the resistance of the Sunni population in Iran, they used all means of power.²³ From then on, the Shia gradually became powerful in Iran and after the eighteenth century, it became dominant in Iranian politics.

The Safavids (1501-1722) managed to create a central government that brought other weak tribes under its control. They expanded the Sultanate whenever it was possible in Iran. Ismail did not face a major challenge from the other Emirates of Iran and this let Ismail attack neighboring countries. Ismail chose Turkistan first because there was a revolt of the Cossads to central authority. He defeated Shaybane Khan in 1510 and invaded Turkistan. His first action was to attempt the genocide of the Sunni population.

C. THE OTTOMAN'S ERA

As mentioned before, the Ottomans began the creation of a Turkish Empire in Anatolia in 1299. The Ottomans were one of

many "Ghazi" states. From the first days of state, the Ottomans advanced to the West against the Christian world.

The Ottomans were Sunni Muslims who devoted themselves to delivering the message of God and being a sword of the faith. They were very skilled in military power and diplomacy. Their wisdom and experience in establishing and administering empires helped them to create a very strong government structure.

Their tolerance to other nationalities and distribution of responsibilities and benefits among their population equally according to their capabilities were other factors that led to a strong administration. They created the *Millet*^k system in which all religious institutions in the Empire were preserved and were represented by their leaders in the Divan, the court of the Sultan.²⁴ All of the different nations were able to have a seat at different levels of administration, even in the highest positions of the *Grand Vezirs* (prime minister).

Except for the period of renaissance following the defeat of Bayazid against Tamerlane in 1402, the Ottomans advanced

^k The Millet system is the harmony of different nations under the fair administration of the Ottoman Empire. This notion became an important element of the Pan-Ottomanism in the nineteenth century.

very rapidly. They regained Anatolia after the Tamerlane dynasty collapsed. The Ottomans completed the conquest of the Balkans in a relatively short period of time.

Mehmed the Second was determined to conquer Istanbul, the second Rome, capital of Byzantine and Orthodox Christianity. It was so strong that many commanders have failed to capture it. Even the Prophet promoted a special status for a commander who could capture Istanbul. Mehmed the Second prepared his army for this holy mission, even building a castle to control sea traffic in the Bosphorus. Eventually, he conquered Istanbul in 1453 and it became the capital of a new world Empire. In the following years, each Sultan advanced the boundaries of the Empire and conquered new territories.

When Selim was a governor in Anatolia, the propaganda of Ismail caused revolts of Turkoman tribes against the Ottomans. Selim had the spirit of a warrior and was very aggressive and vigorous. His two elder brothers on the other hand, were calm and their talents were rather for administration. Bayazid, the Second was aware of the threat of Ismail but preferred to deal with administrative reforms for the Empire. The Ottoman armies thus opposed Ismail, but did not confront him in battle.

Bayazid was in poor health and favored his second son Ahmed. Selim was aware of this fact, he gathered support and

asked his father to accept his claim of succession. Bayazid refused but Selim was able to overthrow his father and became the sultan of the Empire in 1512.²⁵

The first move of Selim was to turn the attention of the Ottomans to the East, and to the emerging threat of the Shia and Ismail. Selim cleaned Ismail's army of propaganda among the Turkoman tribes. Meanwhile, Ismail tried to create an alliance with European powers, but could not achieve his goal.²⁶ Selim moved quickly and forced Ismail into a decisive engagement. The two armies fought at Chaldiran in 1514. The victory of the Ottomans was very clear and Ismail barely escaped from being killed. Selim continued his campaign and captured Tabriz and much of the Safavids's territory. The Safavids did not pose a threat for a long time because of this loss.

Victorious against Ismail, Selim turned his attention to the Mamluks, another Muslim and largely Turkish Sultanate that held the Caliphate. The Mamluk Sultan, Al-Ghawri, marched a force to stop Selim. Selim conquered Syria, Lebanon, and defeated the Mamluks. Al-Ghawri died on the battlefield, and Selim easily reached Egypt. Tuman Bey, the successor of Al-Ghawri, refused to accept Selim's proposals. Selim defeated Tuman twice and Tuman died in the battle. He completed the

conquest of Egypt and Arabia and returned to Istanbul with the holy possession of the Prophet. He could then claim to be head of Islam and Caliph, hence he captured the Caliphate.

Although, Selim destroyed the influence of Shiism in Anatolia, the Shia regained its power. This led to another action of the Ottomans. Suleiman, the Magnificent, continued the campaign of his father and captured Baghdad and the remaining parts of Iraq in 1533.

Suleiman made his second campaign against the Safavids in 1548. In this campaign he captured east Anatolia including Van and its provinces. Suleiman was forced into a third campaign because of the Safavids's attacks. Suleiman crossed the Upper Euphrates and entered Iran. Tahmasp, the successor of Ismail, could not face the Ottomans' army because of the superiority of the Ottomans over his forces. On the other hand, Suleiman could not advance more because of developments in Europe. Under these circumstances, the truce of Amasya was signed and Suleiman returned his attention to the West again.

When Suleiman died in the campaign against Hungary, the Ottoman Empire had reached its zenith. The Ottomans controlled the Mediterranean, Red, Aegean and Black Seas and had sailed to the Indian Ocean. The area from Crimea to Budapest, from North Africa to Iran, from Egypt to Sudan, from the Balkans up

to Vienna, and from Azerbaijan to Caspian Sea, came under the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. This vast area enjoyed the fair rule of the Ottomans for centuries.

After the sixteenth century Europe gradually became powerful. Europe managed to develop a better understanding of science and the arts following the Reform and Renaissance movements and established strong central governments. They were able to adopt better technology in the military field and in their administration. The Ottomans first were stopped in their positions and following the eighteenth century, gradually lost their territories against European powers, such as Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, and Britain.

There were many factors that caused the decline of the Ottoman Empire, but the main threat to the Ottomans came from Europe. The Ottoman land system was known as *Timar*; based on the new victories, new territories were distributed to people who were responsible for training military personnel known as *Sipahis* among Muslim population. So, the loss of territories to powerful Europeans caused the malfunction of the Timar system.

In addition to this, the loss of territories and less plunder from wars caused problems within the *Yeniceri* (Janissaries) system. The problems of the Timar system

destroyed the balance between Muslim forces and Janissaries. The Janissaries became more powerful in the interior politics of the Ottomans and less willing to fight on the frontiers. Their discipline and ethics diminished and they became a threat to the stability of the Empire. Although there were attempts to create a new military system recruited from the Muslim population who were loyal to the Empire, the Janissaries destroyed those attempts and even killed the Sultans in their revolts.

After the death of Suleiman, none of the successor Sultans were strong enough to dictate reforms or create a new dynamism to Empire. In the absence of a strong ruler, the responsibilities of governance fell upon the Grand Vezirs. Because of the corruption of the Janissaries and the system as a whole, they were not able to implement strong policies.

After the Ottomans adopted the Caliphate, they put more emphasis on religion than improvement of industry or other areas. As a response to the decay of the Empire, the Ulema became powerful in the decision making process and they gained greater influence over the administration. The Ulema resisted change in the Empire for a long time and insisted on increasing the role of religion on the administration.

Once, religious leaders forced the Empire to grow and change according to the situations. In those times, the Ottoman culture and technology were overwhelmingly more advanced than Europe's. Ottoman scientists created many innovations that were immediately adapted to the military field. Later, the Ulema gave more attention to increasing their personal power than to the decay of the Empire.

Besides political factors, the economy of the Empire was threatened by the European economies. The Capitulations, economic and political privileges to the Europeans that were granted as a gift, soon became a tool for the Europeans to control the Ottoman economy. Another effect of the Capitulations was the damage to Ottoman industry and trade. In addition to the Capitulations, the discovery of new trade routes and America shifted the trade center of the World from the Mediterranean to the Oceans.

Of course, some of the Sultans, such as Murad the Fourth, tried to change the situation, establish better administration and regain territories that were lost to enemies.

One of them was Murad the Fourth. Murad the Fourth became the Sultan of the Empire after long lasting power struggles when he was a child. After careful struggle against the power centers in the Empire, Murad gained freedom in his

actions and established his rule by clearing opposition to him. He was the last Padishah of the Ottomans who attacked Iran. He regained Baghdad and territories in the Caucasus after two successful campaigns but could not advance more. He made the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639 and established frontiers both in Iraq and in the Caucasus that remain virtually unchanged today, although there has been some exchange of territories.²⁷

In the meantime, the Safavids suffered from similar problems. They had faced two main external threats, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks. After serious defeats against the Ottomans, the Safavids made peace with the Ottomans. This let them confront the Uzbeks with ease.

The Safavids reached their zenith under the leadership of Shah Abbas (1587-1629). Abbas fought successful campaigns against the Uzbeks and the Ottomans. In this period the Ottomans had interior problems and were under the pressure of European powers. Thus, Abbas regained Iranian control over Iraq, and parts of the Caucasus. He established strict control over the tribes and developed all the levels of administration. He put an emphasis on commerce and arts in addition to empowering the Shia institutions. He entered in an alliance with Britain to expel the Portuguese from their bases

in Bahrain and Hormoz. Abbas achieved his goal by capturing Bahrain in 1602 and Hormoz in 1623.

The following Safavids Shahs were not as successful as Abbas, and the dynasty lost power. The decline resulted from weak rulers, interference by women of the harem in politics, a decline in military power, and increasing rivalries among the tribes. At the same time, the Ulema were increasing their power and influence over the society so that they could question the rule of the Safavids.²⁸ However, the Ulema could not manage the intricacies of imperial administration. One of the actions of the Ulema was to force the Shah to convert the strongly Sunni Afghan tribes to Shiism. The Afghan tribes were revolted and captured the Safavid capital.

Finally, following the death of last Safavids Shah, Nadir Quli Bey, a leader of the Afshar tribe; another Turkic tribe, established his rule in 1736. He accepted the name of Nadir Shah, and led his force to successful campaigns against Afghan tribes. After expelling Afghan tribes from Iran, he turned his attention to the Ottomans and to Czarist Russia. He regained territory in Georgia and expelled Russians from the Iranian coast of the Caspian Sea. Later he attacked India, and returned with many treasures including the throne of the Mongols.

His strong rule and success allowed him to regain political unity. He was Sunni and so tried to force the Shia Ulema into a compromise with the Sunnis. Thus the division within Islam would end, by making the Jafari (after Imam Jaffar) one of the regular schools of Sunni Law. However, because of his harsh methods in the administration, he was assassinated in 1747 before completing his project.

Following his death, another period of anarchy and power struggle for supremacy among four major tribes, Afshar, Qajar, Afghan, and Zand, occurred. Despite the temporary rule of the Zands under the leadership of Karim Khan Zand(1750-1779), Qajar, another Turkic tribe was able to gain supremacy and establish a Qajar dynasty that would last until 1925. Their leader Aga Mohammed Qajar became the new Shah of Iran. Aga Mohammed was able to unite the country through the use of force. He established his rule in some parts of the Caucasus including Georgia. As it has become custom in Iranian politics, he was also assassinated after a year of reign.

The Qajar dynasty established unity and order, then tried to implement reforms to improve the situation in the country. However, they could not change the tribal structure of their military forces to create a regular standing and well trained army. They could not change the tribal structure of the

country. Besides, religious institutions of the Shia gradually became most powerful in the society.

The power of religious institutions increased after the dispute among the two main schools of thought, the Akbaris and the Usulis. The Akbaris believed that in the absence of Imam, clergy could not interpret the Book (Quran) and derive a certain judgement on religious and other issues. Contrary to this, the Usulis insisted on the power of clergy to interpret the Book and give a decision on every subject on the basis of *Ijtihat doctrine*.

The triumph of the Usulis rapidly increased the power of clergy. They began to challenge the power of the Qajars and declared their decisions on daily events by issuing the *Fatwas*(orders or declarations of clergy). Their first challenge was issuing a fatwa to force the Shah to declare a war against Russia in 1826. The result of this war was disaster for Iran.²⁹

In the nineteenth century, Iran came under the threat of new external power centers, Czarist Russia and Britain. Russia attacked several times and Iran was forced to sign the Treaty of Gulistan in 1812, and the Treaty of Turkmanchay in 1828. Following the wars with Russia, Iran lost its territory in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Britain, on the other hand landed

troops twice and forced Iran to give up its territories in present-day Afghanistan. Britain also forced Iran to sign the Treaty of Paris and agree to the status quo in 1857.

The influence of two major external powers became so strong that they began to dominate Iran and its administration on every issue such as the economy, trade, internal affairs, and the selection of important officials. They gained special privileges similar to those of the Ottoman Capitulations. The situation became worse due to the corruption and inefficiency of the administration.³⁰

Some members of the Qajar Dynasty and their Grand Vezirs tried to change the situation in the country. Mirza Taqi Khan, who became a Grand Vezir of Naser ad Din in 1848, tried to improve the tax system and central control over the bureaucracy. He also tried to reduce the influence of the clergy and foreign powers. The establishment of the first university which was based on the European school system, Dar ol Fonun, aimed to educate the elite in the fields of science and foreign languages. This was one of the important parts of his modernization program. Mirza Hosain Khan Moshir od Dowleh, another Grand Vezir of Naser ad Din, convinced him to establish a European-style cabinet with administrative responsibilities.³¹

The influence of Russia and Britain increased rapidly in the nineteenth century. In 1872, Baron Reuter, a British financier acquired a broad range of rights including building railway and streetcar lines, mining, and even managing Iranian customs.³² Later he was granted a right to open the first bank of Iran, the Imperial Bank, in 1889. He was not alone in economic privileges, a British company acquired the right to erect telegraph lines in Iran. Another British company was granted a tobacco monopoly by the Shah in return for a fat payment of bribes to the Shah and his officials.

Britain was not alone in these capitulations, the Russians also gained some control over Iran. The Russians established and trained the Persian Cossacks which dominated Tehran and many of the northern population centers. Also the Russians gained economic privileges similar to the British, such as a grant to open the second bank of Iran, and fishing rights in the Caspian Sea.

Naser ad Din Shah preferred Britain dominance to Russian dominance, thus he tried to protect the territorial unity of Iran. His acceptance of British dominance was based on the simple idea of choosing the threat furthest rather than facing the closer threat and being absorbed by the closer enemy.

He was challenged by the Ulema and merchants. As mentioned above, the tobacco monopoly that was granted to Britain jeopardized the interests of the merchants. They created an alliance with the religious leaders, and the Ulema declared fatwa, forbidding Iranians to use and sell tobacco in 1891. The effect of this fatwa was so strong that it was accepted nationwide, including the harem of the Shah. The Shah tried to force religious leaders to change this decision, but he was threaten by the call of a Jihad, an Islamic struggle against him. Finally the Shah gave up, and had to rescind the tobacco concessions.

This event became a test of the political power of the Ulema, and they began to use their power more frequently in the following years. Another point was the alliance of merchants and the middle class with religious leadership that shaped future politics of Iran.³³

The Qajar dynasty enjoyed a relatively good relationship with the Ottomans. Mahmud, the Second sent an ambassador to Iran to establish better relations. The ambassador, Necip Efendi, was able to sign a treaty of friendship and understanding between the two countries in 1824. The Erzurum Treaty declared the boundaries as they were determined in the Qasr-i Shirin, improved the trade terms, and rules for

pilgrimage of Iranians to the holy places. Under the terms of this treaty, both countries established permanent embassies.³⁴

However, despite the relatively good relations of the two countries, which was basically a product of Ottoman will, the Shia caused many problems by continuing their efforts to influence Iraq and Anatolia, especially the Turkoman tribes. Sometimes their efforts caused revolts of those tribes. The provocations of the Shia became a continuous problem between the two countries.

At that time, the decline of the Ottomans became evident and they were forced to retreat in Europe and other areas of the Empire. The vulnerability and attractiveness of its vast holdings, the emergence of nationalism among the Empire's subject peoples, the ambitions of the great powers, the collapse of the Ottoman economy and the periodic crises resulting from these and other factors collectively resulted in raising the "Eastern question". The Ottomans were called the sick man of Europe in this period.³⁵

The great powers of Europe- France, Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, tried to get whatever they could from the Ottoman territories. They created fluid alliances with others to solve the Eastern question for their interests. The political balance of the European powers dictated these

alliances but they were so fluid that any advantage of one of the European Powers against the political balance resulted in another alliance of the disturbed powers.

Austria and Russia tried to control the Balkans. Russia's main goal was to enter the warm waters of the Mediterranean and the Persian gulf. France tried to consolidate its position in Europe and control the Mediterranean. Another important goal of France was to gain Egypt and the Middle East. Britain, on the other hand, tried to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean and stop any other power from threatening its connections with India³⁶.

The Ottomans found themselves consistently at war with one or more of the European powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Empire lost vast lands as a result of these wars. Besides these losses, the economy collapsed and the Ottomans had to borrow money to finance the economic burden of wars. After the nineteenth century, the Ottomans tried to halt the advance of the European powers by using the rivalries between them to gain advantage from the political balance in Europe. However, the European powers acted quickly to create and demolish alliances amongst themselves, keeping the Ottomans from following what was going on.

Although the first reform actions took place as early as the late 1790s, the Ottomans could not manage to stop the collapse of the Empire. The first important reform trial was done by Selim the Third (1789-1807), by westernizing some of the Ottoman institutions. He was influenced by the French Revolution and called his reform program a New Order, similar to the French after the revolution.

As a first step, he tried to establish a new army with western weaponry and tactics and to discipline Janissaries. He brought several Western military personnel to train his new experimental troops.

He was the first Padishah to establish permanent embassies in Europe and send students to study at Western institutions. He also tried to establish a national economy. He recognized the main problems of the Empire but could not change the root causes the problem. The Ulema and Janissaries revolted against him. He was forced to abdicate and later was killed.³⁷

Mahmud the Second (1808-1839), continued the reform program his uncle, Selim, tried to implement. He put emphasis on westernization of the country. He created another professional army and was able to abolish the Janissaries. He tried to reorganize the administration system of the Empire

and established ministries instead of the traditional Divan. Mahmud tried to empower central administration. Mahmud also continued reforms in the education system. He aimed to establish a better code system that would allow people to trust the administration.³⁸

Because of the continuous involvement of European powers in the internal problems of the Empire, Abdülmecit (1839-1861) inaugurated the Gulhane Hattı Humayunu or Tanzimat Fermanı (law of reorganization) in 1839 which was prepared by Mahmud the Second. Under the terms of this law, the Padishah granted some of his rights to the people, declared the equal treatment of all the population, and accepted the superiority of laws. It was declared that, the basic rights of each citizen were under the protection of law which the Padishah took an oath to obey. It was the first time in the Ottoman history that the unquestionable power of Padishah was limited by law. However, the Tanzimat reforms were not implemented fully because of the resistance of the Ulema.

Continuous contacts with Europeans and the French Revolution influenced some Turkish intellectuals to think about the future of the Empire differently than others. They criticized the administration on every issue, but the basic problem was how to gather public support to protect the

sovereignty of the Empire. They assumed that if the people had an opportunity to participate in the administration of the Empire, they would feel the responsibility for protecting it as well. Another assumption was that to be an equal with European powers, the Ottomans had to adopt Western political institutions; including strong central government, efficient administration, and definite superiority of laws. They began to express their ideas, and created a movement, known as Young Turks.

The immediate danger of the collapse of the Empire forced them to move quickly. The Ottomans borrowed huge loans from the Europeans to finance their ongoing reform programs and to repay the interest payments from old loans. The economy of Empire was also under the stress of new capitulations granted to the Europeans due to political pressure and which increasing their role in the economy each day.³⁹ As a result of these factors, the Ottomans declared their inability to pay these debts letting the Europeans control the economy. The mixed commission collected public revenues of the Empire and transferred these receipts directly to the creditors.⁴⁰

The economic burden and the huge losses from the wars with European powers sped-up the Young Turks movement. They deposed Abdulaziz, and finally Abdulhamit became the new

Padishah in 1876. He promulgated a constitution and called for the first parliament of the Empire in 1876.⁴¹

However, Abdulhamit was not in favor of the constitution and parliament. Abdulhamit was also against the idea of a parliamentary system, believing that as a Caliph of the Islamic world, he could recover the situation of the Empire by using the power of Caliphate. He noticed the success of the Slav nations under the banner of Pan-Slavism. He believed that if he promoted the idea of Pan-Islamism, all of the Moslem population of the Empire would gather around the green flag of the Ottomans. Then, under his leadership, the Islamic armies would defeat the West and reconquer all the lost territories.

He used the Turco-Russian war of 1877 as an excuse to dissolve Parliament. The decisive defeat of the Ottoman armies in this war against Russia was very important. Russia achieved all of its goals to enter Mediterranean via Bulgaria, and conquered most of the Balkans except for a few enclaves. On the other hand, they entered Anatolia from east, capturing eastern Anatolia up to Erzurum.

This defeat caused disasters for the Empire from both the West and the East. The pan-Ottomanism, or the idea of gathering all nations under the Ottoman flag by granting a constitution and establishing a parliamentary system,

suffered seriously from the revolts of the Balkan nations against the Empire.

The Empire now began to be dominated by European powers. The European powers start forcing the Ottomans to accept whatever demands were on the table even if they were irrelevant to the agenda of the meeting. For example, Britain and Russia forced the Ottomans to give Katur and its provinces to Iran although Iran was not a party at the Berlin Conference which was held to stop Russia from gaining absolute supremacy in the Balkans after the Turco-Russian war.⁴²

Besides problems abroad, the Ottoman Empire also had internal problems. Although Abdulhamit put an emphasis on the Pan-Islamism, none of the Moslem nations living inside of the Empire considered it seriously and the Islamic armies were not gathered from the Islamic World. The Empire was losing huge territories instead of recapturing them.

In addition to this, the oppressive regime of Abdulhamit the Second, increased internal tension that already was high because of the overall situation of the Empire. The Young Turks movement became even more popular among the intellectuals and young officers. One of the officers who was involved in this movement was Mustafa Kemal. He established his organization in Damascus and Salonika. Later nationalist

Young Turks created the Committee of Union of Progress to struggle against Abdulhamit's regime.

The Movement organized a revolt in Macedonia and forced Abdulhamit to call for a second Parliament and implement the Constitution in 1908. Following the power struggle between constitutionalists and Abdulhamit, the Young Turks movement seized power and declared Mehmed the Fourth as the new Padishah of the Empire. The leadership of the movement became dominant in the politics of the Empire.

The Ottoman Empire could not escape the threat from external powers although she accepted the parliamentary system. Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared its complete independence, and Italy attacked Libya. The alliance of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro declared war and occupied Macedonia, and eastern Thrace, the last Ottoman territories in Europe. This was a total disaster for the Ottomans and came as a great shock. The nations that were under the Ottoman control for a centuries became its enemies once again.

As mentioned before, the idea of the movement to gather all nations under the flag of the Ottomans, emphasize the notion of Millet, and open channels to them to participate in its administration. Unfortunately, as were evident by the

events in this era, the Christian members of Parliament began to seek a way to declare the independence of their nations instead of working for the improvement of the Empire. The independence of Bulgaria and the following Balkan wars became proof of it.

This event empowered the idea of Pan-Turkism, a nationalistic movement. The Young Turks divided into two camps, liberals who believed in Pan-Ottomanism, and authoritarians who believed in Pan-Turkism. The internal dispute among the liberalist and authoritarian groups of the movement was solved by the coming of Enver Pasha (an army officer), an authoritarian, as the new leader of the movement. However, this dispute would determine party politics in the future.

The Ottomans were not alone in their efforts to reform the administration and halt the collapse of the Empire. Iran had the same problems and the same struggle of reform groups with different backgrounds. There were many similarities between the evolution of the Ottoman Empire and Iran.

Meanwhile, there were new winds of change in Iran. Especially after the nineteenth century, people who were trained in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire returned to the country with new ideas. They established newspapers and

explained their ideas to the public. That meant the emergence of a new center, secular intellectuals, in the domestic political scene. They saw westernization of the country as a solution to the problem. They began to demand a Majlis(parliament) and a constitution.

Notorious for his weakness in the administration and his royal extravaganza, Muzaffar ad Din (1896-1907) caused severe problems in the economy and politics of Iran. He borrowed huge loans and granted new capitulations to the Europeans, especially Russia to finance his extravaganza.

This let the Ulema and the merchants rally public support for their demands for the rule of law. They created an alliance with the secular intellectuals because they assumed that the constitution would be a safeguard for the Shia and they would gain more political power if there were a Majlis.

Under public pressure, the Shah drafted the parliament and promulgated a new constitution in 1906. After the struggle between reform groups, the Ulema gained power. The Ulema positioned itself over the parliament by establishing an advisory counsel of five mujtahids(religious leader)¹ to

¹However, the Ulema did not establish this counsel because of the ideologic discreapancy on the subject. Some of the Ulema were against any compromise with the Constitution or Parliamentary system because they believed that it was against the religion. So, this counsel was never activated.

examine the laws proposed by the parliament for consistency with Islamic values.

The new Shah, Mohammad Ali, was determined to overthrow the constitutionalists and establish his rule without any interference. He demolished the parliament and ignored the Constitution with the help of Russian troops in 1908. Despite the Russian troops, resistance grew and constitutional forces reestablished the Constitution in 1909.

The Shah went into exile in Russia but did not give up. He tried to regain his throne with Russian support in 1910. At the same time, the constitutionalists declared Ahmad, the son of Mohammad Ali Shah, as the new Shah of the country. However, this was not the end of chaos in the country. Iran was ruled by several powerful notables, Baktiari chiefs and by the parliament and their Shah until 1921.

Iran was also under the pressure of foreign powers in this period. In 1907, Britain attempted to gain an advantage in Iran by forcing Russia to divide the country into influence areas. Russia, who was trying to control Iran completely, accepted this offer in view of their involvement in the Russian-Japan war. Another factor for compromise was the emerge of Germany as a power center in Europe. The two powers divided Iran into three parts; the Russians took the northern

part, the British controlled the southeastern part, and the central part was declared a neutral zone by both powers.

Their control over these areas was so complete that even the Iranian government in her attempt to collect taxes was unsuccessful. Besides, Russia gave an ultimatum to the Iranian Parliament to dismiss their American Treasurer, Shuster when he tried to establish Iranian control or face the threat of war. Despite the efforts of Shuster to improve the economy, the Iranian parliament dismissed him because of the Russian threat of war.

Relations with the Ottoman Empire were relatively normal except for minor boundary disputes. There were no wars between the two countries. The main problem was the propaganda of the Shia in the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottomans granted some religious rights to the Shia, such as smooth conditions and increased quottas for pilgrimage, they understood the danger of Shiism. As they figured out, the increasing power of Shiism caused a danger for Islam and the unity of believers. When Abdulhamit called all Muslims to fight against the Western World, and gather under the banner of Pan-Islamism and under the flag of the Caliph, the Shia refused to participate.

The Shia refusal of Pan-Islamism was basically due to religious and political discrepancies between Shiism and Sunni Islam. Later, despite these discrepancies, some of the Ulema asked the administration and their believers to support the Ottomans in their struggle against colonialism when they were threatened by the invasion of colonial powers in 1911.⁴³

The Shia were not satisfied by refusing the Caliphs call, and increased their propaganda of Shiism in Iraq and eastern Anatolia after 1880. The Shia sent religious agents, known as Ahonds, to continue this religious war with the Sunni Ottoman Empire and cause revolts among the people.⁴⁴

Because the Ottomans were so concentrated on the Western front, they tried to minimize disputes with Iran. So, instead of declaring war against Iran, they decided to respond to this challenge by the same methods. Under the leadership of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, the Ottomans implemented a social and religious reform program in these areas. They concentrated on the education program for the people and opened schools everywhere, empowered the position of religious and tribal leaders who were loyal to the Empire, improved the infrastructure in the holy areas, and strictly controlled the Ahonds. By the help of religious leaders and nomads they were able to stop the Ahonds and reduce the Shia propaganda.⁴⁵

The efforts to stop the Shia propaganda lost its acceleration due to a change in the Ottoman throne. The new Padishah, Mehmed the Fourth, was under the influence of the Young Turks movement. The triumvirate consisting of Mehmet Talat Pasha, Ahmet Celal Pasha, and Enver Pasha was in fact controlling the Empire. They had other areas of concern rather than the Shia propaganda in eastern Anatolia and Iraq. So, the Shia found an opportunity to regain power in these areas.

The Ottoman Empire, after the disasters of the Balkan wars, tried to reorganize its military and administration under the influence of Germany. Germans were pro-Ottoman during the Balkan wars and offered support for them. With relations extending beyond this period, Germany became the dominant actor in this era. The Germans were granted the right to open a railroad from Berlin to Baghdad in 1902. When the Ottomans could not find any support from their traditional allies in the 1900s, Germany was quick to fill this vacuum. Continued German investment, introduction of German officers to train the army, and exchange of students increased German influence in Istanbul.

The leader of the Young Turk movement, Enver Pasha, was also sympatic to the Germans. He found the opportunity to practice his dream of uniting all of the Turkish peoples of

Central Asia and the Caucasus under his leadership. He made secret contacts with nationalist leaders of Caucasus, and also a secret alliance with Germany.⁴⁶ All of his efforts were concentrated on his dream of establishing Turan^m.

When the World War One began, all the leaders of the Empire were in favor of being neutral except Enver. As a Minister of War (and son-in-law of the Padishah), he had used his position and the fear of the traditional enemy of Russia, an ally of Britain and France, to force the government to enter the war. He made a secret treaty with Germany to enter the war as an ally of the Central powers. He began to wait for the provocation of Germany for the *casus belli*. In a short period of time, the events provided him a good excuse.⁴⁷

Many people believed that this would cause the total collapse of the Empire. One of them was Mustafa Kemal, who was a rival of Enver. Mustafa Kemal declared long before that the Empire should be neutral and if there was a side to choose this should not be Germany who would lose eventually. He was also against the idea of the involvement of military personnel in politics. Because of these discrepancies, he separated

^m As mentioned before, the word Turan first used in Persian accounts as a name for Turkish tribes. Here, it became a country that includes all of the Turkish speaking and ethnically Turkish people from China to the Balkans, from Iraq to Caucasus. It was frequently used by the supporters of Pan-Turkism to define the boundaries of the new Turkish Empire.

himself from the Young Turks movement and devoted his efforts to the military field.

Two German warships-the battle-crusier Goeben and the crusier Breslau- which were running away from British warships entered the Turkish Straits. Meantime, Britain refused the delivery of two newly-build warships she had sold to the Ottomans before the war. This caused great public anger, because the money that had been paid for those ships was collected by the people voluntarily. The Germans gave the Goeben and Breslau to the Ottomans along with their personnel. They raised the Ottoman flag, and took the name of Yavuz and Midilli. Without any orders from the Ottoman government, these ships sailed into the Black Sea, hunted Russian ships and attacked Russian ports without. As a result, the Ottomans found themselves in a war that they were not preapared for. The results of this war became total disaster, and the Empire finally collapsed.

The Ottomans were forced to fight everywhere, from Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, to Egypt and the Middle East, even in Gallipoli to defend the Empire. They were also asked to participate in operations in Romania after the defeat of Austria on this front.

The Ottomans could not advance and capture the territories lost before. On the contrary, revolts of other nations within its boundaries forced them to be defensive in the war. Arab revolts, sponsored by Britain, halted the advance of the Ottoman army to Egypt although there were successful campaigns. Later they were forced to retreat slowly to Iraq. It was noteworthy that, as a Caliph of the Islamic world, the Ottoman call for Jihad could not stop Arabs from fighting against the Empire. British gold was more important than the holy war against the traditional enemies of religion for Arabs.

As soon as the Ottomans became involved in the war, Enver sent an army of 150,000 troops under the command of his uncle, Halil Bey, whose goal was to reach the Caspian Sea by sweeping through northern Iran. Enver believed that the immediate operation would bring victory, and by isolating Russian troops, he would be able to combine Central Asian Turks with the Ottoman army.

The operation began in December, 1914. Following the initial success of the Ottoman army, the army faced the danger of winter. The army was not ready for winter and logistic supplies were not prepared before the operation. The limited supply channels were under continuous attack of

Armenian irregulars. These irregulars also attacked Turkish villages and massacred Turkish people.⁴⁸ As a result of winter conditions, the army lost over 90,000 men during its campaign in the mountains.⁴⁹ Thus, the Russians were able to defeat the Ottoman army at Sarikamish.

The Russian advance forced the Ottomans to retreat. They lost Van, Mus, and Bitlis. The Ottomans took, then lost Tabriz in January 1915. Later, the Ottomans attempted to take Tabriz again, but were stopped in Nahjivan. The Ottomans lost Erzurum and Trabzon in 1916. This war was also costly for the Russians; their toll reached 146,998 dead and wounded.⁵⁰

Britain attempted to capture Iraq for several reasons. First, Iraq was strategically located between India and Egypt. They also wanted to divide Ottoman power in this area to keep the Ottomans from recapturing Egypt. Second, they wanted to secure their holdings in Iran, especially in Abadan. The oil refineries in Abadan was providing necessary oil for British warships in this region. Third, they wanted to advance north and establish a link between the Russians in the Caucasus and British forces. This would give them another channel to provide logistic supplies to Russia.

British troops landed at Basra in November 1914. However, the Ottomans first stopped the advance of British army in

1915, and later captured all of the British army including their commander, General Townshend in 1916. Despite the success of the Ottomans, Britain landed an even more powerful army at Basra. This time, the Ottomans, who were dealing with the Arab revolts in the Middle East, and fighting on the Egyptian front, could not stop the British advance. Thus, British troops captured Baghdad in 1917 but could not advance north via Iraq. Another British army advanced north via Iran and formed a link with the Russians in the Caucasus.

Another important event was the attempt by the Allied powers to capture the Turkish Straits. The main idea was to neutralize the Ottoman Empire by invading its capital, Istanbul. Another major goal was to create a vital link with Russia. By opening a new front, the Allied powers forced the Central powers to relieve their pressure on the Western front.

The operation began in February 1915 with the bombardment of Turkish defense points at Kumkale and Sedddulbahir at Canakkale. After heavy bombardment of the Turkish batteries for more than a month, they gathered a huge naval power to open the Strait. The attack of the impressive fleet on March 18, 1915 became a major naval defeat in history.

The Allied powers realized that they could not pass the Strait using naval power, so they landed ground troops in

August 1915. Although Turkish plans recommended against allowing the landing of enemy troops, the German commander, Liman Von Sanders, let the enemy land its troops in Geliboluⁿ to relieve the pressure on the German armies on the Western front.

Realizing the immediate danger of these landings, Mustafa Kemal attacked the British and Anzac troops without waiting the order of high command. His victories in Anafartalar and Conkbayiri stopped the advance of the enemy. Later, he became commander of Turkish troops in Gelibolu, and forced the enemy to withdraw. The withdrawal of the Allied powers concluded in 1916. The Turkish army lost over 230,000 and the Allied powers lost 210,000^o in the tiny area of Gelibolu. Despite the heavy losses on the Turkish side, this victory reconciled the nationalistic feelings in the country. This war also introduced another hero, Mustafa Kemal to the nation.⁵¹

Mustafa Kemal later was appointed to the Russian front. He organized the Ottoman army, and began a successful

ⁿThe Turkish troops were deployed behind Gelibolu, not on the coastal defense line. The troops that showed resistance to the landing troops of the enemy were the *mufrezes*(platoon) on patrol. In one event, only one mufreze(40 men) were fought against the landing of the Anzacs (2000 men). They resisted untill all of them became martyrs, however they managed the delay the landing for a full day.

^o These figures consist of dead, wounded, missing, and other war-related losses.

counteroffensive against the Russians. He recaptured much of the territory in eastern Anatolia. Following his success on this front, he was appointed commander of Ottoman troops in Mesopotamia.

It was noticeable that whenever Mustafa Kemal succeeded on the battlefield, he was moved to another front with ever greater risk to his reputation and without advancing much on the fronts where he succeeded. This was a result of his rivalry with Enver, who was the Minister of War in the Empire. Despite this, Mustafa Kemal continuously proved his leadership and extraordinary capabilities as a military commander.

Before the arrival of Mustafa Kemal to Mesopotamia, the Ottomans lost Hicaz, and Necef in 1916 following the revolt of the Arabs. With the help of Arabs, British troops were able to advance to Syria and Palestine. In 1918, France and Italy landed troops in Syria. The British troops in Iraq also advanced more.

Mustafa Kemal gathered all of the Ottoman troops under his command. By a successful retreat to Syria and Iraq, he preserved the army and created a defensive line in Iraq. Before he could be challenged on this front, the war was over. He never lost a battle, all of his campaigns were full of victories, and he became a national hero.

On the eastern front, after the departure of Mustafa Kemal, the Ottomans advanced slowly. The collapse of the regime in Russia, and emergence of a communist regime let the two countries sign a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. Meanwhile, a communist diet was established in the Caucasus which then contacted the Ottomans. The Ottomans insisted that before negotiations could begin, first the diet must represent an independent state. Thus the Transcaucasian Federation was born in April 1918.⁵²

The Ottomans captured the rail line from Aleksandropol through the Julfa on the Iranian-Russian border in order to pursue the war against British forces in Iran. The advance of the Ottoman army was welcomed in Azerbaijan. Georgia, under the influence of the Germans declared its independence in May 1918. This led the Azeris and Armenians to declare their independence.

The Azerbaijani government signed a treaty with the Ottomans which promised Ottoman armed assistance to defend the newly born state. The Ottomans and Azerbaijanis created a new army, called the Islamic army, and forced Armenian troops to retreat. The advance of this army to Baku caused fear among the British and Russians of losing control of Baku oil. The

Islamic army also defeated Soviet forces and advanced to Baku.⁵³

The control of Baku oil by the Turkish also caused fear in Germany. They made a deal with the Soviets, that in return for a share of the oil, the Germans would force the Ottomans to backdown. Meanwhile, a British army advanced north with the aim of either controlling or destroying the Baku oil field. Its commander was General Dustrerville. The British advanced quickly and captured Baku before the Islamic army could reach it. However, they had to evacuate, and the Islamic army conquered Baku.⁵⁴

The Empire could not stand against the Allied powers alone after the defeat of Germany and Austria. It was forced to sign the Mondros Armistice on October 9, 1918. As a result of the treaty, the Ottomans were forced to leave Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. However, some troops of the Ottoman army remained as a part of the Islamic Army.

The Ottoman advance to the Caucasus increased the power of the nationalistic movement among Azeri Turks. The teachers that had been sent to Azerbaijan aimed to Turkicize the education system. Turkish military personnel trained Azeri Turks in military art and led them to create a national army. Since the Azeri Turks were excluded from military service in

the Russian army, they had no weaponry and equipment to combat despite the well trained and equipped Armenians and Georgians who were constantly massacring the Turkish population in the Caucasus. After the evacuation of the Ottoman army, the British gained control of Baku and Azerbaijan.

As can be seen from the flow of events, despite declaring her neutrality in the World War One, Iran could not escape involvement in the war. Iran became a theater of competing armies of the Ottomans, British and Russians during the war. In addition to this, a group of notables led by Nezam os Saltaneh Mafi, with the help of German agents, revolted and created a provisional government in Kermanshah. They hoped to liberate Iran from Russian and British dominance. Although they were able to stand against British and Russian forces during the war, they could not gain much support.

After the end of war, the British gained total control of Iran. While Russia was dealing with its internal struggles, Britain offered a loan and advisers in every field to Iran in return for an agreement that would led the British protectorate of Iran. The agreement was signed in 1919 but rejected by the Majlis. However, the control of foreigners over Iran continued.

D. IN THE MODERN HISTORY: FROM ATATURK TO KHOMEINI

The Ottoman Empire collapsed after the World War One. It lost hundreds of thousands of people among its four million army. The territory of the Empire was divided among the Allied Powers and their puppets. They landed British, French, Italian, and Greek troops in Istanbul to force the implementation of the armistice. By interpreting the terms of armistice according to their will, they occupied the Empire and Anatolia.

The new Padishah, Mehmed VI, could not resist the Allied Powers. He became a prisoner in the hands of the occupation army. The guns of the allied fleet were pointed at his palace. The Allied Powers dismembered the Parliament and imprisoned its nationalist leaders. The triumvirate that led the Empire into the war fled the country, and two of its members, Talat and Cemal Pashas were assassinated by Armenian terrorists. Enver continued his struggle to create Turan with the minor support of Turkish tribes and died in battle against Russian troops in Central Asia in 1922.

Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun on May 19, 1919 as a military inspector with the duty of disarming the Turkish irregulars who were supposedly attacking Greek people in that area. However, his goal was completely different than what

was ordered. He organized the irregulars and created a national army. Mustafa Kemal was called back to Istanbul but he refused and resigned from the Ottoman army. He became an outlaw. Following two conferences, first at Erzurum and later at Sivas, he was able to gather the nation for the independence struggle. Only the regulars of the Third army, under the command of General Karabekir, accepted his leadership. The Third army attacked the Georgian and Armenian forces and forced them to make a peace treaty.

The Allied Powers finally solved their disputes on the question of how to divide the Ottoman Empire amongst themselves and forced the Padishah to sign the Treaty of Sevres. The Sevres treaty distributed all of the Empire's territories among the Allied Powers except for a tiny area in Central Anatolia. In addition, they created an Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia, and a Kurdish state in southeastern Anatolia. Thus the Sevres treaty became a declaration of the collapse of the Empire, and Mustafa Kemal became a symbol of the independence struggle.

Mustafa Kemal accelerated the nationalist movement and established his capital in Ankara. He assembled a Turkish Grand National Assembly with representatives from the provinces. A Turkish national army was also established and

it successfully resisted Greek and French advances. The first victories of the Turkish troops in the Inonu battles and strong resistance against allied forces made the French recognize Mustafa Kemal and sign the Treaty of Ankara. The Italians evacuated Anatolia without significant fighting.

Mustafa Kemal established his authority and heavily defeated Greek troops in the Battle of Dumlupinar in 1922. Few survivors from the defeated Greek army were able to reach Izmir. The Greeks put the city to torch before the arrival of the Turkish army. When the Turkish army turned to Istanbul and Thrace, British troops were in front of it. Under these circumstances, the British were saved from defeat only by signing of an armistice on October, 1922.

Mustafa Kemal created a new state according to the national boundaries. He negotiated heavily with the allied powers and forced them to sign the Treaty of Lausanne which nullified the Sevres treaty. He also removed the capitulations which were a big threat to economy of the country for centuries.

He abolished the Sultanate, and established a new Turkish republic in October 1923. He became its first president, and Ankara became the new capital of the state. Later he abolished the Caliphate and declared a secular structure for the

republic in 1924. To empower the secular structure, he demolished religious schools, sects, dervishhood, and abolished "Sheriat"^p. He abolished all of the titles of honor from the Ottomans and introduced surnames. He was granted the surname of "Ataturk" by the Grand National Assembly. He made several radical reforms to modernize the country, his main goal being to match contemporary civilization (which he defined in Western terms) and change the mentality of the society.

In foreign affairs, he based his strategy on the realities of power. His main aim was full independence and the preservation of the integrity of the republic. He put a great emphasis on creating good relations with neighboring countries, and mutual agreement in the region. His motto was "peace in the country, peace in the world". As an example of his active diplomatic efforts, the new republic negotiated friendship treaties with fifteen states in 1925. The Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship was signed with the Soviet Union, and renewed for ten years in 1935, which lasted until their aggression in 1945. Turkey also joined the Balkan Pact and increased its efforts to create better relations among the Balkan countries. Ataturk also regained Turkish control of the straits by the Montreux Convention in 1936.

^pSheriat means ruling every aspect of state affairs according to the religious laws.

Meanwhile, Iran was under the influence of a modernization movement led by Reza Shah who came to power by a coup d'etat. The Iranian government was overthrown by a Persian Cossack Brigade officer, Reza Khan in February 1921. He was also of Turkic stock. He became Minister of War and Commander-in Chief of his army until 1923. Sayyid Ziauddin Tabatabai was Prime Minister. Reza Khan soon forced Tabatabai to leave the country and established his authority in the country. Following the departure of the last Qajar, he first declared himself Prime Minister, and later became the new Shah of Iran in 1926. Thus the Pahlavi dynasty occupied the throne.

Reza Shah had similar goals to Mustafa Kemal. He tried to gain full independence and preserve the sovereignty of the country. He demolished all the institutions against his reforms except for the Ulema. He tried to westernize the country. He abolished the capitulations except for those of British, and gained limited control of the economy.

Personally, Reza Shah was influenced by the achievements of Mustafa Kemal. As Mustafa Kemal managed to transform the religious structure of the society, Reza Shah also tried to break down religious institutions to transform the society to a secular structure. He also tried to create a powerful central administration by using the army to bring tribes under

control. He contacted Mustafa Kemal and visited Turkey. The relations of Turkey and Iran began with the honeymoon of two countries under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah. Both leaders realized the necessity of mutual understanding and need for a peaceful region.

The close association of the two countries led Iraq and Afghanistan to develop similar relations with neighbouring countries. Turkey acted actively to help these countries solve border disputes amongst themselves. As a result, a Nonaggression Treaty among Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey was signed in 1937. By doing so, these countries established the Sadabat Pact at the same time. Eventually, Turkey secured its position in the region.

Mustafa Kemal died in 1938 without finishing his program. However, the power of change was so irresistible that the nation continued his program after his death. Despite the pressures, Turkey remained neutral during the World War Two. However, the nation felt the economic burden of the war. Turkey joined the Allied powers just before the end of war as a diplomatic maneuver to find a place in the new era.

On the other hand, Iran became a theater for foreign powers in the war. Reza Shah was suspicious about Britain and the Soviet Union. He switched his foreign policy to a more

independent route; he abolished remaining capitulations, offended Britain by cancelling the oil agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and outlawed communism in Iran. Although an oil agreement was signed later, neither Iran nor Britain was happy about it. To create a balance against Britain and the Soviet Union, Reza Shah depended solely on Germany.

Despite the declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the World War Two, the Allied powers attempted to force him to expel all German nationals in Iran. Reza Shah at first refused these demands. Meantime, the attack of Germany on the Soviet Union in June 1941 required the aid of Allied powers to this country. To create a supply channel, British troops attacked Iran from the West and South while the Soviets attacked from the North in August 1941. Reza Shah could not resist the Allied powers and abdicated the throne in favor of his son. He was sent into exile by the British. Later, Iran signed a treaty of alliance with the Allied powers, in turn they accepted Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity in 1942. In 1943, Iran declared war against Germany.

The war and occupation of the country by foreign powers led to changes and disturbances in the society. The communists became active among the industrial workers and intellectuals.

The first active communist party was established under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union. It was named the Tudeh.

In December 1945, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party revolted against the government and created an autonomous Azerbaijan republic. Similarly, the Kurdish elements established another republic, Kurdish Republic in Mahabad in 1946. Both republics were the result of Soviet propaganda, and Soviet troops stopped government troops from intervening in the situation.

The Soviets requested oil privileges in northern Iran and continued their occupation. They evacuated Iran only after being granted oil privileges by the Iranian government. Without Soviet support, both republics could not resist the government's forces and they quickly collapsed.

Later, Iran looked for the support of the United States to balance the Soviet threat. The United States quickly grasped the situation and understood the immediate danger of communism and the degree of Soviet aggression. Under the pressure of the United States, Britain, and partially the United Nations, the Soviets withdrew. The Majlis refused to grant oil privileges to the Soviets and, furthermore, to any other foreigners. Following the signing of a bilateral agreement with the United States in 1949, Iran relied on

United State's aid and power. Iran also became a member of the United Nations.

Iran was not the only country that under the threat of Soviet aggression. Stalin demanded Kars, Ardahan, and their provinces from Turkey in 1945. He also demanded joint control of the Turkish straits. Stalin asked for unspecified revisions of the Turkish-Bulgarian border. Turkey refused these demands and prepared itself for a struggle with the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Turkey looked for allies. The Truman Doctrine gave this opportunity to Turkey in 1947. Subsequently, Turkey participated in the United States sponsored European Recovery Program known as the Marshall Plan. Because of the immediate Soviet threat, Turkey changed its foreign policy from being neutral to becoming a part of the Western alliance system. Turkey also participated in the United Nations.

The postwar domestic situation of Turkey led to changes in the state. The people were demanding economic reforms to relieve the economic burden of war. President Inonu let some former party members form an opposition party under the name of Democratic Party in 1946. Thus, multi party democracy was established in Turkey. The new party based its program on the free enterprise system and used religion as a campaign tool. The competition between the two parties relieved the pressure

from the religious sects and the government reopened religious schools 1947 despite Ataturk's ideology.

Following their success in the elections, the Democratic Party came to power in 1950. They continued to use religion in their propaganda. Meanwhile they encouraged private enterprise and foreign investments. Turkey became a close ally of the United States. Under the leadership of the Democratic Party, Turkey participated in the Korean War, and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. The basic reason was to gain a security umbrella from the West to defend the country against Soviet aggression.

Turkey, in addition to his membership of NATO, undertook development of regional security systems in the Balkans and in Southwest Asia. First, Turkey, contacted Greece and Yugoslavia to establish a new Balkan Pact which would create a defensive link against the communist threat in the Balkans. These countries signed a Treaty of Nonaggression and Friendship, thus they established the Balkan Pact in 1954. At the same time, Turkey tried to secure its southeastern front and increased its diplomatic efforts to create another alliance with its neighbors. The idea was consistent with the Northern Tier Defense doctrine of the United States which was based on the Rimland theory.

Turkey signed a security treaty with Pakistan in 1954. In the same year Turkey increased its diplomatic efforts to create a regional security organization in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia. Turkey and Iraq declared their common will to create a new organization during the visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister in October, 1954.

The new organization was seen as a threat to Egyptian efforts to create an Arab league that would gather all Arabs in the region under their leadership. So Egypt forced other countries not to participate in this organization. The Turkish Prime Minister visited Damascus and Beirut to convince Syria and Lebanon to participate in the new organization. Both countries did not show any intention of participating, and the Baghdad Pact was declared and signed as a Treaty by Iraq and Turkey in 1955. Following the declaration, Britain joined the pact. Although the United States was not a member, it supported the Pact. Pakistan was asked to join and was accepted as a fourth member in 1955. In the same year, Iran also joined to the organization.

Postwar Iran had domestic problems; a nationalist movement gained power. The Majlis assumed many roles of the Shah under the leadership of Prime Minister Mossedeq. The oil resources of the country became a symbol of this movement.

Although the sentiment to nationalize oil had existed before, Mossedeq was able to pass the bill to nationalize the oil resources and implement it. Britain was very upset about this development and tried to stop Iran. The International Court of Justice could not produce what Britain was looking for, and British offers to share revenues were refused by Mossedeq. Mossedeq also increased his authority by limiting the Shah's power and ability to control events. The attempts of the Shah to dismiss the Prime Minister were not successful. Under pressure from Britain, Iran's oil exports were halted and oil production came to virtual standstill. The economic problems and increasing domestic pressures forced Mossedeq to be close to the Tudeh.

At this point, the United States intervened. The CIA and the British MI-6 prepared a plan known as Operation Ajax to overthrow Mossedeq. The operation's first stage was unsuccessful; the Shah left the country. But soon pro-Shah army units defeated Mossedeq's forces in August, 1953. The United States immediately granted economic aid to help Iran overcome its economic difficulties.

This event forced the Shah to become a close ally of the United States and Britain. He established his authority at each level of his administration and other institutions. He

reacted boldly against any activities of the opposition. He diminished the power of the Majlis by all means, even controlling candidates for the legislature as had his father. He banned the Tudeh, the National Front, and other parties. He suppressed religious leaders and censored the press. He increased the role of his secret police, the SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar).

To tie itself closely to the United States and Britain, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Thus, the northern tier countries established a link between NATO and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to halt the advance of communism. Iran had achieved its goal of gaining security agreements for external threats and internal threats to its monarchy.

Iraq withdrew from the Pact after the coup d'etat in 1958. The pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and moved its headquarters to Ankara. In 1959, Iran signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. Later, in order to strengthen the commitments of the United States, Iran approached to the Soviet Union and normalized its relations with that country in the mid-1960s.

Turkey also faced a domestic crisis in this era. The Democratic Party government began to suppress the opposition

which was heavily criticizing the situation of the country. The country was under pressure from inflation and foreign debt. The economy was close to break down. In spite of the oppressive, unconstitutional methods; the corruption and mismanagement of the administration kept increasing the tension in the country. The Democratic Party moved to dictatorship and departed from the basic principles of Kemalist ideology. Under these circumstances, the army carried out a coup d'etat in May, 1960.

The coup was accomplished without violence and was accepted throughout the country. The leadership of the movement established the Committee of National Unity composed of the officers who had organized the coup. The committee acted as an interim government. General Gursel assumed the Presidency. The major issues of the interim government were to transfer the administration to civilian leadership, to create a new constitution, to organize the central administration and bureaucracy, and to manage the economic problems.

The new constitution was declared in July, 1961 and accepted by the public in a referendum. The 1961 constitution was basically similar to the 1924 constitution; the principles of Kemalism being protected in the new constitution as well. The main concerns of the authors of the constitution were the

empowerment of the individual versus the administration, and the protection of multi party system. General Gursel resigned from the military and became President of the country. New elections were held in October, 1961.

The leaders of the former Democratic party and some government officials faced trials known as the Yassiada trials. They were charged for the dictatorship and mismanagement of the country. Although 15 death sentences were given, the interim government pardoned all of them, except for Prime Minister Menderes and two of his ministers. The sentences of former president Bayar and the others were commuted to life imprisonment. Several years later all of them were pardoned, and their rights restored.

Turkey concentrated its efforts on normalizing its economy. Efforts were also made to increase economic ties with the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey signed an agreement of membership with the EEC in 1964 which would allow Turkey to be a full member by 1995.

At the same time, Turkey addressed the need for economic assistance among the members of CENTO in a meeting in 1964. This idea was welcomed by Iran and Pakistan, and the three countries established the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in July, 1964. This organization would lead

to the development of these countries by sharing technical know-how and economic assistance.

Turkey was forced to reevaluate its alliance with the West. This was a result of a series of events from 1962 to 1964. The first question mark occurred when the United States removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962. This event showed Turkey that the United States might risk the security of Turkey at the negotiating table.

Another important event was the 1963-64 Cyprus crises. The United States preferred to intervene in favor of Greece and President Johnson sent a harsh letter requesting Turkey not to be involved in any activity in Cyprus. Johnson's pressure on Turkey to cease the production of opium was also accepted as an intervention in domestic events by the public.

The Turkish approach to the Soviets was also accelerated by the relieve of cold war tension. Additionally, the Soviet Union appeared to be following a policy of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet foreign policy was seen as being in favor of Turkish demands in Cyprus in the 1960s.

In Iran, the Shah was trying to implement economic and social reforms to create a strong and contemporary country with the goal of regional leadership. However, his reforms

were challenged by several opposition groups, including the nationalists, the communists, and the Ulema. The Ulema gradually increased its power in domestic politics and empowered its base in rural society. In 1963, when the Shah granted rights to women, proposed land reform, nationalization of forests and pastureland, and profit-sharing for industrial workers under the program he called "White Revolution", the Ulema challenged him directly.

Many clerical leaders were against the program, especially land reform and woman's rights. They assumed that this program would increase royal authority and government involvement. Ayatollah Khomeini directly attacked the Shah in his speeches and was later arrested. Following his arrest there were very violent demonstrations lasting several days. The Shah controlled the situation by harsh methods and suppressed the clergy for a while.

Although these reforms, backed by the increase in oil revenues, seemed successful, they could not solve the basic problems of the masses. The opposition violently challenged the Shah in 1964 and 1971. When a bill to grant diplomatic immunity to United States personnel and their dependents in Iran was offered in the Majlis, the opposition, remembering the humiliating capitulations of 1900s, revolted. The Ulema,

led by Khomeini, prepared mass demonstrations against the bill. In 1971, when the Shah celebrated the uninterrupted Persian monarchy of 2500 years with lavish celebrations, the Ulema and other opposition groups made mass demonstrations.

In the foreign policy area, the Shah began to shift his pro-Western policy to a more moderate policy. Following the 1965 Kashmir War, the policy shift became more clear. It went from pro-Western to closer to non-aligned. The Shah observed the inadequacy of the Baghdad Pact to protect the throne in Iraq in 1958. This time he understood that even bilateral agreements with the West would not ensure his security if a threat came from another power other than the Soviets. The reluctance of the United States to provide support to Pakistan made it clear that Iran needed to diversify its military supply sources.

Besides the lack of the United States's commitment, the lessening of tensions in the cold war stimulated this shift. A change in Soviet foreign policy assured less threat to Iran. Additionally, Iran saw a chance of acquiring more material and economic aid both from the Soviet Union and the West.

The Shah was determined to be a regional power with a strong military in the 1970s. Iran was enjoying huge increases in oil revenues and the Shah also considered a strong army as

a protector of his throne. He established a powerful army, increased the size, and improved its technology by acquiring a modern arsenal. The Shah wanted the Navy and the Air force to be able to penetrate the Persian Gulf.

He began to intervene in the politics of the Persian Gulf and tried to increase his position in the Middle East. Although in international politics Iran was less important, it emerged as a dominant figure in the Persian Gulf. Iran was equipped with the most advanced and extensive weapon systems of the West. This shifted the power balance in the region against the relatively small Gulf countries.

Iran showed its new intentions by supporting the royalists in the Yemen civil war(1962-1970) and assisting the sultan of Oman in suppressing a rebellion by military force. Although Iran gave up its traditional claims on Bahrain and let Bahrain be an independent state in 1970, it invaded three disputed islands, Great and Lesser Tunbs, and Abu Musa as part of the secret deal with the British to give up its claims on Bahrain. In order to improve its position on the world scene, Iran participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

However, Iran was challenged by Egypt and later by Saudi Arabia in this role. Iraq saw the invasion of the three islands as a threat to its security and broke its diplomatic

relations. Turkey also became uncomfortable because of the Shah's aggressive policies and ambitions.

The Shah's policy was approved by the United States and Britain. The basic motive of this was to create a friendly security environment in the Gulf. Under the leadership of President Nixon, the United States encouraged Iran to increase its military power. Nixon sought to encourage the allies of the United States to shoulder greater responsibility for regional security. In the post-Nixon era, the United States accepted Iran as a force for peace in the region, and increased its military aid and the transfer of modern weapons to Iran.

On the other hand Turkey was under pressure of the West after its intervention in the Cyprus crisis in 1974. The Turkish peace operation in 1974 established peace on the island between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The operation was a response to a Greek attempt to capture the island by a coup d'etat in 1974. The United States put an embargo on its military sales and aid programs to Turkey after the operation. As a response to the embargo, Turkey suspended all of the military operations of the United States on Turkish soil and tried to reduce the effect of the embargo by any means. In this period, Turkish-Soviet relations became very

positive and the Soviet Union offered economic and military aid to Turkey.

The embargo was an effective lesson for Turkey, thus Turkey understood clearly the need to create a national industry for modern weapons and not to depend solely on one power. The Turkish economy was also hit by the embargo, adding to the pressure caused by the oil crisis of 1973. Meanwhile, the country was under the threat of internal disputes and terrorism which gradually increased tension within the society.

Turkey was not alone in its struggle to overcome internal difficulties. The opposition in Iran also established new organizations and began armed resistance to the Shah. The nationalist, communist, and religious groups established their organizations under different names, such as the Fadayan and the Mojahedin. These organizations were inspired by the guerilla movements of Cuba, Vietnam, and others. These organizations opened their guerrilla operations as early as 1971.⁵⁵

The anti-regime movements sped up in 1977 when the economy began to collapse due to mismanagement, corruption, and other reasons. The Ulema increased its propaganda, declared the regime of the Shah abhorrent to Islam, and

advocated it be replaced by Islamic rule. Their propaganda was also based on the threat Westernization posed to the country. The threat to Islamic values and traditions was symbolized by dress, the life style of the upper class, music, films, and television programs. This propaganda also used the extensive foreign presence as evidence of the threat of the West against the identity and culture of the society.

The traditional allies of the Ulema- bazaar people, urban workers, and the lower class masses, were under pressure from the economic burden created by their fixed salaries or low incomes. The Ulema easily increased its base of supporters as a result of political repression by the Shah and his inability to control the situation. When a regime controlled newspaper attacked the personality of Khomeini by declaring him a British agent⁹, the Ulema responded with violent mass demonstrations in Qom and Tabriz in 1978. Deaths occurred, and this added fuel to the fire of anger among the masses.

These demonstrations were a turning point in Iran's history. The opposition always aimed at the restoration of the Constitution and demanded basic rights for the people until

⁹This article was probably delivered by the Ulema itself through their secret ally, General Fardust, the Shah's liason between the Court and SAVAK, with the purpose of provoking popular demonstrations.

1978. The 1978 demonstrations marked a major shift in these goals; this time the Ulema directly demanded a total change in the regime and in society.

This shift is confirmed by the mass strikes of workers in September 1978. Despite the fact that the economic demands of the workers, such as an improvement in salaries and working conditions were met quickly by the administration, the workers also demanded political changes in the country.

The National Front approached the Ulema and they combined their efforts to create a "democratic and Islamic" government in November, 1978. The communist elements also saw an opportunity to establish a Marxist regime. To the communists, the propaganda of the Ulema was based on their arguments. Although, the communist elements did not directly approach the Ulema, they cooperated on many points with the religious groups.

Thus, the same thing occurred in 1979 as it did in 1906 and again in 1953. However, this time the Ulema grasped control of events and increased the tension in the country very quickly.

The Shah tried to meet their demands to find a moderate way to control the situation. He could not resist the change, so negotiated with opposition moderates on a reform program.

An interim government was established by one of the leaders of the National Front, Baktiari, in January, 1979. The Shah left the country in the same month as it was negotiated. Baktiari also declared the withdrawal of Iran from both the CENTO and RCD in 1979. Following Iran, Pakistan also withdrew, and Turkey declared the closure of these organizations.

The departure of the Shah was a turning point. The leader of the Ulema, Khomeini returned from exile and assumed control. Although the Baktiari government tried to implement moderate reforms to protect the monarchy, he was undermined by Khomeini. Khomeini declared his own Prime Minister, Bazargan, and the country moved toward chaos. The confrontation between the people and the security forces became daily events. In many areas authority was grasped by revolutionary committees.

Meanwhile the United States tried to bolster the Iranian military and encouraged a coup d'etat. The special emissary of Carter, General Huyser arrived in Tehran in January, 1979 and established daily contacts with security elements of the government.⁵⁶ However, the armed forces soon tired of clashing with its own people, and some of them joined revolutionary units. General Huyser could not accomplish his mission and returned to the United States. Finally, the leadership of the armed forces declared their neutrality in this struggle in

February 1979. This became the end of Baktiari government and also the end of monarchy in Iran.

E. THE POST-REVOLUTION ERA

The early stage of the revolution was chaos. Various armed factions assumed responsibility in their areas, and began to clash with one another. Murders of ex-regime supporters were common. Revolutionary committees were established everywhere. The situation was completely out of control.

Mehdi Bazargan was declared Prime Minister by Khomeini. Bazargan tried to establish a government structure to control the events in the country. Besides the formal government structure Bazargan was trying to establish, there was a shadow government under the name of the Revolutionary Council which was created by Khomeini. This council acted like the Politburo of the Soviet Union. The council was composed of clerics close to Khomeini and his aides, such as Abolhasan Bani Sadr. It held the supreme decision making authority. Khomeini saw himself above any institution and established his authority in the country.

Khomeini also established an irregular army loyal to him and revolution called the Pasdaran. It was established as a

counter balance to the army and other armed groups such as Marxist guerrillas or ethnic groups.

Some problems occurred between the ethnic groups and the Revolutionary Council. Some of these problems were handled by settlement, such as a dispute by the Turkomans. Others, such as the Kurdish demand for autonomy, Arab demands for autonomy in Khuzestan resulted in armed struggle. The Kurdish uprising proved more deep-rooted, serious, and durable. Khomeini used the army to suppress the revolt for the first time.

Khomeini decided that the new form of the regime would be purely Islamic, so all of the opposition was to be suppressed. Following his decision, opposition newspapers and parties, including the National Front and Marxist elements, were closed and their leaders arrested.

Khomeini ordered the preparation of a new constitution. He held a referendum in which the people would select what kind of regime they desire; but the only choice was an Islamic regime. So, it was no coincidence that the 98 % of Iranian people were in favor of the Islamic Republic when it was declared. Khomeini declared the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran on April 1, 1979. In November a new constitution was finished and approved by the leadership. The Constitution gave all the privileges to Shiism while the Shia

clergy assumed all of the superior powers. All of the minorities were also required to obey the same principles incumbent on the Shia.

Another important incident was the seizure of the American Embassy by the followers of the Imam. Although it seemed an unplanned action of irregulars to humiliate the United States, it soon became a propaganda tool for revolutionary organizations.

As a moderate person, Bazargan tried to put limits on the Revolutionary Courts which were established to implement revolutionary justice. He also tried to increase the power of the cabinet and establish law and order. However he failed and resigned in November 1979. The Revolutionary Council took over the duties of Prime Minister.

Later Bani Sadr was appointed as President and new elections were held to fill the positions in the new Majlis. From the beginning, disputes between Prime Minister Rastai and Bani Sadr occurred. Bani Sadr, with the support of Khomeini, assumed a powerful position. He tried to control the Majlis. But in the following days, he lost the confidence of Khomeini. He could not gain power to control the Ulema and the revolution, and finally resigned in June 1981. He escaped from death by fleeing to exile in France.

Iran was not the only country transforming its leadership in this period. Turkey had another military coup d'etat in September, 1980. The basic reason of the operation was to reestablish law and order in the country which was under the threat of undeclared civil war, among the different terrorist groups and between these groups and the Turkish security forces.

Terrorism was backed by different ideological elements and was leading the country to civil war, especially after 1977. One of the most important incidents was the clash of Sunni and Alevi people caused by the provocation of rightist and Marxist elements in Kahramanmaras. The clash ended with more than 100 dead and several hundred wounded just in two days in 1978.

None of the political institutions could produce solutions to the problem because of the corruption and polarization amongst themselves. The economy collapsed, and the Parliament was unable to select a new President more than six months.

Under these circumstances the military took over the country and quickly reestablished law and order. All former parties were banned and a National Council was appointed to rule the country for an interim period. The operation was

welcomed by a majority of the people and did not meet any resistance. General Kenan Evren, who was then Chief of the General Staff, assumed the leadership.

The new constitution was prepared by the Constituent Assembly and approved by the people in a fair referendum in 1982. Evren became President through the same referendum. Democratic elections were held in 1983. The Motherland Party led by Turgut Ozal won the elections. Ozal became Prime Minister even though he was not preferred candidate of the military.

The situation in Turkey became more important for regional security with the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in September, 1980.

Iraq was very anxious about the intentions of the new Iranian regime because of its immediate efforts to export revolution. Iranian propagandists were spreading the message of the revolution to other places where Shia Muslims were living, especially Iraq and the Gulf countries. They established links with other radical Islamic groups in Egypt and Algeria. With a substantial Shia population, Iraq was directly threaten by the propaganda of the new regime in Iran. Iraq was already facing the opposition of the Shia, so it was important for them to contain the opposition.

Ongoing disputes over the Shatt-ul Arab waterway and Kurdish issues led Iraq to move quickly to solve these problems by means of armed struggle against Iran. Iraq tried to gain advantage from the weak situation in Iran before Revolutionary elements could consolidate their power.

In the beginning phase, Iraq launched attacks along three fronts and made a surprise attack on Iranian air power with limited success. Iraq advanced quickly on the battle field untill Iran fully mobilized its power. In the second phase, Iran stopped the Iraqi advance and put Iraq on the defensive. Meantime, the Revolution consolidated its power in 1984 by eliminating virtually every opposition. In the third phase, Iran successfully pushed back Iraqi forces and gained Iraqi territory. A Syrian-Iran alliance and the occupation of Iraqi land in the Gulf led Iraq to depend on the only major pipeline from Turkey for its oil exports.

From the beginning of the war, each side tried to stop the oil exports of the other by attacking ports, oil facilities, and oil tankers in the Gulf. This movement sped up after the Iraqi acquisition of French Exocet missiles in 1983. Iran began to attack tankers going to Kuwait on the basis that Kuwait was supporting Iraq. This led the United States and

other Western powers to intervene and protect international ship traffic in the Gulf.

In 1987 the balance of the war shifted back to Iraqi side. With Saudi and Kuwaiti financial help, Iraq was able to acquire more advanced weapons from the West and the Soviet Union. Iran, on the other hand, could not mobilize any more resources to the war. As a result, Iraqi forces won a series of battles and pushed Iranian forces back in the Spring of 1988. In the Summer of 1988 the war ended with a ceasefire between the two countries.

During the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey remained neutral and offered its services in finding a peaceful settlement. Turkey became very active in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and also became a member of the Islamic Peace Committee (IPC). The IPC was established to find a peaceful solution to the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey's main concern was preserving the power balance in the region and securing the oil supply lines. Another concern was the Kurdish problem in southeastern Anatolia, which was being affected by the power vacuum in northern Iraq. Relations with Syria were also a source of problems given its traditional territorial claims and support for terrorist groups attacking to Turkey.

Turkey became anxious about the Iranian policy of exporting its revolution. The official news media of Iran launched a campaign targeting extreme religious groups in Turkey. This campaign openly attacked the secular structure of the country and its leader, Ataturk. In 1987, President Evren warned of the immediate danger these extreme religious groups posed against the secular structure of the country. Iran questioned the belief that Iranian opposition groups were using Turkey as a transit route to Europe.

Iran also questioned Turkish operations against Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. Iran insisted that Turkish efforts to suppress the Kurdish rebellion were aiding the Iraqi war efforts by enabling them to post fewer troops in the north. In response to this, Iran offered support to the PKK, and invited another organization, the ASALA, to open an office in Tehran^f. Turkey saw a threat from an Iranian invasion of northern Iraq and its efforts to organize a Kurdish revolt in this area. Turkey also saw a threat to its interests when Iran decided to attack the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline. Turkey warned Iran about the possible consequences of cutting the pipeline.

^fThe PKK is a Marxist-separatist Kurdish terror organization established in the 1970s. The ASALA is another well known Armenian terrorist organization which has attacked to Turkish diplomats and officials in order to create an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia.

Despite the many problems of the ambitious regime in Iran, Turkey wanted to improve relations with this country by ignoring their propaganda campaigns. Turkey assumed these campaigns were the result of Iranian domestic politics an internal problem of Iran. So Turkey preferred to remain neutral without intervening in the situation unless Turkey was directly threatened.

Turkey worked to improve relations with the West which had deteriorated after the military coup d'etat. Bileteral relations with the United States also improved rapidly. The United States expressed an understanding for the reasons of the military operation, but the West was still not cooperative for certain reasons. Turkey, understanding the threat posed by the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 and the documented support to terrorist groups in Turkey before the coup, acted as a close ally of the United States despite certain problems. One of the major problems between the United States and Turkey was the political support of the United States to the claims of Armenian terrorist groups.

In late 1980s, Turkey launched a campaign to enter the European Community which had been previously agreed to by the European Community back in 1963. Without regard to Turkey's ongoing efforts to integrate itself with Europe, the EC

postponed its entry and forced Turkey to implement another integration program.

In contrast to the improvement of relations between Turkey and the West, Iran was left alone by the West. Some factors influencing the West were the export of regime to other countries (especially to the Gulf countries), the presence of Iranian-backed terrorist groups and their activities (especially in Lebanon), the hostage crisis, and the Salman Rushdi crisis.

As a response to its weak position in the international arena, Iran sought the support of the Soviet Union in 1989. Despite the fact that Khomeini declared the United States as a great Satan, and the Soviet Union as a lesser Satan; Iran greatly needed Soviet aid. Khomeini personally concerted these efforts, and the rapprochement was established. Soviet political, economic, and military support were gained. Relations with the Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Eastern Europe countries were also improved in this period.

Iran was shocked by the death of Khomeini in June 1989. Following his death, the more pragmatic Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsancani came to power and created his cabinet with fewer extremists in August 1989. As a spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Hoseni Khameni was selected. However, Khameni was less

powerful than Khomeini, so he preferred not to intervene in Rafsancani's policies. Rafsancani placed more moderate professionals in the senior posts. Khameni became involved in more religious and political duties rather than in the administration. Rafsancani tried to improve the economic condition of the country and implement a privatization program.

The improvement of the economy became important because of the effect of the protracted war with Iraq and diminished oil revenues. The poverty of the people increased the influence of the opposition, causing several riots in 1992. Rafsancani and other moderist politicians tried normalizing Iranian relations with the West, and other international institutions, such as the World Bank, and the IMF. Two major factors forcing the moderates to do so were economic and political. Iran also tried to break down the Arab league, which had exculeded it, by trying to improve its relations with some Gulf countries. This helped Iran undermine the strength of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC has been acting against Iran under the leadership of Saudi Arabia. Iran attacked the organization, and refused to recognize it. Iran preferred to continue its dialogue on an individual

country basis which might further split the cooperation in the GCC.

Turkey also had severe economic problems during this period. The export boom had decreased and inflation had increased. Turgut Ozal became President in 1989 and Suleyman Demirel became Prime Minister. Turkey faced increasing tension in the southeastern region from the Kurdish rebellion following power vacuum in northern Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war.

Following several weeks of tension and military build up, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In an extremely rare instance of immediate international cooperation, the Coalition forces were established and the Desert Storm campaign began on 16 January 1991.

Before this crisis occurred, Iraq approached Iran to create peaceful relations which would relieve Iraqi army concentrations on the Iranian front. Iraq accepted the peace terms of Iran and a peace treaty was signed in August 1990. Normalization of relations were quickly established, Iraqi troops left Iranian territories, war prisoners were exchanged and embassies opened respectively. By doing so, Iran gained the peace treaty on its own terms, but it did not support Iraq in the Gulf crisis. Iran could not let Iraq become powerful in

the region by the acquisition of Kuwait and its huge resources. Iran did not support Iraq, despite domestic pressure to confront the Great Satan (the United States).

President Ozal was anxious about Iraqi movements and so kept Turkey as a close ally of the Coalition in this crisis. Although it was against the philosophy of Kemalist ideology to intervene in crises with neighbors, Ozal was determined to be seated at the table when peace conditions and regional balances in the postwar era would be shaped. So, despite the resistance of certain groups, including high ranking officials and army officers, Turkey supported the operation. The support of Turkey was crucial for the Coalition. Economic sanctions were strictly enforced and a second front threatening Iraq from the north was opened with the help of Turkey. On the down side, this operation and further sanctions against Iraq became a heavy economic and political burden on Turkey.

Syria and Egypt gathered at a meeting of the GCC countries in Damascus in March, 1991 to discuss future security arrangements for the Gulf. This meeting resulted in a new cooperation for peace and stability in the Gulf region, which was later known as "the GCC plus two" formula. In this cooperation, Egypt and Syria would provide manpower, and the GCC would assume the financial support of providing security

in the Gulf Region. With this agreement Egypt completely renewed its image in the Arab world, and increased its influence in the Middle East. However, this cooperation considered neither Iran nor Turkey in the regional security process.

One of the problems that this war caused in the region was the quick collapse of the balance of power in the area. Iraq tried to regain influence over northern Iraq by means of force, causing another crisis situation resulting in Western intervention in the Winter of 1991. When Iraqi forces tried to control the area, their harsh methods caused the Kurdish people to flee the country. Some of them choose Iran, a few of them preferred Syria, but most of the Kurds immigrated to Turkey. Turkey opened its door to these people because of humanitarian reasons, but the burden was so high that it could not bear any more immigration.

In just a few weeks, almost a half million Kurdish people found safety in Turkey. However, these refugees were not only peasants, but also some Pesmerges and PKK members. A further escalation in the crisis was prevented using Western pressure. To provide basic security and humanitarian aid to Kurdish people in this region, Operation Provide Comfort was implemented by some Western countries under the auspices of

the United Nations. Additionally, all Iraqi military activities were restricted and No-flight zones were established in north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel, where the Iraqi army was operating against Shia opposition groups.

However, the most important event of the late 1980s was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of cold war era. The collapse did not happen overnight, dramatic changes occurred in the Soviet Union as early as the late 1980s. The dissolution of the Soviets began in 1990 and was sped up in 1991 following the attempted coup in Moscow. This event changed the international political stage and global power structure that forced every country in Southwest Asia to make major alignments in their foreign policies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union introduced new countries to the region. The new republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasus began to declare their independence from the Soviet Union near the end of 1991. These new states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are ethnically Turkish and religiously either the Shia or Sunni Muslims speaking some form of Turkish (with the exception of Tajikistan which is officially using Persian but Turkish is also spoken).

Besides these countries, Armenia and Georgia were established in the region. The introduction of these states to the political scene also introduced many disputes and problems for the security of the region. Some examples would be: the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh, border and ethnic disputes in the Central Asian republics, and the power struggle of parties for regime in these countries.

Both Turkey and Iran interpreted the situation differently and have tried to create areas of influence in the region by emphasizing cultural, religious, or linguistic and economic ties with these countries. Both countries simultaneously opened embassies in these new countries.

Turkey's initiative was successful in creating another regional organization. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was a result of Turkish efforts which began in 1990. The first meeting was held in Moscow with the Foreign Ministers from Turkey, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania attending. Yugoslavia, Greece, and some republics of the Soviet Union (Moldavia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) participated as observers.

The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a pause, but not an end. The establishment of the organization was signed by the Presidents of Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia,

Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldavia in Istanbul in June, 1992.

In the late 1980s, Turkey also increased its activities in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The ECO was established in 1964 as Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) between Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. However, this organization lost its initiative in the following years. Turkey addressed the need for economic and technological cooperation in the region. The RCD was reactivated by the same founding countries and renamed as the Economic Cooperation Organization in 1985. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also joined the organization during its summit meeting February 1992.

Likewise, Iran tried to increase its influence in the Central Asian republics by creating a similar organization that would increase the cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In this perspective, Iran was able to sign the Caspian Sea Cooperation (CSC) with Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

Turkey and Iran established diplomatic relations with the Central Asian and Caucasus states. Ministrarial visits occurred especially in 1991 and the following years. Turkey hosted Presidents of these states on several occasions, and

Turkish Prime Minister Demirel visited these states in 1992 following the visit of his Foreign Minister. President Ozal visited these states in 1993. At the same time, Iranian officials paid visits to these countries as the representative officials from the Central Asian and Caucasus states were visiting Iran in 1992.

Another development in the region was the ongoing peace arrangements between the Palestinians and Israelis called the Middle East Peace Process, began in Madrid during October, 1991. A peaceful solution to Palestinian problem would bring moderate and more stable relations to the surrounding Middle East countries, especially aiding ongoing Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Iran vehemently opposed the process, and continued to adhere to uncompromising rhetoric on the Arab-Israeli conflict more because of domestic pressure than its policy prerequisites. Turkey, however, welcomed the peace process and supported the normalization of the situation in the Middle East by leading to a fair and acceptable peace solution.

Iran involved itself in another dispute with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) by forcing Arabs to leave Abu Musa-a tiny island in the Gulf. Iran had seized control of Abu Musa and two more islands in the Gulf back in 1971. In the 1971

agreement with the UAE, Iran allowed 700 Arabs to remain on the island and share control with the UAE. Iran claimed the islands were a natural part of Iran, but the UAE did not share this view.

Khameni and Rafsancani worked together to prepare new elections to be held in 1992. These elections forced hard line groups out of administration. Rafsancani was able to create a moderate administration from among his supporters.

In 1993, Rafsancani was elected as President for a second term. In the same year the Turkish President, Turgut Ozal died from a heart attack following his visit to the Central Asian states. Suleyman Demirel was elected as President after Ozal's death. For the first time in Turkish history, a woman, Tansu Ciller was elected as a Prime Minister.

Another change in the presidency occurred in Azerbaijan but this time by a coup d'etat in June, 1993. Elchibey, the former President, was known for his close links with Turkey. Haydar Aliyev who came to power following the coup of armed units, was an ex-communist party leader and politburo member of the Soviets who was closer to Russia than Turkey. Turkey remained neutral during the conflict despite domestic pressure.

In February 1993, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian states agreed to cooperate on steps towards a Southwest Asian common market. In the same month, talks between Turkey, Iran, and Syria were held in Damascus regarding the future situation of Iraq. This meeting was followed by several meetings held to understand each other's viewpoint on the issue.

Relations with Russia were an important factor in Turkish and Iranian foreign policies. For this reason, both countries paid visits to Moscow at different political levels. Russia also signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran on June 1993. Consequently, Russia increased its trade and arm sales volume to Iran in this period. The Turkish Prime Minister Ciller also paid a visit to Moscow in September, 1993.

Turkish relations with the West also increased in 1993 although there were still some problems. Turkey hosted the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher in June, 1993. In September 1993, Ciller visited the United States. In the same month, Ciller visited Germany. Turkey continued its efforts to cooperate with the EC, and hoped to have a full membership status in 1996, although the EC postponed entrance until an undetermined date.

Meantime, the GCC countries held a meeting in Abu Dabi in June 1993. Egypt and Syria also joined the GCC countries. This meeting did provide far from creating a security arrangement in the Gulf, but another arena where the UAE's claim on the three islands was reissued.

Turkey and Iran kept to a minimum confrontation on certain problems. An exchange of visits occurred on several different diplomatic levels. The Vice President of Iran visited Turkey in December, 1993. Several Ministers of Turkey visited Iran. However, keeping relations open became very hard for Turkey following the involvement of Iranian groups in the assassinations of secular and prominent figures of Turkey. Despite these strains, both countries continue their efforts to preserve cordial relations.

III. CURRENT ISSUES

This chapter addresses the major issues between Turkey and Iran that may shape their future relations. It is quite easy to see disputes between sovereign states. However, some of them require special attention because of their impacts on the state's future well-being, and possible side effects of these disputes on regional stability. So, the main areas addresssed in this chapter are:

- a. Kurdish Problem
- b. Status of Northern Iraq
- c. Export of Regime
- d. Rivalry in Central Asia
- e. Azerbaijan Nationalism and Nahcevan
- f. Extensive Military Build-up of Iran

All of the major issues are a result of developments in the region and are, of course, influenced by the global environment. Some of these issues impact countries other than Turkey and Iran. These issues are result of developments over long time period. The historical setting of events proves the necessity of being literate in history as the first prerequisite to understand 'recent' problems. In addition, knowledge of culture and geopgraphy of region we are concern

with are just as important as knowledge of the history. The cultural aspect will reveal the behavior of the people and how they respond to challenge. Geography limits the actions taken and determines what can be done. However, these aspects will only be briefly mentioned in this chapter.

A. KURDISH PROBLEM

1. Historical Setting

One of the most important problems in Southwest Asia is the Kurdish problem. The Kurds basically live in four countries: Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. A few Kurds also live in the Caucasus. The growing ethno-nationalism among the Kurds has become a major source of conflict in this area, threatening the stability and security of the region. This problem has continuously been a tool for external actors to intervene in the politics of the host country or countries. An examination of Kurdish revolts, especially after the 19th century, shows that these uprisings (whether they were in a feudal or ethnonationalist form), occurred in times of greater conflict among the regional actors or other external actors and a weakened status of the host government.

The origin of the Kurds is not clearly defined by scholars, and this issue is a current source of controversy.

Modern-day Kurdish intellectuals trace their origins back to the Medes tribe that ruled what they call Kurdistan from 614 B.C. to 550 B.C.⁵⁷ Other sources claim the Kurds were another Turkic Stock that came to Anatolia in the first wave of emigration of Turks from Central Asia.⁵⁸

So called "Kurdistan" is an area which includes southeastern and parts of eastern Anatolia, northeastern Syria, northern Iraq (from Khaneqin-Kirkuk-Mosul), northwestern Iran (from Kermanshah to Lake Urmia), and south of Armenia (from Yerevan). This area is very mountainous and contains other nationalities besides the Kurds. Certainly, Anatolia as a whole definitely has belonged to the Turks since 1071. Hundreds of thousands Turkomans (who are also Turks) live in Mosul and Kirkuk. In northwestern Iran there are large number of Azeris and in northeastern Syria there are many Arabs.

It is estimated by some sources that there are total of 17,110,000 Kurds of whom 9 million are currently living in Turkey, 4 million in Iran, 3 million in Iraq, 750,000 in Syria, and some 360,000 in the remaining areas.⁵⁹ It is impossible, however, to depend on any source because of conditions of the area, and the policies of the countries involved. It is not possible to have any reliable numbers.

Some Kurdish leaders go well up to 35,000,000 of whom 25 million live in Turkey. From our point of view, this claim can be regarded as being highly exaggerated.

The Kurds themselves have numerous divisions, so to does their language. The Kurdish language also has different forms. The major Kurdish languages are: Kurdi (including the Gurani and Sulaymani dialects), Kurmanji, and Zaza. However, these Kurdish languages are mutually exclusive and in some cases inaccessible to speakers of other dialects. In essence, it is hard to tell the existence of a language linguistically, because these languages consist of early Turkish, Arabic, and Persian words. The Kurds are also divided in religion. With the exception of a few Yazidis-a paganist religion, Kurds are Shia and Sunni Moslems. The religious sects, such as Sufism and Naqshibendi, are established amongst the tribes.

Tribalism and feudalism remain important in Kurdish society. Tribal leaders, "Aghas", are dominant actors on the domestic political stage. Aghas gain their authority from being a leader of the tribe, from their wealth and landholdings. The third leg of authority of the Aghas came from the acceptance of being a religious leader or Sheikh by their followers. Although being a sheihk is not a rule, it is common. For the average Kurd, loyalty to his tribal leader

comes first, then his religion. The ethno-nationalism was a main aspiration for the Kurds during the twentieth century. The tribal factors dominated many revolts between 1919-1975 rather than nationalistic aspirations.

2. Kurdish Movements in Iran

The Kurds in Iran showed political or ethnic activity as early as the late nineteenth century. The very first revolt of Kurds occurred in 1880 under the leadership of Sheikh Obeydollah. He tried to control the area between Lake Urmia and Lake Van. He contacted the Russians and the British, and was supported by the British. The British provided arms and ammunition to him. However his revolt was suppressed by a coordinated effort of the Ottoman and Iranian armies.⁶⁰

The end of World War One created a power vacuum in the region. Following this vacuum, the area became a theater for continuous revolts until 1943. Most of these revolts shared the same tribal and feudal character, including the role of external and regional actors. These revolts were clashes of tribes against each other, with other ethnic groups, and host states.

The first revolt following of this pattern occurred in Iran in 1920 under the leadership of Ismail Aga Simko as

uprising started in an area consisting of Lake Urmia, Salmas, and Khoi. However, Simko was challenged by the Shia Azeris. A series of revolts by Simko finally ended when he died in a battle against Reza Shah's forces. Reza Shah, following the example of Ataturk, refused to recognize any other identity other than Iranian and tried to unify Iran.

One clear example of the role of an external actor is the short lived Kurdish republic of Mahabad. World War Two transformed the politics of Iran and weakened the authority of the central government. Soviet's expansionist policy used the Kurdish problem in its efforts to influence Iran. To do this, the Soviets coopted many of Kurdish tribal chiefs and honored them with the rank of "general".⁶¹ The Kurds established their ideological groups during Iran in this era. The Komala-e Zhian-e Kurdistan(Committee for the Resurrection of Kurdistan) was established in Mahabad, a predominantly Kurdish city.⁶² The Komala, looking for alliances with other tribes, signed a pact entitled "*Peman e Se Senur*" (The pact of three brothers) with representatives from Iraq and Turkey.⁶³ This pact did nothing more than create a map that could later be used as a basis for an artificial Kurdistan.

In an alliance of authoritarian Kurdish figures, who were supported and supervised by the Soviet Union, a new

political party, the Kurdish Democrat Party (KDP), was established under the leadership of Qazi Mohammad in 1945. Following the establishment of the new party, the leaders of the party declared the new Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. At the time, they were wearing in Soviet general uniforms in the presence of the Soviet officers.⁶⁴

The Republic enjoyed neither the support of Shia Kurds nor other ethnic groups in the area. The Soviet-Iranian agreement on economic coordination and extensive oil privileges resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from northern Iran. A few months later, the Iranian army recaptured all the territories of the republic and hung the leaders of revolt. The puppet "Republic" enjoyed less than a year of authority. The Shah then increased the authority of the central government and accelerated the reintegration of non-Persian ethnic groups into a Persian identity.

The Kurdish Democratic Party continued its activities in secret, popping up only in favorable conditions. In 1952-53, and again in 1956 the Kurdish people revolted against the harsh methods of the military or against their feudal landlords. The Shah himself favored some of these tribes as well as some landlords. Certain tribe members came to high positions in all levels of government including the military.

When the Baath Party came to power by coup d'etat in Iraq, the Shah became suspicious of the radical policies of the Baathi regime. So, the Shah used the common wildcard of the region, the Kurds, to hinder the progress of a Baathi Iraq. He supported Mullah Mostafa Barzani for the purpose of "securing some direct influence within the Kurdish national movement. The idea was to make Barzani's movement depend upon the aid and to increase that aid as the movement grew so that eventually the Kurdish movement's very survival would depend upon it."⁶⁵ In addition, by dividing the Kurds, he could then quickly reintegrate them. The Shah was not alone in his support of Barzani; Israel and the United States also rallied to support Barzani in hopes of diminishing the authority and power of the Baathi regime.⁶⁶

Not enjoying the idea of depending on the Shah's decisions, some Kurdish leaders separated from Mullah Mostafa and revolted. Mullah Mostafa believed that with the Shah's aid he could win an immediate victory in Iraq. He blockaded the escape route of the rebels and the rebels who continued to fight in Iran soon found themselves surrounded by the Shah's armies.⁶⁷

When the Islamic revolution began, the Kurdish people again were divided on how to respond. Most of them, peasants,

and urban people were in favor of the revolution from the beginning. However the tribal leaders and landlords preferred a wait and see approach. Only a few, who were favored by the Shah, acted against the revolution.

The revolution and the Islamic regime did not provide them what they were hoping for. In theory in an Islamic government there are no differences or privileges regarding ethnic background. The Islamic state is universal and not just for the Persian, or Arab, or Kurd but for all Moslems. Only other religious groups can be called a minority in the Islamic sense. As Khomeini addressed it:

Sometimes the word minorities is used to refer people such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians, Baluchis, and such. These people should not be called minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference between these brothers.

There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for instance, the Arabs or the Persians. It is very probable that such problems have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be united... they create the issues of nationalism, of pan-Arabism, pan-Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and Islamic philosophy.⁶⁸

The constitution of the Islamic republics also addresses the same issue and in Article fifteen of the Constitution, Persian is recognized as the official language of Iran. However, the use of local vernaculars in the media and

classroom is permitted so long as they are used in conjunction with Persian. The only recognition given to minorities in the constitution is for religious minorities (Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian).⁶⁹ As an Islamic Republic, it refused the notion of nationality among the followers of the Prophet, and classified all its citizens as brothers except followers of other religious groups.

Kurdish groups began a campaign for autonomy in Kurdistan province. They boycotted the constitutional referendum, and joined other opposition groups. They tried to establish a greater support base and strongholds in Kurdish towns. In the military field, they joined other Marxist guerilla groups and began to attack the revolutionary government. Although Prime Minister Bazargan tried to reassure non-Persian ethnic minorities of the government's commitment to create mutual understanding by opening a debate between those groups and government, he failed. His attempt to solve the problem by negotiation was a failure because of his lack of control over the government.

The hard line clergy saw the efforts of the Kurds as a Marxist inspired conspiracy. The Kurdish demands of extending the provincial borders of Kurdistan at the expense of the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Ilam, and Kermanshah were not

acceptable to the residents of these areas. Following the failure of negotiations, fighting intensified between Kurdish groups and the Islamic Pasdarans in March 1979. Fighting also increased between Kurdish groups and the Azeris and Turkomans.

Khomeini used army troops to suppress the revolt for the first time in the revolution. Army units were able to reestablish control over Kurdish areas, forcing the Kurdish Peshmergas to flee into the countryside. After regaining control, the regime sent its harshest judge (Sheikh Sadeq Khalkhali) to Kurdistan. Khalkhali sentenced hundreds of suspected guerrillas to death. Sentences were carried out by the Pasdarans immediately.⁷⁰

In August 1979, another attempt was made to find a solution to the rebellion through negotiations. Although the Bazargan administration was willing to compromise, Khomeini was steadfast against any compromise. Khomeini sent his associate, Hojjatoleslam Hussein Kermansani, to oversee the crushing of the insurgency.

Bazargan continued his efforts to find common ground for agreement, and sent his representative, Minister of Labor, Dariush Foruher, to continue the negotiations. Foruher was presented an eight point plan. The major demands listed in the plan were legal recognition of Kurdish autonomy in the Iranian

Constitution, recognition of Kurdish autonomy over the area including of West Azerbaijan, Ilam, and Kermanshah, establishment of a Kurdish parliament with jurisdiction over all local matters, inclusion of Kurdish officials in all levels of central government, use of Kurdish language in all official communications and in schools, and allocation of a certain amount of the national budget for the Kurdish economy. The administration representative agreed to these demands but Khomeini refused any compromise with the Kurds.⁷¹

A presidential change occurred in the administration, when Bani Sadr was elected as the new President of the Islamic Republic. Bani Sadr made the disarmament of Kurdish groups a first step in the negotiations, but this was rejected by the KDPI leadership. Another wave of rebellion occurred in Kurdistan province in February 1980. A cease-fire was declared by the parties involved on April 29. Another round of negotiations ended in failure and fighting intensified.

In 1980, a major crisis between Iran and Iraq developed and Iraqi armies attacked Iran in September. Saddam Hussein saw the regime of Iran as a threat to Iraq's internal stability. He tried to strike first at a time of great chaos in Iran before the Islamic regime could establish its total

control of the country and empower its military and ideological capabilities.

The Kurdish groups under the leadership of the KDPI accepted military and logistical support from the Iraqi army. Iraq attacked from the north and captured Qasr-e Shirin and Nowdesheh in January 1981. This victory enabled the Baathi regime to create a supply route for the KDPI. With Iraqi weapons and military aid, the KDPI launched a coordinated attack on Pasdaran units and was able to establish a liberated zone in Kurdistan by April 1981. However, the decision of the KDPI to side with Iraq found resistance among its followers and some of them turned away from the party.

The power struggle of Bani Sadr and the Islamic Republican Party resulted in a series of defeats for President. The radical groups first captured seats in the Majlis, and then selected their candidate as Prime Minister. The defeat of Bani Sadr's policies in the Majlis led to his political defeat on the streets. Mass demonstrations occurred and his supporters clashed with Pasdarans. His newspaper and party were banned. Khomeini removed him from his post as a Commander-in-Chief of the military. Bani Sadr went into hiding and fled to France with the head of the Mojaheddin-e-Khalq, Massaud Rajavi, in July, 1981. The two leaders announced the

formation of the National Council of Resistance (NCR) to fight the Islamic government.⁷²

The KDPI joined the NCR and continued its struggle to establish an autonomous Kurdish area in Iran. The Kurdish Pesmerges were able to control some towns in the countryside and infiltrate some major cities at night. The Peshmerges also held control in the country side. Meanwhile other opposition groups, especially the Mojaheddin, were extensively active during this period. After Bani Sadr's impeachment, opposition groups opened an extensive armed struggle against the Islamic government. The political leadership of the Islamic government and the IRP were assassinated. President Rajai, Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar, the chief justice and IRP party secretary general Mohammad Behesti, four cabinet ministers, twenty seven Majlis deputies, many government officials, several religious leaders, judges, and members of revolutionary organizations were all assassinated during 1981. Growing bolder opposition groups tried to control several towns and cities, and attacked the Pasdarans with grenade launchers and machine guns.

The Islamic government responded with harsh methods, increasing the activities of the Pasdarans. There were widespread arrests and immediate executions. As Amnesty

International documented, 2,946 executions occurred during this period.⁷³ Many executions were never reported and sometimes over 100 people were executed in a day. The armed guerrilla activity lost its momentum largely because it could not win the support of the military or the public. The governments' ability to dispose of the guerrilla groups by counter-terrorist methods, plus the regime's ability to fill the vacuum in the leadership also contributed to a decline in activity.

The Kurdish Peshmerges soon lost their control of the towns and fled to the countryside in November, 1981. Iranian forces launched a series of counter-offensives against the Iraqi troops and the KDPI by the end of May, 1982. In 1983, the government units established their control over Kurdistan province. Peshmerge activities decreased, and becoming restricted to tiny regions of the country. The KDPI then became a marginal actor in the Iraq-Iran war.

Iran also used the common wild card-the Kurds- in the war. After Iranian troops put the Kurdish rebellion under control, Iran tried to exploit the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq. Iran's long time ally, the Barzanis were ready to fight against the Baathi regime once again by 1983. Iran concentrated on creating a united Kurdish effort to overthrow

Saddam. The Iranian policies were successful in creating an alliance of Barzani and Talabani in their efforts to destabilize the Baathi regime. When Iran launched another offensive against Iraq in 1983, the Iraqi Kurds were cooperating with the Iranian army. With the help of the Iranian army, the Barzani Peshmerges were able to capture Haj Omran and its environs. This victory had a significant effect on the KDPI's struggle, because its bases and supply routes were located in this area. In 1985, Iran, by using the Kurdish groups, launched another offensive in northern Iraq, and the Iranian-backed Kurdish groups captured new territories.

An internal conflict within the KDPI ended with the separation of some groups from the KDPI. As a result, more radical Marxist groups who were against any negotiations with the administration, established their organization, *Komala-ye Shureshgari-ye Zahmat Keshan-e Kordestan-e Iran* -Committee of the Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kordestan- (KOMALA), in 1985. Another problem was Iraqi aid to the rebellion. New groups were established still split on the question of compromise versus armed struggle in 1988. Some KDPI members established another Marxist organization, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran-Revolutionary Leadership (KDPI-RL).

The conflict among these groups led to armed clashes in this period.

The leader of KDPI, Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, was assassinated while he was secretly negotiating with Iranian officials in Vienna in 1989. Although it was not proven, evidence points towards the involvement of the Islamic government of Iran. However, many groups benefitted from the assassination.⁷⁴

By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had consolidated its control over the internal opposition. The opposition groups were forced to leave Iran. Iran's counter offensive in Kurdistan put an end to the armed struggle of many Kurdish groups. However, the KOMALA became more powerful in this period. The ceasefire between the KOMALA and the KDPI created a weak alliance of these groups, but they were not able to create strongholds in Iran. Despite their current weakness, several groups continue their struggle for an autonomous Kurdistan or another Mahabad Republic. The Kurdish problem for Iran did not disappear but was weakened for a while.

3. Kurdish Movements in Turkey

When Mustafa Kemal established a national state in Turkey, its southeastern borders remained in dispute with

Britain. The Lausanne Treaty let the dispute be solved bilaterally between the Turkish government and the British. The problem was the situation of Mosul. According to Turkey, it was part of the homeland with an extensive Turkish population. When the independence war began, the declared national border "Misak-i Milli" consisted of Mosul and its provinces which are now part of northern Iraq. Mustafa Kemal established the last defensive line of the Ottoman army on the southeastern borders of Misak-i Milli. These areas had an extensive Turkish population.

Mustafa Kemal also learned from the past experience of the Ottoman Empire that it was crucial to create a nation in which all aspects would have the will to protect the state. Neither the old notion of Millet nor the Islamic brotherhood would protect the state in a crisis. So, the unity of the nation and full independence became the main goals of Mustafa Kemal. Modernization of the country included every aspect and institution of social life, administration, economy, and judiciary was necessary to attain the level of the contemporary Western powers. He understood that catching and surpassing the higher standards of the Western powers was a basic prerequisite in achieving full independence.

With this determination in mind, he made several reforms to change the structure of society and government. One of them was the separation of religion from the government. His secular reforms had a goal of eliminating the power of the Ulema who were selfishly guarding their own positions rather than working for the well-being of the nation. The removal of the Ulema was necessary to create a dynamic state capable of responding to future challenges. Having a dynamic structure in the state was essential for having a contemporary state.

In terms of a cultural revolution, he emphasised that being a Turk was enough to be proud of; given the many Turkish accomplishments, not to mention the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. He created institutions to study the pre-Ottoman Empire era, and worked to remove foreign influences from the Turkish language, including Arabic and Persian influences.

He also tried to establish a harmony within the nation and welcomed peaceful co-existence with minorities. The groups, such as the Lazs, the Yoruks, the Tatars, who had a Turkish origin obviously were not considered minorities. He pointed out that there were many things in common between the Kurds and the Turks which could be explained only with a common ethnic tie back to Central Asia, the homeland of Turks. The minorities were only the Christians, the Greeks, the

Armenians, and the Assyrians. Additionally, Mustafa Kemal stated that feeling himself as a Turk was as important as being a Turk.

Mosul and its provinces were rich in oil and it was between Egypt and India. The French involvement in the Middle East by controlling Syria required extra attention from the British. The emergence of the Soviet Union with a hostile ideology to the British and their efforts to gain supremacy in the great game was another concern of Britain. At the beginning, they were in favor of a Kurdish state in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq and an Armenian state in the Caucasus and in eastern Anatolia. Thus the British would create buffer zones that were crucial for their imperial interests in the region. The Wilson principals were a good camouflage for the British and French imperial interests. The Sevres treaty was a document in which they were able to create their puppet states on paper.

Contrary to the expectations, Mustafa Kemal tore the paper into pieces and demolished the British dreams. Following the Turkish military success, the British had to choose other ways to establish their control on this area. Thus, the British created the kingdom of Iraq and placed Faisal as Emir of this kingdom. Faisal was the agent of Britain who

undermined the Ottoman efforts to protect the holy areas from the enemies of religion.

The question of Mosul remained unsolved in the Lausanne, and the problem was referred to bilateral talks and later to the League of Nations for determination. The committee was unable to determine the will of the people because there were too many groups whom were in favor of autonomy, or Turkish rule. But it was definite that they were not in favor of the Arab rule of Faisal.⁷⁵

The tribes in Suleymanieh, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Marivan did not participate in the referendum to give a legitimacy to the Faisal regime.⁷⁶ Other evidence were the constant revolts of the Kurdish tribesmen against the British-Arab existence in the region which dated back to the Sheikh Mahmud revolt of 1919. Later, the Dilo Kurds revolted against the British in 1920. Other clashes between the British and the Kurdish tribes were suppressed by the overwhelming fire power of the British and their agents in rival tribes.⁷⁷

Under these circumstances, the Kurdish revolt in southeastern Anatolia was not difficult to understand. Sheikh Said of Palu, who was also a Naqshbendi dervish, revolted under the guise of religion in February, 1925. It has been said that the Sheikh Said revolt was a response to the secular

and nationalist reforms of Mustafa Kemal. However, the timing of this revolt and the covert British aid to the rebels were clear indicators of British involvement. The revolt occurred at the time of the visit of the committee of League of Nations to Mosul.⁷⁸ Before the revolt, Mustafa Kemal was preparing his army for a military action against Mosul.

The rebellion was suppressed by the army in a few months. The leaders of the revolt were captured and hung or they fled to Iraq. As explained, this revolt was neither religious, nor nationalist. It was just a financial leverage of the British.

The League of Nations decided in favor of the British and awarded Mosul to Iraq under the British Mandate based on the report of the Commission which included anti-Turk representatives in December, 1925.⁷⁹ This was also a result of the Sheikh Said revolt which had destroyed the solidarity of the Kurds and the Turks.

The decision of the League of Nations was not a surprise for the Turks, they were used to losing on the table what they won on the battlefield. Besides, Turkey was not a member of the League of Nations, and its members had been enemies of Turkey for centuries. Turkey did not accept the decision of the League of Nations, and Mustafa Kemal was determined to go to war. However, he had to choose between the well-being of

the new state and another armed struggle with the lack of resources. The country had fought decades ceaseless with one enemy then another and it had dried up all of its resources.

Under these circumstances, Turkey signed a tripartite agreement with Iraq and Britain in June, 1926. By this agreement, Turkey gained some territory, and a share of the oil revenues. Also, anyone would be free to choose Turkish nationality in the region. By signing this treaty, Turkey did lose its claims on the overall territory of Mosul, but consolidated its right to control Mosul and gained time to implement its reforms in the country.

Some articles of this treaty require special attention to prepare a better ground for further analysis. It was briefly mentioned in this treaty that this area would be a neutral zone in which no insurgent bands could be formed. Articles 6, 7, and 8 expressed that "... any preparations made by one or more armed individuals with the object of committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the neighbouring frontier zone...", and that a reciprocal information exchange regarding such bands would be undertaken. Article 12, guaranteed that the parties would refrain from "... all correspondence of an official or political nature with the chiefs, sheikhs, or other members of tribes which are nationals of other state and

which are actually in the territory of that State... They shall not permit in the frontier zone any organization for propaganda or meeting directed against either state."⁸⁰

While the talks for agreement were proceeding, another British inspired revolt occurred in Turkey led by Seyyid Abdullah in July, 1925. Seyid Abdullah led a series of raids in the same region. The revolt was crushed swiftly, and Seyyid Abdullah fled to the protection of his patrons in Iraq.⁸¹

Another revolt of tribes occurred in 1927 as a raid of armed groups infiltrated across the Iranian border. The first raid was led by Sheikh Pasho on Telit in August, 1927 from a sanctuary in Iran.⁸² The Jelali and Haideranlu tribes of Iran, with the support of the Kotch-Ushag clan in Dersim, actively participated in this revolt. The Iranian involvement and the British conspiracy led the Turkish government to send a protest note to the Iranian government. The basic motive of the Iranian involvement could have been the hope of the revision of the Turco-Iranian border of 1918.⁸³

The rebels tried to control Mount Ararat and its vicinity and to declare an independent state. They established the *Khoybun* (Kurdish Independent Government) among themselves. However, the rebellion was suppressed within a few months by the Turkish army, and the so called *Khoybun*, never existed.

The southeastern border was also dispute with French controlled Syria. Syria and Turkey resorted to international arbitration to solve the problem. It was the same scenerio as Mosul. When the commission was working on the problem, Sheikh Hadjo of the Badr Khan tribe revolted in Nisibin in 1928. The tribe had links with the Kurds in Syria, and the revolt was staged from Syria. The guise of revolt was the response to the efforts of the Turkish government to establish central authority at the expense of tribal authority.⁸⁴ The revolt was quickly supressed and the leaders of revolt fled to Syria. However, the border dispute was finally solved by the agreement of the French and Turkish governments in July 1929.⁸⁵

Another border problem with Syria regarding the status of Hatay continued. Hatay was also in the Misak-i Milli borders of Turkey, however, it was occupied by French troops. The residents of this area were Turks, and they were struggling against the Arab-French yoke. They had an autonomus status which was established by the Turco-French agreement of Ankara in 1921. The international commission recommended the establishment of an independent state in Hatay. After a long struggle, the residents of Hatay established their own republic, and by a plescibite, they decided to join Turkey and to demolish the Republic in 1938.⁸⁶

One of the major revolts of Kurdish tribes occurred in 1930. It was also the first example of the alliance of different tribes from other areas. The Jelali, Haideranlu, Belikali, Moulari tribes from Iran, the Herkis tribe from Iraq, and some Turkish tribes of Dersim and Ararat region were participated in this revolt.⁸⁷ These tribes had close kinship among themselves and were living in adjacent areas.

The main area of revolt was Mount Ararat and its vicinity. The main leaders were Hussein Yusuf Abdal of the Iranian Jelalis, Sheikh Hadjo of Syria, and Ishan Nuri. They tried to create a stronghold to declare their independence.⁸⁸ The coordinated efforts of different tribes from Iran, Iraq, and Syria were the result of the external actor, which was probably the Soviet Union. The Soviet Armenians actively supported the rebellion which was not suprising. Also there was strong evidence regarding Iranian aid to the rebels.⁸⁹

The rebellion was crushed by the Turkish army and air force in October, 1930. Turkey forced Iran to cooperate and used hot pursuit to supress the rebellion.

Later, the Haideranlu tribe with the support of the Kalan, Deman, and Lolanis tribes revolted in Dersim area in March, 1937. The leader of the revolt was Sayyid Riza. The revolt was local, and its main aim was to resist the authority

of the central government regarding taxation and other laws. This revolt was suppressed within months by the Turkish army, and Sayyid Riza was hung.⁹⁰

After the 1937 revolt, Turkey did not face any more armed action from the Kurdish tribes. Besides its careful domestic policy toward the issue, the Turkish government followed a sensitive policy toward the developments in the region. For example, Turkey carefully followed the developments in Iran. When the attempts to establish the Kurdish Mahabad Republic occurred, Turkey declared that the problem was not an internal problem of Iran anymore.⁹¹

The Turkish government tried to create cooperation among the regional powers against the Kurdish groups several times. One of them was the Turkey-Iraq conference at Ankara in March, 1946. One of the key objects of the conference was mutual support against the Soviet Union as well as "mutual protection against dangerous individuals" which were interpreted as the Kurdish groups.⁹² This was followed by the signing of a pact between Turkey and Iraq in March, 1946. One of the benefits of this pact was that it would provide "mutual assistance on the question of public order" in the respective countries.⁹³

The beginning of a multi-party system in Turkey opened a new era in domestic politics. In return for the votes of their

people, the Democrat Party gave importance to the positions of the Aghas and other feudal landlords. These people still controlled votes of their people. They are accepted as a source of bulk of votes in viewpoint of the parties. The Kurds voted overwhelmingly for the DP, because of the DP's tolerance to the authorities of Aghas. The agriculture and economic program of the DP also attracted the support of feudal landlords.

The constitutional reforms of 1961 allowed many extreme groups to be active in the following decade. The leftist elements established the Worker's Party of Turkey (WPT) in the 1960s. This party was successful enough to win fifteen seats in the assembly. Although communism was banned, the WPT followed the same ideology as the communists.

Many parts of Turkish society became politicized in this period, especially the young intellectuals. They began to rally around extreme ideas as their counterparts did in Europe in 1968-69. The extreme elements, such as the communists, the racists, and the religious groups, established their underground organizations. They began to clash with the government security forces, and with each other.

Under these circumstances, some of the Kurdish students began to establish their organizations. Their banner was the

improvement of the status of the eastern part of Turkey. However, some more radical elements began to ask for the separation of southeastern Anatolia, and a Kurdish uprising. All of these groups were inspired by socialist ideology, they followed the examples of Cuba and China.

The economic situation of the country forced peasants to immigrate into cities. This was a common problem in the country; many immigrants were concentrated in the big cities of western Anatolia. They established shadow suburbs called "gecekondu". They provided labor force for the industries of these cities. The leftist groups established strongholds in the suburbs. The urbanization of the Kurdish peasantry by immigration increased their politicization by the propaganda of the leftist groups.

In 1969, the Kurdish intellectuals, under the propaganda of the leftist groups, established the Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO). The WPT and DDKO began to criticize the government and blamed it by being a fascist and totalitarian.⁹⁴

The military interfered in the administration in 1971, forcing the administration to implement effective measures against the terrorist groups in Turkey. The legal groups who

were campaigning against the state, including the WPT and the DDKO, were banned.

However, in the following years the administration fell victim to party rivalry. By the end of 1973, the administration could not implement any stable policies on any of the major problems of the country. The economy began to collapse and the society began to be divided by the extreme movements. Each side created its own stronghold and confronted with the government security forces and opposing groups. The leftist groups split because of ideological differences.

The Kurdish groups also underwent the same changes. The ideological differences forced them to be divided among themselves in the 1970s. The Kurdish separatist groups established many ideologic and ethnic organizations in this period. Main organizations of this group were: the Komala-Rizgari, the Ala-Rizgari, the Liberation Path Revolutionary People Culturel Society (DHKD), the Kawa, the Kurdish People Liberation Army (KHKO), the Kurdistan Democratic Party Of Turkey (TKDP), the Tekosin, the National Liberation of Kurdistan (KUK), the Road to Freedom (Ozgurluk Yolu), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the Kurdistan Socialist Party Of Turkey (TKSP).⁹⁵

Some of them were ideologically Marxist and others were ideologically Maoist. However, the common point was their ultimate goal of the separation of southeastern Anatolia and establishment of the Kurdish state. The differences were the way to reach the goal and the future ideology of the proposed Kurdistan.⁹⁶

All of these groups were actively working to create the base of supporters and were running terrorist campaigns. Their strategy was based on terrorizing the Kurdish society to win their support if it could not be gained by propaganda. Thus, the people in the southeastern region became silent because of their terrorist campaign.

The overall situation of the country was worse, terrorism was the main issue of the country. The economy collapsed and Turkey began to seek for additional debts to pay the regular payments of previous debts. The party politics left no room for compromise among the major parties. So, there was no strong administration in this period to implement necessary measures to overcome the problems.

The terrorism staged several phases; the last stage was the civil war which began in Turkey after 1979. The extreme elements created their strongholds, called liberated regions, and established their full control over these areas. Later,

they began to attach these areas to each other. The security forces of the administration could not implement law enforcement in these areas, and they created their own trials. In the early civil war period (September, 1979-1980) the death toll in the country reached 2,812 (not including terrorist dead) in a total of 23,841 terrorist incidents. This number was much higher than the death toll of 898 in a total of 9,052 terrorist incidents between December, 1978-September, 1979.⁹⁷

Under these circumstances, the military operation of September 12, 1980 happened. The people welcomed the operation and fully supported it. The bloodless operation achieved its aim of establishing law and order in the country. Terrorism was hit severely by the operation. The extreme elements were captured and tried. The country began to feel peaceful harmony in the society.

Next step was to prepare new constitution which would put barriers for extreme elements. The 1982 constitution favored strong administration. The constitution also put strict limits on terrorist activities.

The Kurdish terrorist groups were also hit by the operation. Most of them lost their leadership and organizations. The peaceful atmosphere eliminated their

influence on the Kurdish people. Some of them escaped from total destruction only by fleeing to neighbouring countries.

One of them was Abdullah Ocalan, who established his Marxist organization, the workers party of Kurdistan (PKK) in 1979. However, Ocalan's activities dated back to 1974. The PKK advocated the establishment of an independent Kurdistan that united Kurdish regions throughout the Middle East.

The PKK recommended a two-tiered revolution, first national, then Marxist. The PKK attacked the feudal and tribal structure of Kurdish society to create a classless society. Armed struggle, by all means, was accepted as the only way to liberate the Kurdish masses from the Turkish yoke.⁹⁸ By this reasoning, the PKK attacked the Kurdish people violently and killed even babies and pregnant women. All of its activities were only brutal murders under the banner of the independence struggle. Before the military operation of 1980, the PKK found an opportunity to establish its organization by creating 19 regional committees, 63 county representatives, and armed groups.⁹⁹

The military operation of 1980 crushed the PKK along with other organizations. Ocalan escaped by fleeing to Syria. Syria welcomed Ocalan as it did many other terrorist groups which

were acting against Turkey. Ocalan continued his efforts and reestablished the PKK with the Syrian aid.

The Syrians saw not only the opportunity to use the PKK against Turkey, but also against Iraq.¹⁰⁰ Syria was not the only country to provide aid to the PKK. Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Armenia, and the Greek republic of southern Cyprus were eager to support the PKK. Even some European countries, such as Germany, were sympathetic to the PKK and let it open branches in their countries. The Armenian terrorist groups actively participated in the actions of the PKK.¹⁰¹ The Turkish security operations killed some Armenians among the Kurdish PKK squads.

The PKK began its activities in the region in 1982 on a small scale. In 1984, the PKK launched major wave of attacks. Its first targets were small villages in Eruh and Semdinli near the Iraqi border. Later, the PKK launched extremely violent attacks against the state and the Kurdish people to achieve its goal. Thousands of people died in the attacks of the PKK between 1984-1994.

As a response to growing ethno-nationalist terrorism, the Turkish government followed domestic and regional policies to overcome it. Regionally, Turkey contacted Syria, Iraq and Iran and forced them to suspend their support of terrorist groups.

In several meetings with Syrian officials, Turkey used rewards and covert threats. As a reward, Turkey guaranteed the steady flow of the waters of Euphrates river and economic cooperation. As a covert threat, Turkey reminded Syria that it could use hot pursuit tactics and might cut the flow of Euphrates. The agreement, regarding the cooperation of both countries on security matters, was signed by Ozal and his Syrian counterpart in 1987. However, Syria continued to give a support to the PKK by allowing it to establish a base in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley.¹⁰²

Turkey was more succesful in its efforts to gain Iraqi support to suppres the terrorist activities of the PKK. In 1983, Turkey contacted Saddam Hussein, and reminded him of the agreements that were signed before. Although, Turkey asked regional countries not to provoke the Kurdish groups against each other, Iraq continued to play the Kurdish card. However, Iraq gave permission to Turkey to use hot pursuit tactics in Iraq in case of necessity.

Turkey made its first hot-pursuit into Iraqi territory in 1983. The main goal of this attack was to destroy the PKK camps in Iraq. The PKK groups were preparing armed groups to attack from this territory to their targets in Turkey. The Iraqi army left this area uncontrolled when the Iraq-Iran war

was began. The PKK and other groups used the army posts to launch raids against Turkey.

On the other hand, Iran saw the attack as a Turkish support of the Iraqi regime in the war ignoring the threat of the PKK against the integrity of the Turkish nation. The Iranians believed that the timing of the attack was coincided so to prevent the Iranian-backed Kurdish attacks against the pipeline and the Iraqi territory. They accepted Turkish intervention as a Turkish attempt to control northern Iraq. Despite the opposition of Iran and Syria, Turkey continued to use hot pursuit tactics whenever necessary in northern Iraq.

Turkey increased its efforts to improve the economic and social conditions of the southeastern region. The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), became a symbol of this effort. The GAP is the most expensive (\$20 billion), and the biggest project that Turkey ever began. It will change the structure of the southeastern region, and the whole country will benefit from the project.

The project includes the building of several dams (21 dams and 17 hydroelectric power plants) on the Euphrates and Tigris, an irrigation network, and related infrastructure. This project will lead to greater employment and greater prosperity for the 4.5 million people in the proposed

catchment area. The distribution of government lands to the land-less peasantry will hit the feudal structure of the region.

Politically, Turkey changed its policy and recognized the Kurdish existence in Turkey. It granted several rights for the Kurds, such as removal of the ban on the speaking of Kurdish. Turkey let the Kurdish opposition establish parties. These parties won several seats in the parliament.

Although, there was no suppression of political rights to any person in Turkey, and the Kurdish politicians became Ministers, and even President (Ozal declared that his mother was a Kurd¹⁰³), the new parties followed a different path than others. Instead of integrating themselves to the democratic structure of Turkey, they positioned themselves against it. They criticized the government and called it fascist and imperialist. The PKK established its control over the People's Labor Party (HEP- later renamed as DEP), and the HEP became a lip service of the PKK in the parliament. The connections of several HEP deputies and the party with the PKK and their separatists actions were proven by the evidence gathered by the intelligence sources of Turkey.

Several newspapers, such as Ozgur Gundem, were established by the Kurdish opposition groups and began to

attack the state and the military in their publications. They also established links with the PKK. When the PKK attacked a military installation and killed several soldiers, the Ozgur Gundem wrote that "the liberation army (the PKK) captured ... area and destroyed a battalion of the enemy (Turkish soldiers)".¹⁰⁴

When Turgut Ozal became President, he played the role of the Shah in the 1990s and contacted the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. The talks with Jelal Talabani and Mesud Barzani were held in 1991. Ozal supported their claims in Iraq in return for cutting the supply channels of the PKK. When the extensive immigration of the Iraqi Kurds occurred, Ozal was the first leader who proposed to establish a buffer zone in northern Iraq.

Ozal forced the administration to open talks with the PKK, and the PKK declared unileteral ceasefire in the area in 1993. However, the ceasefire was ended by the PKK itself when the PKK squad, led by Semdin Sakik, killed 35 unarmed soldiers in Bitlis who completed their terms as soldiers and were on their way to their homes.

As a result of political and military efforts, the PKK lost its initiative in 1993. The Turkish army established strict control in the region and removed the support channels

of the PKK. In 1994, the PKK became a defeated armed group rather than a broad-based guerilla group. It could neither duplicate the unity of other groups nor rally the people to revolt. Despite its failure and huge losses, it managed to survive as a minor terrorist group and continued to attack Turkish security forces on a small scale. Most of all, the Kurdish problem in the region continued. The threat to Turkish territorial and social unity continues.

4. The impact of the Kurdish Problem on the relations of Turkey and Iran

The Kurdish problem affected the relations of the two countries negatively. Turkey did not support any anti-regime groups in the region. Turkey always accepted regime struggles of different groups in other countries as an internal problem of these countries. It tried to establish a mutual cooperation with the regional countries without considering the regime or the leadership of these countries. Additionally, Turkey tried to create a regional security institution that would create peaceful harmony in the region. It strictly recommended to other regional countries not to interfere in the internal problems of each other.

Turkey, also did not favor any attempt to use ethnic groups in any country. When Iraq, Iran, and Syria began to use

the Kurdish groups in opposite countries, Turkey warned these countries about the future problems of playing with such a dangerous card.

The support of Iran to the Kurdish groups in Iraq and the PKK deteriorated the relations of the two countries. The Pasdaran participation in the PKK activities and the establishment of the PKK camps in Iran were considered a hostile policy by Turkey. Whenever the Turkish security forces established relative control in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, the PKK always moved to Iran and launched its raids into eastern Anatolia. The Mount Ararat region is accessible only via Iran or Armenia, and the PKK used both routes to attack to this area. It has been reported that Iran provided a base to the PKK near Lake Urmia.¹⁰⁵

The 1992 operation of the Turkish army in northern Iraq forced the PKK to move their camps to other areas. Ibrahim Ocalan (brother of Abdullah Ocalan and the commander of the PKK squads in northern Iraq) escaped from the operation only by entering Iran. Later, the PKK remnants (around 700) were gathered in Iran and launched a raid to Erzurum and its province via Iran. This group was destroyed by the Third Army units. However, the PKK activities in Iran continued.

Iran also permitted the ASALA to open branch offices in Iran. The ASALA was notorious for its attacks on Turkish

officials. Besides, the ASALA attacked Turkish diplomats, and bombed the Turkish embassy in Iran just before they opened their offices in Tehran in 1984. As was noted, the PKK-ASALA alliance was known by Turkish officials. So, Iran's decision became a severe problem for the security of Turkey.

In June 1993, the PKK simultaneously attacked several Turkish embassies and tourism offices in twenty-nine cities in Europe. The PKK also prepared mass demonstrations in front of Turkish embassies. This kind of terrorist activity could not be prepared only by the PKK. Turkish officials were suspicious of Iran's involvement.

B. THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ

The Iran-Iraq war had an important side effects on the regional power balances. One of the side effects was the loss of the Iraqi control over northern Iraq. Northern Iraq was a scene for the war efforts of both sides after the second stage of war. As noted, the Kurdish groups were used by the two sides; and the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq became more powerful than before. The Kurds in Iraq obtained greater degree of autonomy from Iraq and gained a much degree of freedom in their actions in northern Iraq.

This raised the question of the future of northern Iraq, including the Kurdish controlled areas and oil rich Mosul and Kirkuk. As addressed before, there are Turkish claims on northern Iraq based on the historical setting and the existence of Turkish people (mainly Turkomans).

Turkey could not stand and watch the establishment of a puppet state in a region that threatens its territorial integrity and economic interests. Besides, a Kurdish state that will be established in northern Iraq may eventually claim the territory that was promised to them in the Sevres treaty. The existence of such a state will attract the radical Kurdish elements in Turkey and they will increase their terrorist campaign. In any case, the existence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq will lead to the participation of Turkey. So, any attempt to establish the control and sovereignty of the Kurds in northern Iraq will be a major threat to the national security of Turkey.

Economically, the Iraqi pipeline that carries the Iraqi oil from Mosul to the Mediterrean via Turkey is an important source of revenue for Turkey. The exports to Iraq are also a substantial amount of Turkish exports. Turkey can ill afford to loose these revenues in a time that it needs hard currency the most.

Politically, Turkey could not let Turks in Iraq be oppressed and removed from their lands and replaced by the Kurds. The Iraqi Turks number between 300,000 to 500,000 and live in the Kirkuk area.¹⁰⁶ Their situation would worsened if a Kurdish state with constant claims towards Kirkuk and Mosul were established.

Under the light of these reasons, it is not hard to understand the motivation of Turkey to keep the Iraqi sovereignty as a whole. Any attempt to divide Iraq will be harmful for Turkey, in this case, Turkey will react to protect its rights in the region.

The example of this reaction was given during the Iran-Iraq war. The Kurdish groups with the support of the Iranian army began to attack the pipeline and establish its control in the northern Iraq. Turkey declared that it will not allow any attempt to do so, and forced Iraq not to grant any major concessions to the Kurds. By using the hot pursuit rights, Turkey used its troops in northern Iraq on search-and-destroy missions when the Kurdish groups attacked Turkish villages via northern Iraq. In 1984, The Turkish delegation, led by Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu, visited Iraq and warned about the consequences of granting any major concessions to Kurds.¹⁰⁷

The action of Turkey was accepted as being in support of Iraq in the war by Iran. The actions of the Turkish army

caused the relief of the pressure on the northern flank of the Iraqi army. Thus the Iraqi army increased their efforts in other areas. Additionally, the Kurdish groups were restricted in their actions and could not cut the pipeline. This kept the revenue flow generated from the pipeline for Iraq. Based on these arguments, Iran blamed Turkey for being a supporter of Iraq.

Additionally, the Turkish media which was rallying for the Turkish protection of northern Iraq caused concern in Iran. It is not hard to understand that Iran will prefer a weak Iraqi control, or a puppet state in northern Iraq, instead of the existence of a strong Turkey. The political advantages of controlling northern Iraq and the economic benefits generated from oil, would strengthen Turkey's position in the region.

Another stage of the problem occurred after the immigration of the Iraqi Kurds. At the end of the war, the Iraqi troops attempt to regain their control over northern Iraq. Their swift actions, including the usage of chemical weapons against the Kurdish villages, caused the first wave of the immigration of the Kurds to Turkey and Iran in 1989. Chaos occurred and it caused anarchy in the region.

However, the scene was changed rapidly following the Gulf crises in 1991. By the fear of retaliation of the Iraqi troops

after their failed uprising during the Desert Storm in northern Iraq, the Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran by the hundreds of thousands. President Ozal asked for an international protection for the Kurds because of the huge burden of immigration to Turkey. In this period, Ozal also shifted his policy on the Kurdish problem. He tried to gain influence on the Iraqi Kurds to shape their decision-making process and to use them as a barrier to more radical elements that were attacking Turkey.

His call was supported by the English Prime Minister John Major. As a result of combined efforts of Turkey and respected countries, the Operation Provide Comfort was launched to create a safe heaven for the Kurds to the north of the thirty-sixth parallel by the participation of the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands.

Operation Provide Comfort facilitated a massive Kurdish repatriation while squeezing out the Iraqi government's authority. By the end of September, all Kurdish-dominated areas in Iraq had come under local Kurdish control whereby the Iraqi authority disappeared.¹⁰⁶

As a result of Western support and a power vacuum in the region, the Kurds established a de facto government which was supported by some 100,000 armed Kurds. They voted for the

posts of de facto government in May, 1992. The Kurdish National Assembly and the Kurdish administration were established in Irbil. The KDP and the PUK shared the posts as a result of the elections.¹⁰⁹ The members of the administration began to use the title of "Minister of Kurdistan". When a delegation from the administration visited Iran, their visit was declared a first visit by officials from the "Kurdistan region government", and the head of the delegation used the title of "Minister of Justice".¹¹⁰

The Western powers, especially the United States, began to use any opposition group in Iraq as a tool to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The economic sanctions or any other measures of the West did not work to overthrow Saddam. Saddam Hussein was accepted as a cause of the instability of the Gulf region and should be deposed and replaced by a pro-Western administration. As Robert Gates, the deputy national security advisor of President Bush, declared in May, 1991:

..all possible sanctions will be maintained on Iraq while he (Saddam) is in power... Iraq will be nothing but a pariah state as long as he is there... Saddam is discredited and can not be redeemed.¹¹¹

With 100,000 armed men, the Kurds shared their part of role from the United States in its efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish leaders were aware of the fact that to

gain the support of the West, they should join other opposition groups.

As a result of the incentives of the West, the opposition groups in Iraq joined in the meeting at Damascus in December, 1990. In this meeting they declared coordination in their efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein and established the Iraqi National Congress, led by the Leadership Council consisting of the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders of the opposition.

The Kurdish leaders were rewarded by the United States, and they were accepted by the Secretary of the State in Washington. Another meeting of the opposition groups was also held in Washington in July, 1992. As a result of the activities of the United States, the fate of the Kurds is placed largely in the hands of American policy-makers. The United States enjoyed the support of France, Britain, Germany and other Western countries in its efforts.

Ozal also supported the United States and opened the talks between Turkey and the opposition leaders, especially the Kurdish leaders, Talabani and Barzani. His efforts were interpreted as gaining leverage and influence over the Iraqi Kurds. If there would be any Kurdish state in the future, to make sure that it will be under Turkish influence.

However, this idea was against the traditional Turkish foreign and national security policies. Ozal's policy towards the Kurdish problem and his willingness to be actively involved in the Gulf crises caused many critics. The Chief of General Staff resigned because of Ozal's willingness to compromise and his foreign policies in 1990. The Foreign Minister joined him and resigned because of the involvement of Ozal in the foreign policy. The existence of foreign troops as a part of Operation Hammer was also criticized heavily in the Parliament.

Iran saw the Turkish policy as a threat. Iran was always anxious about the existence of Western military in the Gulf. This time, the foreign actors, especially, "the Great Satan" began to exercise their control in northern Iraq. The situation reminded them the Shah era when the United States and Israel were actively supporting the Iraqi Kurds who were under the leadership of Mullah Mostafa. At that time, the United States and Israel used the Kurds to weaken Iraq and its rhetoric of pan-Arabism.

As it was noted by Rafsancani in his address, using a pretext of protecting the people of the region, the expansionist powers justify their military presence to establish their goals:

...In practice, the expansionist countries of the world have opted in the past to create some sort of

policeman and arm one power in order to serve as the guardian of the region... to serve as a protector of their interests.. They either had to occupy the area, which was not a viable alternative since the age of gunboat diplomacy had passed and some semblance of cordial ties with the indigenous people had to be maintained, or resort to an archaic method which is still in practice; this approach entailed a military presence in the region, reestablishing military bases and dispatching naval forces. Even this were a choice, it would be one which should be considered as one that was forced upon them by the circumstances and without prior planning. In other words, it may be considered as the only way out of the problem.¹¹²

Although Iran supported the opposition groups, also declared that it is against the participation of Iraq. This was the result of fear that Turkey will use the participation as a pretext to occupy the Mosul and Kirkuk region. Additionally, they may calculate the side affects of a Kurdish state for their Kurdish population. To ensure that Iran will be a party in the decision-making process of the fate of Iraq, Iran followed a dual strategy.

First, they approached Turkey and Syria to discuss the future of Iraq. The three countries held a series of meetings, in Damascus, Istanbul, Ankara and in Tehran. In these meetings, all parties accepted not to intervene in the domestic affairs of Iraq and stressed the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq. All countries

declared their will for determining of the fate of Iraq by implementing the common and free will of the Iraqis.¹¹³

As a second, Iran tried to show its determination by means of force. Iranian jets bombed the facilities of the opposition group, namely the Mojaheddin, in Iraq, in May, 1993.¹¹⁴ The timing of this was interesting, it occurred just before the beginning of the tripartite meeting in Tehran. This action may be interpreted as a show of determination and power to the other countries, especially Turkey. It may be a response to the military activities of Turkey in northern Iraq, and has a meaning of "if Turkey intervenes militarily in the situation in northern Iraq, then we will do the same thing."

Neither the future of northern Iraq nor the policies of the parties involved are clear at the present. So, the situation in northern Iraq remains crucial problem and a danger for the stability of the region because of its effects on the domestic and security policies of the parties.

C. THE EXPORT OF REGIME

1. The Religious Movements in Turkey

Mustafa Kemal clearly showed the direction of development to Turkey, it was the West that Turkey would take a part. The

westernization of the country was accepted as a fundamental instrument to establish a strong and contemporary state. For Mustafa Kemal, the reason was simple: "A science oriented mind was open and initiative; a religion-oriented one was narrow and underdeveloped."¹¹⁵

The influence of religion on the state mechanism was removed and the new state based its structure on secularism. The role of religion was limited to the individual. Religion is between the individual and God, the state has no part between the individual and God. Everyone is free to chose any religion or not to chose at all.

The power of religious groups was eliminated and religious instutions were demolished. To remove the influence of foreign cultures, such as Arabic and Persian, the Arabic call to prayer(*Ezan*) was replaced by the Turkish call. The Dervishhood and religious sects were also demolished. The mosques became only a place to pray, their political role was diminished.

The first challenge from the religious groups was their attempt to control the party that Mustafa Kemal permitted in order to create a multi-party system. The religious groups tried to use the Progressive Republican Party to prepare a revolt in 1926. The party was dissolved by its founders. The

religious groups within this party tried to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in 1926.¹¹⁶ Another attempt by Mustafa Kemal to create a multi-party system in the form of an authorized loyal opposition party failed. The party, which was established by his colleagues, was captured by religious groups. The revolt in Menemen by the religious groups and the murder of third Lieutenant Kubilay was accepted as the malfunction of the multi-party system. Fethi Okyar, the founder of the new party, dissolved it in 1930.

The strict enforcement of secularism in Turkey was set back by the multi-party system. To gain more votes, the DP removed some of the secular measures and let the religious schools (the *Imam Hatips*) open. Arabic replaced the Turkish call to prayer and in the teaching of the Quran. Religious education in the schools became compulsory for Muslim students. Many mosques were opened and tombs were reopened to visitors in this era(1950-1960). The reluctant secular policies of the political parties continued and the religious groups increased their power.

In the following years, the religious groups increased their activities by using the religious schools and favored sects. For example, there were 337 teachers and 4,548 students in the Imam-Hatips in 1960. In 1971, there were 1,547 teachers

and 49,308 students in the Imam-Hatips.¹¹⁷ This number increased greatly in the following years.

The Islamic groups established political parties and began to seek opportunities in this era. These groups also published several newspapers and periodicals. One of the religious parties was the Nation Party. It was established in the 1950 and won a seat in the Parliement. Because of its militant overtones, the party was banned in a few years.¹¹⁸ Another Islamic party of the 1960s was the Islamic New Order Party which was banned after the military intervention of 1971. The remmants of it established the National Salvation Party (NSP) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan.¹¹⁹

In 1974, the NSP found an opportunity to come to power. Because of the balance of seats in the Parliement, none of the major parties could create a government. The RPP made a coalition government with the NSP in 1974. Necmettin Erbakan became Deputy Prime Minister, and some NSP deputies became ministers. In the following years, the NSP continued to hold key positions in coalition governments. They affected foreign policy and followed anti-western and pro-Islamic policies.¹²⁰

The presence of the NSP in the administration increased the activities of the religious movements. The extreme religious groups established their organizations. Their

organizations had dual structure: legal and illegal. The legal structure established its links within the administrative organizations and created a supporter base for further activities. The main area of activity was political, and these organizations were under the control of the NSP. Some of them were the Akincilar Society (Ak-Der), the Akinci Labor Society (AK-IS), and the Akinci Civil Servants Society (AK-MEM).¹²¹

The illegal organizations were terrorist groups, trying to overthrow the secular government and establish the Islamic regime by means of an armed struggle. They fought against the government security forces and other opposition groups. These groups followed the classic structure of religious terrorist groups. The structure was as follows: The leadership of the Sheikh, the *Shura-i Mesveret* (the main committee), the Fatwa committee (where the decisions were declared), and regional representatives. The major illegal religious terrorist groups were the Islamic Liberation Army of Turkey (IKO), the Islamic Liberation Front of Turkey (TIKC), The Urgent Mojaheddin of Islamic Revolution (IDAM), the World Sheriat Liberation Army (DSKO), the Universal Brotherhood Front Islamist Revenge Platoon (EKC-SIM), and the Islamist Mojaheddin Army of Turkey (TIMO).¹²²

The main illegal sects campaigning against the secular structure of the government were the Nurcular, the Naqshibendis, the Suleymancilar, and the Isikcilar.¹²³ These groups followed the same path to create a supporter base. They opened religious schools and used Mosques and religious institutions. They infiltrated administrative posts and made a sustained effort to infiltrate to the education system, the judiciary, and the military forces to gain a supporter base. Some of them were also active in Europe. They continued their religious propoganda among the Turkish workers and sent propoganda materials into Turkey. One of them was Cemalettin Kaplan who was following the same path as Khoemeini. He established his organization in Germany and constantly attacked the secular structure of Turkey and the military.

The military operation of 1980 hit the extreme religious legal and illegal groups. The NSP was dissolved and Necmettin Erbakan was tried. The extreme religious terrorists were either captured or fled to Europe.

However, the NSP was renamed and reopened by the former politicians of the NSP. The Prosperity Party (RP), which was established in 1983, continued to emphasize the political struggle for a new order. The PR gradually reestablished its supporter base in the late 1980s. Besides the PR, the Nation

party (led by Aykut Edibali) and the Reformist Democracy Party (led by Mevlut Ilik) were the other parties based on Islamic grounds.

The program of the PR is similar to the IRP of Iran. The RP wants to bring "a just economic system", in which there is no interest and no tax to remove the oppressor and to protect the oppressed. Wages will be based on the partnership footing. Foreign capital, except the capital inflow from Moslem states, is forbidden. The PR also seeks "a just new order" within society; that the individual will be cared for and honoured. A just and moral order will be empowered by change in the education system. Instead of the EC and NATO, the PR emphasizes the establishment of a "Moslem United Nations" along with a "Moslem Countries Common Defence Organization", a "Moslem Countries Common Market", and a "Moslem Countries Cultural Cooperation".¹²⁴

When Ozal came to power, the activities of the religious groups increased. Ozal was a candidate of the NSP in 1980. He had close ties with Erbakan in that era. His brother, Korkut Ozal, has close ties with religious groups. When Ozal's mother died, she was put next to the famous Sheikh of a sect.

In his term, the articles 141, 142, and 165 of penalty code were removed. Article 141 and 142 were measures against

communist activity. Article 161 was against extreme religious activity. The religious groups also forced the secular structure of the higher education system to be changed. The argument in 1989 about the "turban"^s went beyond individual rights. The main idea was to penetrate the secular system by using the turban as an example. Although President Evren and many officials were against it, the turban was allowed in the universities in the following years.

In this era, Saudi financial institutions which were proclaiming that they were Islamic institutions and offering the Islamic option to investments were granted permission to be open their branches. The Al-Baraka Turk and the Faisal Bank were the main examples of them. These organizations provided a profit share instead of interest which was against Islam. Many of the religious groups invested in these institutions because they were "Islamic". However their system was the same with other banking institutions except the name for interest. Besides, some Saudi Islamic organizations, such as the Rabita, increased their support to the Islamic groups, including the PR.

^s It is a scarf that women wear to cover hair. It is used along with long clothes instead of a veil.

Under these circumstances, it was not suprising to find the emergence of the PR. The PR and its followers made extensive efforts to increase their share of votes. They based their campaigns on the example of American presidential campaigns. They used one-to-one and mass propoganda at the same time. Their activities were financially supported by international religious organizations, mainly the Saudis and the Egyptians.

As a result, they won 40 seats in the Assembly in the 1991 general elections. The PR increased its share to 16.88% while the True Path Party (TPP) was 27 %, the Motherland Party (MP) 24 %, and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 20.75 %. In the 1994 local elections, the PR took 19 % of the votes, the TPP 22 %, the MP 20 %, and the SDP 11 %. The PR was so succsesful that it won the elections in major cities, such as Istanbul, for the first time in Turkish political history.¹²⁵

This result may be interpreted as the succses of the political struggle of the religious groups. In the next general elections, they may do better because the economic conditions are worse under the administration of Tansu Ciller and the TPP. The SDP lost importance because the left is so divided and their policies about the Kurdish issue are very distractive for many people. The PR with the banner of "try

the one that is not tried before" may come to power legitimately as a result of the general elections. Although they do not declare that they are openly against Kemalism, their program and leadership are against the secular and pro-Western structure of Turkey.

2. The Export of Iranian Revolution

The Islamic Republican ideologues articulated their conception and desire to create anew the moral Islamic man and the just Islamic society. This effort was part of an overall set of goals that also influenced the establishment of the idea of divine rule in Iran, the restoration of Iran's independence and that of all other islamic nations, the latter through the export of the Islamic Revolution if necessary.¹²⁶

The main ideolog of the Islamic Revolution who established the base of the Islamic Republic of Iran was Khomeini. His ideas about the Islamic Government are summarized in his concept of the *Velayet-e Faqih*. Because Khomeini shaped post-revolutionary Iran, this study will refer to his ideas about the dynamics of the revolution and the export of it.

Most of the Islamic ideologues have accepted that since the days of colonialism, new and alien ideas, such as

socialism, communism, democracy, and nationalism have penetrated Muslim society. The agents of these ideas did not belong to the masses but to the middle and upper-middle classes who were influenced from abroad.¹²⁷

Because of this, the influence and sovereignty of Islam in society have declined. The notion of Islam has fallen victim to division and weakness. The laws of Islam have remained in abeyance and been subject to change and modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign laws and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil purposes, causing people to be infatuated with the West.¹²⁸

So, under the leadership of the Ulema, all Muslims had a duty to fight against these ideas in order to create pure Islamic order in the Muslim society. According to Khomeini,

The duty of the Ulema is to put an end to this injustice and seek to bring happiness to millions of people ... through destroying and eliminating the unjust governments and through establishment of a sincere and active Muslim government.¹²⁹

The Islam that Khomeini interprets is:

Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism.¹³⁰

So, the real Muslims have both the means and reasons to open a struggle against the imperialists and their puppets in their society.

Besides, the imperialists created an unjust system among hundreds of millions of Muslims through the political agents that they have placed in power. The unjust economic system of these puppet governments divided Muslims into two groups: The oppressed and the oppressors. The struggle of oppressed Muslims continued but their way was blocked by the ruling minorities and the oppressive structures of their governments. So, it is the duty of the Islamic Republic to be a helper to the oppressed and an enemy to the oppressor.¹³¹

Khomeini continues:

How can we stay silent and idle today when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of millions of Muslims—thanks to the support of their masters and through the power of the bayonet—granting the Muslims not the least right to prosperity? It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression, and, for the sake of the well-being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow these oppressive governments and form an Islamic government.¹³²

In his New Year's Message to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1980, he laid out the purpose of both Islamic revolution and the foreign policy of the new Islamic Republic:

We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world, and must abandon all idea of not doing so, for not only does Islam refuse to recognize any difference between Muslim countries, it is champion of all oppressed people. Moreover, all the powers are intent on destroying us, and if we remain surrounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. We must make plain our stance toward the powers and superpowers and demonstrate to them that despite the arduous problems that burden us. Our attitude to the world is dictated by our beliefs.¹³³

In the same speech, he declared his support for all movements and groups that were fighting to gain liberation from the superpowers of the left and right.¹³⁴

In his address concerning the meaning of the Cultural Revolution in 1980, he called on other Muslims of the world to revolt with the following statements:

Muslims the world over who believe in the truth of Islam, arise and gather beneath the banner of tawhid and the teachings of Islam! Repel the treacherous superpowers from your countries and your abundant resources. Restore the glory of Islam, and abandon your selfish disputes and differences, for you possess everything! Rely on the culture of Islam, resist Western imitation, and stand on your own feet. Attack those intellectuals who are infatuated with the West and the East, and recover your true identity.¹³⁵

Khomeini paid attention to the ethnic differences among Muslims, and accepted it as an alien idea which was a result of the imperialist propaganda. He mentioned that "one of the themes that the planners of disunion among the Muslims have

put forward, and their agents are engaged in promoting, is that of race and nationalism."¹³⁶ When the constitution of the Islamic Republic was prepared, Khomeini declared that the new government accepted no ethno-nationalism as was mentioned before.

Blessed for you be this government that knows no difference of race, whether between black and white, or between Turk, Persian, Kurd, and Baluch. All are brothers and equal; nobility lies only in fear of God, and superiority may be attained by only by acquiring virtues and performing good deeds.¹³⁷

Khomeini addressed the differences between the Shia and Sunni Islam, but claimed that the dissension between the Sunnis and Shia was a mischievous propaganda of the imperialists. He insisted that there was no oppression of the Sunnis in the Islamic Republic. He asked his Sunni brothers to pay no heed to the divisive propaganda of the imperialists and to regard the Shia as cherished brothers and thereby frustrate the sinister plans of foreigners.¹³⁸

So, the united Muslim world would be created against the imperialists and enjoy the glory days of Islam. For this reason, the protection of the lands of Muslim world against the outside or internal attacks of foreigners is the responsibility of all Muslims. The legal rulings of the

Sheriat, which was compiled by Khomenini, make it a duty to Islamic government:

(2826) If the enemy attacks the lands of the Muslims or their borders, it is the duty of all Muslims to defend them by any means possible, including the sacrificing of one's life and the expenditure of one's wealth. With respect to this matter, there is no need to seek permission from a shari'a judge.

(2827) If the Muslims fear that the foreigners have drawn up a plan to conquer their lands, whether directly or intermediary of their agents acting outside or inside the country, it is their duty to defend the Islamic lands by any means possible.

(2829) If it is feared that foreigners will gain control over the lands of Muslims by expanding their political, economic, or commercial influence, it is the duty of the Muslims to defend their lands by any means possible and to destroy the influence of the foreigners as well as their domestic agents.¹³⁹

In the light of ideology, it is not hard to understand the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. However, this was only the beginning, the reverberations of this policy were felt immediately throughout the Middle East. The incident in the holy land, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the following bloody uprising in which more than 400 people died before it was suppressed, are other examples.

The Shia workers in the oil rich countries of the Middle East began to revolt. In Bahrain, mass demonstrations of the

Shia that comprise the majority occurred. Iraq was another country in which the Shia staged a ceaseless revolt after the Islamic Revolution. In Lebanon, the Shia established terrorist organizations which were funded and supported by all means by the Islamic government. These organizations opened international terrorist campaign against the imperialists. They aimed to establish an Islamic regime in Lebanon.

The Iraq-Iran war stimulated the terrorist campaigns of revolutionary groups. Their campaigns focused on the several Gulf countries which were opted Iraq in this dispute. In 1981, the first international attack was held by an Iraqi Shia terrorist group, the *al-Dava*, in the bombing of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut.¹⁴⁰

A conference which had an aim to promote the creation of the Ideal Islamic Government was held in Tehran in 1982. In this conference, the representatives of militant groups from several Arab and Islamic countries gathered to discuss the means of a movement to advocate worldwide Islamic revolution. As addressed above, the codes of Sheriat legitimates the use of force by all means, including terrorism. By this conference, the clergy of Iran found a chance to use international terrorism as a tool for the foreign policy of the Islamic government and to exploit and co-opt the

for its revolutionary goals among radical Muslims throughout the world.¹⁴¹

In 1980, Iranian officials became dominant in *Amal*, the Shia terror organization headquartered in Lebanon. Later, the split of *Amal* introduced the Islamic *Amal* and the *Hezbollah* terrorist groups which were strictly controlled and fully supported by Iran. The units of IRGC were deployed at the disposal of these groups. In his answer to a related question, the Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayeti interpreted the existence of revolutionary guards in these organizations as "a symbol of the help of Iran to the oppressed".¹⁴²

When the U.S. led the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force deployed in Lebanon, the Shia terrorist groups violently attacked the force. The existence of the force would help the Lebanese government to establish its control over Lebanon. That would mean the end of the activities of these groups. The huge losses of the multi-national force was explained by Velayeti as follows: "The United States intervention in Lebanon is the main cause of developments that followed. When the United States intervenes in another country it should expect certain reactions from people."¹⁴³ What Velayeti called "people" included the Revolutionary Guards of Iran which numbered between 2,000 and 3,000.¹⁴⁴

In 1983, the Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks targeted Kuwait. Kuwait was a small, defenseless, and geostrategically important country with rich resources. However, the existence of the Shia population and their poverty stimulated the Iranian efforts to export their regime by creating instability in Kuwait and promoting a revolt among the Shia community. Additionally, Kuwait was sided with Iraq and financially supported it in its war efforts.

The Islamic Jihad, another terrorist organization carried out several terrorist actions including two bombings in Turkey against the common targets of the Iranian sponsored terrorist campaign. The terrorist campaigns of these organizations included bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations. It was reported that several ex-Shah followers and opposition leaders were assassinated in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Turkey by these groups and the SAVAMA (the secret intelligence agency of Iran).

Iran also used the terrorist activities as a blackmail of the West to gain its political goals. For example, when the Hezbollah hijacked a TWA flight and its 41 American passengers in 1985, Iran used its influence for releasing the passengers in return for several shipments of U.S. arms. Later, two American nationals were freed by terrorist groups after the

so-called "arms for hostages" deal between the United States and Iran.¹⁴⁵

In 1987, another wave of terrorism occurred after the struggle between the hard-line clergy and Rafsancani. Three oil installations were bombed by the Revolutionary Organization Forces of the Prophet Mohammed just before the meeting of the Islamic Conferance Organization in Kuwait.

Several terrorists were captured with explosives in Europe before they attacked their targets. However, others were succsesful. They carried out an attack against Arab nationals in France, an assasination of two Iranian dissidents in London, and an attempt to assasinate an Iraqi diplomat in the Southern Greek Republic of Cyprus. As a response to arrests, several Europeans were kidnapped by unknown terrorist organizations; the Revolutionary Justice Organization, the Organization of the Oppressed of the Earth, and the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine.

Members of the Islamic Jihad were captured by Turkish police before they attacked American and Israeli officials in Turkey. In Egypt, the Islamic Jihad of Egypt attacked Americans, and attempted to assasinate two prominent Egyptians. Several terrorist activities occurred in Lebanon by previously unknown organizations. Another terrorist activity

of a previously unknown group, the Organization for the Defense of Free People, occurred in Tunisia as a series of bombings. The Saudi arm of Hezbollah blew up a natural-gas pipeline in Saudi Arabia. The offices of Pan Am were bombed by the previously unknown Organization for the Liberation of Muslims in Kuwait.

Although, the names of these organizations were previously unknown, many of them were used by the Hezbollah to cover the Iranian involvement.¹⁴⁶ Despite this effort, the security forces of related countries gathered enough evidence to reveal the Iranian involvement. As a result of these findings, some countries, such as Egypt, restricted their relations with Iran.¹⁴⁷

The victory of Rafsancani over the hard-line clergy and his efforts to establish a moderate foreign policy decreased the support of Iran to the Islamic terrorist groups. Despite the moderate policies, Iran continues to support radical Palestinian terrorist groups, anti-Baathist groups, and some other major Islamist terrorist groups, such as the Hezbollah. Iran also plays a major role in supporting Sudan's hard-line Islamic groups. It was reported that Iran shipped at least \$17 million worth of arms to Sudan in 1991. Additionally, Iran continues to support Islamist groups in Algeria, Morocco,

Tunisia, and Egypt. The FIS movement of Algeria reportedly acquired Iranian support.¹⁴⁸

3. The Effect of the Export of the Regime on the Bilateral Relations of Turkey and Iran

Turkey opted for the West, with its secular structure and democratic government. This is not contrary to the fact that 99 % of its population is Muslim. The secular and democratic government of Turkey is not against religion, it fully respects its citizens's moral obligation. However, it is against the people who try to use religion as a tool to seize power and dictate their will on others by means of force.

Turkey showed an understanding of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. It recognized the Islamic regime immediately. Additionally, Turkey refused to enforce the economic sanctions of the West in 1979 following the takeover of the U.S. Embassy.¹⁴⁹ The basic reason for this lays in the foreign policy of Ataturk. He respects other countries in their effort to find the most suitable regime for themselves unless they try to impose it on others.

Turkey was aware of the danger of the religious provocation in Anatolia. It saw examples before, for example, the Celali revolts of the Shia Turkomans and the provocations

of the Ahonds. Turkey has considerable numbers of Shia within its borders, most of them are Alevis. The Alevis usually opted for the left in politics. The Sunni majority and the Alevis did not enjoy very good relations. Intermarriages between the two communities were not accepted by the two communities. An important number of the Sunnis preferred the right wing in politics. However, there was not any oppression of the Alevis or any other religious groups in Turkey. The major problem was that the two communities did not establish close links with each other.

Unfortunately, the minor religious difference between the two communities always became a tool for outsiders to provoke a major crisis. A few months prior to the revolution in Iran, Turkey faced the brutal clash of the two communities which had both political and the religious overtones.

Although there were prior outbreaks of Sunni-Alevi violence in Anatolia, the turning point in this type of civic disorder was the December 1978 massacre in Kahramanmaras. Three days of sheer mayhem started with the shooting of two Alevi teachers by the NAP forces and ended with more than 111 dead and more than a thousand wounded, two hundred of them were heavily wounded. The city was heavily damaged in this event, more than 500 buildings were destroyed. In this event,

the right wing agitators (including extreme religious and racist groups) and the Marxist agitators added religious and ideological meaning to the violence. Heavily armored army forces managed to control events in three days. When the army took control of the city, more than 800 people were arrested.¹⁵⁰

Inter-communal fighting also continued in 1979. This time the target of the agitators was Malatya, then Sivas, then Corum and finally Yozgat. All of these incidents were brutal and destructive to the harmony of the nation.

It is noteworthy that the inter-communal and religious clashes occurred at the time of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. As soon as the Revolutionary elements seized power in Iran, Iranian propaganda opened a disturbing campaign against the secular and democratic government of Turkey, its well respected leader and founder, Ataturk, and its military forces. Turkey became a target for Iranian subversive broadcasting.¹⁵¹ Every day, the Iranian radio was throwing out threats and calls for an Islamic revolution and calling Ataturk a Jew and Godless.^t

^tIn my personal interview with one of the supporters of the religious groups, he claimed that Ataturk made a reform of clothes and offered modern the hat instead of the Fez because the merchants of fabrics and hat importers were Jewish. So, in his view, Ataturk forced the nation to change its oriental look to a contemporary one just to make Jews rich. This shows that the

The Iranian attacks to the personality of Ataturk and the secular and democratic structure of Turkey were obvious. Iran used every opportunity to attack the symbols of the secular and democratic structure of Turkey including the agenda of the Iranian officials during their visits to Turkey. For example, when the Iranian Prime Minister, Mir Hussain Musavi, visited Turkey in 1987 he refused to visit the Ataturk mausoleum (the Anitkabir) in Ankara-which was "a must" for all visiting dignitaries- and publicly critized Ataturk.¹⁵²

In 1988, the Iranian Embassy refused to follow the tradition of showing a respect to Ataturk by not lowering its flag to half-mast on the 50th anniversary of Ataturk's death. In 1989, Iranian broadcasting insulted President Kenan Evren who was also the former Chief of the General Staff by comparing him with Salman Rushdie because of his policy towards the turban issue. In the same year as a gesture of Turkish tolerance towards Iran, Turkey lowered its flag to half-mast following the death of Khomeini. Two days after, a crowd, which was provoked by the hard-line clergy, attacked the Turkish Embassy in Tehran.¹⁵³

The political and symbolic overtones of Iranian efforts added a militant character when the security forces of Turkey

Iranian propoganda was succsesful enough to have its listeners or even the believers.

revealed the operations of the SAVAMA and its connections with the militant extreme groups in Turkey. For instance, in 1988, the car trunk saga where the SAVAMA attempted to kidnap a prominent member of the Iranian opposition and smuggle him back to Iran occurred. The evidence showed the involvement of the personnel of the Iranian Embassy.¹⁵⁴

In 1989, when the constitutional court ruled against the wearing of the turbans by woman students on university campuses, the extreme religious groups made mass demonstrations in which they clashed with the police. The Iranian regime openly supported and provoked these demonstrations. The hard-line clergy prepared mass demonstrations in Tehran against Turkey. Its ambassador to Ankara, Manoushehr Mottaki, gave very provocative speeches on this issue, he even declared that Iran was going to put economic sanctions on Turkey. As a response to the open involvement of Iran in the internal affairs of Turkey, the Turkish government led by Evren followed a strong policy and restricted its relations with this country. The Turkish ambassador to Tehran was recalled.¹⁵⁵

In the early 1990s, the prominent authors and journalists of Turkey, such as Cetin Emec, Ugur Mumcu, Behice Uçok, Turan Dursun, and Muammer Aksoy who were secularists and strictly

loyal to the Kemalism, were assassinated by the extreme religious groups. The security forces captured one of the suspects and gathered evidence that revealed their connections with Iran.¹⁵⁶

In 1993, the provocation of extreme religious groups caused another severe and brutal incident in Sivas. When Aziz Nesin, who was a leftist and atheist author, visited Sivas and participated in a conference which was organized by the Alevis, the two communities were provoked by the agitators. The clashes between the two communities resulted with setting on fire an hotel in which Nesin and the Alevi groups were staying. More than thirty people died in the fire, and Nesin barely escaped from death.^u Calm in the city was established by army troops but the death toll was high. The investigation of the incident found evidence, based on the pictures and confessions, of agitators from outside.

The covert support of Iran to the extreme religious groups consisted of its support via international Islamic terrorist groups to the militant groups and its political ties

^uWhen Ugur Mumcu was killed on January 24, 1993 Nesin declared his stand against extreme Islamic groups and vowed to translate Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses. In Iran, the radical newspaper, Islamic Republic demanded a fatwa ordering Nesin's death and placed him in the assassination list. It is not clear that any fatwa was issued but the external agitators targeted Nesin in Sivas and were very close to reach their goals.

Reference: Conflict over Killings, Hugh Pope, MEI 19 February 1993, pg: 12

with the mainstream Islamic parties in Turkey. The open support of Iran to the extreme religious groups by propaganda and political involvement can be seen in the example of the turban case.

In both cases the Iranian involvement acts against the secular and democratic structure of Turkey. Additionally, the Iranian policy to export its regime became a tool to intervene to the internal affairs of Turkey. So, unless Iran gives up its policy to export the regime, the problem will continue to worsen the relations of both countries as it did in the turban case.

D. THE RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

1. The Current Situation

The events in the late 1980s and early 1990s were full of surprises for the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the most important one with its huge impact on global politics. One of the results of this event was the emergence of new states in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. The Central Asian states; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan declared their independence in 1991. Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were established in the Caucasus in the same year.

The Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan are experiencing a transition period. Political restructuring and institution-building is necessary for them to build their nation states. As soon as the formal break-up of the Soviet Union and the declaration of their independences occurred in 1991, the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan began to look for concepts and values by which they might preserve their presence and create strong nations.

The major obstacles for them are the traditions and practices inherited from the former regime, the political cadres' ignorance and inexperience in the administration of a modern state, dependence on the socialist economic and political system, and the lack of technology, know-how, financial capacity, and a trained work force.

The main economic problems of these countries stem from the production structure imposed on them by the Soviet centralism which was based on primary goods and single crops. The related problems include the lack of light industry, unemployment, inflation, the deterioration of living standard, and the vacuum created by the sudden collapse of central planning.

Their infrastructure and economy were dependent on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union used these countries as a

source of raw material and certain agricultural goods. They desperately need technology and financial aid to overcome their difficulties. Their trade routes, or any kind of links, were connected to Russia. They are geographically far away from the common markets of the Gulf, the Middle East or Europe. Their economy was based on the socialist system. They have no experience with free market economy or the accumulation of wealth by individuals to invest in the private sector. So, their efforts to privatize the economy and establish a liberal system face enormous problems.

The transformation of the economy to a liberal one irritated the administrations. It caused high inflation and unemployment. In some countries, the administration halted the privatization which was necessary to establish liberal economy.¹⁵⁷ Eliminating the vestiges of a totally different regime and mind-set will take time. The severeness of the political, structural and economic problems they face, may make the transition period last longer.

Another problem is their ethnic structure and growing ethno-nationalism. All of these states had different ethnic groups, and even different nationalities. There are millions of Russians and some Europeans in these states, especially in Kazakhstan.¹⁵⁸ The borders of these countries are fragile,

because they were arbitraliy drawn by Stalin to implement "a divide and rule" principle. Even under the Soviet rule these borders were "adjusted" many times.¹⁵⁹ For this reason, one may find some elements of a tribe in different countries which causes ethnic problems. For example, in Tajikistan, 24% of the population is Uzbek, on the other hand, Semerkant and Bukara are Tajik dominated cities in Uzbekistan.¹⁶⁰

Additionally, these countries found themselves in a dispute with other countries. The clear example of this case is Azerbaijan, which faced the invasion of its territories by its neighbour, Armenia.

The Soviet rule could neither change the tribal structure in the countryside nor eliminate religion. Although the Soviet Union had an antireligious, Marxist ideology, the Soviet Union found itself forced to create an official religious clergy as early as 1943. The people were aware of religion and kept it underground. Some people in the countryside performed as clergy parallel to the official clergy.¹⁶¹

The religious reawakening is backed by the openings of mosques, religious schools, and other religious institutions. Islam is spreading very fast among the youth. The Islamic party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, follows a militant flavor and is very active in the region. Despite being banned,

the IRP has considerable supporters and opened its branches in these states. Besides the IRP, other Islamic groups, such as the Adalet(justice) were formed.¹⁶² The Islamic groups and the IRP are active in the civil war in Tajikistan.¹⁶³ However, it must be noted that these groups are also nationalist by some extend.

The present administrations are led by former leaders of the Communist party. They continued to hold their offices in the present administrations. However, several opposition groups have established parties. The ethno-nationalist parties, the religious parties, and other secular parties began to rally for power in these states. The power struggle in the domestic politics of these countries varies from the establishment stage to civil war as seen in Tajikistan and the coup d'etat in Azerbaijan.

The growing ethno-nationalism reveals itself in the formation of ethno-nationalist parties, such as the Birlik (unity) and the ERK (freedom) of Uzbekistan. National identity is prominent among the intellectuals, however, it also became influential among the masses. Evidence of it is the renaming of public places and the openings of museums for the historical figures of their nations. The ideal of the Turan became attractive. But everyone interprets it differently, for

the Uzbeks it is the great Uzbekistan. As a response to the Turan, some Persian speaking Tajiks look for a great Khorasan state of Persian speaking Tajiks which was advocated by the Great Ariana Society.¹⁶⁴

The scarcity of water and the drying up of the Aral Sea combined with its environmental impacts pose a great danger to the stability of the region. The majority of the water resources are in the most mixed and fragile area, the Fergana Valley. The control of these resources may cause a dispute between already conflicting ethnic groups.

In the other areas of government, the presence of foreigners is clear. These foreigners, especially Russians, continue to preserve their situation in the bureaucracy, in the economy, and in the industry because of the lack of a trained work force in these countries.

Another concern was the future structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States organization which was imposed by Russia to continue its control over the Soviet empire. The presence of Russian troops and military installations is a real instrument of ensuring Russia continues to enjoy its control. Contrary to the presence of Russian troops, none of these countries- except Azerbaijan had a national military power by any means. Even their police

force consists of many Russians. Interestingly, Kazakhstan is building up a military force on a small scale which recruits from the Russian officer corps. However, Uzbekistan is trying to establish a small scale military force which will recruit mainly Uzbeks.¹⁶⁵

2. The Turkish Efforts of Influence

Turkey reacted slowly to the transformation of the Soviet Empire. The basic reason was the traditional awareness of Russian politics. However, when it was clear, Turkey made significant changes in its foreign policy. By the end of 1991, Turkey opened an immediate and extensive diplomatic campaign and established close diplomatic links with all of the former states.

The establishment of independent Central Asian states and Azerbaijan was welcomed by the public with great enthusiasm. The Turkish people acted as if they had found a long lost relative. The media paid heavy coverage to the events in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Many journalists, intellectuals, and academicians traveled to these states.

The administration joined the public in its enthusiasm. The very first effort of Turkey was to establish formal ties with these countries. Because of the Kemalist ideology which

restricts the relations with the Turkish populations in other parts of the world to cultural and humanitarian relations, the formal ties with these states did not exist before. Another reason for the lack of relations was the Soviet threat.

Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian States and Azerbaijan. On November 9, Turkey recognized Azerbaijan, and the next month Turkey extended recognition to the all of the former Soviet Republics. The establishment of embassies by these countries and diplomatic visits of top level officials respectively occurred in 1992. Turkey hosted the heads of these states and reciprocated the visits by sending first Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, and later Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. President Ozal made his last trip abroad to visit these states in 1993. By the beginning of 1993, there were over 140 bilateral accords signed on different subjects between Turkey and these states.¹⁶⁶

The cultural and economic relations were established simultaneously with the diplomatic efforts. The Turkish-Azeri and Turkish-Uzbek business councils were established as early as November, 1991. Many businessmen visited these states either with the diplomatic convoys or alone. Turkish businessmen were granted several projects including the

operation of oil fields and construction of airports and other infrastructure.¹⁶⁷

Turkey was active in the infrastructural development of the region. The basic reason was to establish physical links with these countries. By 1992, the Turkish Airlines scheduled regular flights to the main cities in the region. Turkey also sought to develop rail and road links with the region. The proposed route of the railroad was via Nahcevan and Iran to Azerbaijan and by train-ferry cross of the Caspian sea to the Central Asian states.¹⁶⁸

Another important effort was given to the construction of several pipelines that will connect the hydrocarbon resources of these countries to the world market via Turkey. One of them was a 1,060 kilometer pipeline between Turkey and Azerbaijan which will carry the Azeri oil to the Mediterrean. This pipeline will transit Nahcevan and Iran and will be connected to the already existing Turkish-Iraqi pipeline. Turkey made several offers to Kazakhstan to carry its oil to the Mediterrean via Turkey. Another pipeline project that Turkey is trying to accomplish will connect Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the Mediterrean. The possible route of this pipeline will be either via Iran to the south or across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia or Armenia to the north.

This pipeline will carry natural gas from Turkmenistan and oil from Uzbekistan.¹⁶⁹

As a main instrument to establish links with these countries, Turkey gave an emphasis to telecommunications. The telecommunication industry of Turkey is well-developed and has high technology. Turkey is developing a telecommunication network for these countries which will supply 2,500-lines to each of the five Central Asian states. Later on, the capacity of the system will be increased by opening an additional 10,000-lines for each of the states. The telecommunication network will be connected via Turkish supplied earth stations, to the Intelsat satellite, which will connect them to the Turkish gateway exchange and to the world. The Intelsat will be replaced by the next Turksat satellite^v which will be a Turkish satellite.¹⁷⁰

Additional efforts are being made by the private telecommunication companies. The NETAS installed its self-designed DMS digital switchboard systems, and made joint ventures with local companies to build telecommunication devices.¹⁷¹

^vThe first satellite that was built by the French and would be placed in orbit by their rocket was destroyed by the explosion of the rocket in 1993. However, Turkey was determined to have one, so the studies for the second Turksat satellite have already begun.

In the financial field, Turkey provided \$ 1.2 billion with its limited capabilities. Some of this money was aid, especially food aid (mostly wheat and sugar), but most of it was credit sales for these countries.¹⁷²

Turkey tried hard to establish cultural ties with the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. It encouraged them to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic. Turkey sent many textbooks and offered to help to rewrite existing textbooks with the Latin alphabet and according to their cultures. Some Turkish entrepreneurs are trying to open private schools in which the Latin alphabet will be used. Some scholars joined their colleagues to examine establishment of a common Turkish language, which will be Istanbul Turkish. Turkey also offered 10,000 scholarships, including 1,200 at universities, to the Central Asian States.¹⁷³

Turkish radio and television broadcasts became available for these states. The new channel, the Avrasia channel was established by the state television broadcasting organization in 1992. The Avrasia channel broadcasts seven hours of weekday programming and thirteen hours on weekends in Istanbul Turkish with subtitles. The main channel of the state television, the

TRT-1, can be watched by some areas in the Caucasus, especially in Azerbaijan.

These efforts by Turkey aim to provide the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan with a model of a nation-state in their transformation process. The proposed model of Turkey is an independent nation-state based on the secular and democratic government structure and a liberal economy. The common factor of ethnicity will create harmony and goodwill with these states to improve relations among themselves and thus bring security to the region. The Turkish model will provide an instrument for them to increase the well-being of their citizens and guarantee the individual rights of their people.

3. The Iranian Efforts of Influence

The Iranian efforts to influence the Muslim population of the former Soviet Union began as early as the early days of the revolution. These efforts were the result of the policy of export of the regime. Iran made sustained efforts to reach the Muslim population which were suppressed by the Soviet regime. One of them was the direct broadcasts from Iran which delivered the message of revolution to the oppressed Muslims of the Soviet Union. In 1982, Iran asked permission to transfer its Consulate in Leningrad to Dushanbe- the capital

of Tajikistan, but was refused.¹⁷⁴

The break-up of the Soviet Union promoted challenges and opportunities for Iran. On the one hand, Iran's efforts at exporting its revolution, although more recently with good-neighbourliness rather than militancy, remained a central theme for elements within the theocracy as it continues to try to serve as a model for others.

On the other hand, Russia and other CIS countries remain as a main sources of sophisticated weapons and technology. Although they expect to create an annual \$8-10 billions worth of trade volume for the Iranian goods with the Central Asian states,¹⁷⁵ Russia and the Ukraine became important partners in trade. Iran signed a trade accord worth up to \$7 billion with the Ukraine in 1992.¹⁷⁶ What Iran is trying to do is walk a fine line between establishing its influence in Central Asia and enjoying good relations with Russia and the remaining CIS countries.

What so called Iranian model is an Islamic regime by all aspects similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is trying to emphasize that their model is neither simply "Islamic fundemantalist" nor "threatening". In their point of view, it is more geopolitik than ideological and both practical and pacific.¹⁷⁷ They believe that their cultural,

ethnic, and religious ties with the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan will be useful to export their model. Additionally, their model, with its economic, ideological, and political tools, will help the recipient states to close the gap between rich and poor and establish strong countries.

To establish its influence over these states, Iran resorted to a battery of strategies, mainly by developing mutually beneficial bilateral relations with individual republics, and championing membership of these states in multinational organizations. Another area of interest is increasing the cultural and religious ties by offering the Arabic alphabet by Iranian letters, printing textbooks for these countries, providing scholarships, and supporting mosques and religious institutions.

To implement these strategies, Iran worked hard to create diplomatic ties with these states. It recognized the independence of the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan quickly, and opened its embassies in these countries. Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayeti spent November 1991 in these states during his visit to Russia. Everywhere he traveled, he committed Iranian aid and assistance, as well as stressing Iran's natural willingness to help with religious education.

Iran has shown great interest in Tajikistan because the Tajiks speak Persian. Iran tried to establish direct air links, telecommunication and television broadcasting service. The National Bank of Iran planned to open its branch in Tajikistan.¹⁷⁸ The government officials of Tajikistan visited Iran several times,¹⁷⁹ and Iran sent teams to seek areas to cooperate with Tajikistan.¹⁸⁰

Tajikistan officially adopted the Arabic alphabet with Iranian letters. Iran published textbooks in Arabic alphabet for Tajikistan. The idea that Tajik is different than Persian is rejected and the Russian names of public places are being replaced by Persian ones through a "Foundation for the Persian Language".¹⁸¹

Iran also paid attention to Turkmenistan. Both countries share a border and Iran has a considerable amount of Turkomans within its territory. Iran offered to build a railroad link between Sarakhs and Mashhad. This link will be a part of the Silk Route project which will connect China and Iran to the West via Turkey. The two countries are also activating their ports on the Caspian Sea, in addition to establishing air links and building two dams.¹⁸²

Iran offered its assistance to improve the hydrocarbon industry of Turkmenistan. Iran expects to export 6.5 million

tons of crude oil annually as a part of a barter deal. Iran is going to buy 3 billion cubic meters of gas in order to supply its southern provinces.¹⁸³ In the cultural field, Iran offered to open cultural centers in Turkmenistan and exchange radio and television programs.¹⁸⁴

Iran is improving its relations with Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan plays a significant role in Iran's transportation and communication aspirations. Iran's Silk Route Project involves in part Iran's access to China through Kazakhstan. The expansion of Iran's shipping lines in the Caspian Sea embraces the ports of Anzali and Now Shahr in Iran and Ektau in Kazakhstan. Iran also established an air link between Tehran and Alma Ata. Kazakhstan's nuclear capacity also deserves Iranian attention.¹⁸⁵ Iran is also proposing a pipeline which will carry the Kazakh crude oil from the Tengiz oil field via Azerbaijan to the Iranian refinery in Tabriz. The refined oil will be transported to the Iranian ports in the Gulf.¹⁸⁶

Iran tried to establish banking relations, trade exchange, and facilitate joint investments with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.¹⁸⁷ The exchange of diplomatic envoys including top level officials occurred between Iran and the two countries. The construction of railway and road links became another area

of cooperation between Iran and the two countries.¹⁸⁸ Iranian radio began its broadcasting in Kyrgyz and Uzbek languages.¹⁸⁹

On the multinational level, Iran established the Caspian Sea Cooperation Council (CSCC) with the participation of Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Another regional cooperation organization, the ECO, which was established between Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, accepted the memberships of the Central Asian States, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan.

Iran was also determined to be an alternative leader to Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. To prove this, Iran offered the membership of Azerbaijan to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) during its Sixth Summit Meeting at Dakar in December, 1991. Besides, Iran presented to the summit the Azeri Sheikh ul-Islam (Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Caucasian Muslims) and Kazakh Foreign Minister. Both officials flew to Dakar in the Iranian plane as members of the Iranian delegation.¹⁹⁰

4. The Impact of the Rivalry on the Relations of the Two Countries

Although Iranian officials refuse the idea of a rivalry between Turkey and Iran, both countries are trying to their best to diminish the impact of each other and emphasize their

models to the region. The Iranian model and the Turkish one are fully contrary to each other. As noted, the Iranian model is based on the religious government structure. Turkey proposes the secular structure in which religion's role is diminished to the moral obligation of the individual.

The proposed trade routes of the two countries which will be based on the transportation links shows the rivalry. Turkey, despite the geopolitical disadvantage, proposes to connect the trade routes to the Europe via Turkey. However, Iran, by using its relative advantage of common borders and proximity, offers links with the Gulf. In any case, the reality of the geopolitics requires the substantial amount of links to be established via Iran.^w

Turkey, keeping this disadvantage in mind, offers to establish the communication links between the Central Asian states and the world via Turkey. Iran, on the other hand, tries to establish the communication links with these countries.

In the cultural field, Turkey empowers the common ethnic ground and offers the Latin alphabet as a common alphabet.

^wIt must be noted that, Iran and Turkey are not alone in the rivalry in Central Asia. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and many countries are rallying to get a share of the economic resources of the region. In terms of the trade and communication links, Pakistan also offered an alternative routes.

Iran, because of the limits of the ethnic ground, empowers the religion, and offers the Arabic alphabet and Persian.

So, the rivalry includes political influence, trade markets, and cultural influence. Whomever could enjoy the victory in this rivalry, it would definitely be a regional leader that can shape the outcome of the events in this part of the world. By using the economic, social, and political benefits of this victory, the triumphant nation may use its regional position to gain more political leverage in global politics.

If Iran will be surpassed by Turkey, and the Central Asian states prefer ethnic ties and secularism instead of the Irano-Islamic model, then this will be dangerous for the stability of the regime in Iran. The Turkic belt, which will surround northeast and northwest of Iran, may become attractive for the Turkish elements in Iran, such as Azeris and Turkomans. The secular structure and the refusal of the Irano-Islamic model will also empower the secular opposition groups in Iran.

On the contrary, if the Irano-Islamic model is successful, then Turkey may forget its economic and political hopes. The extreme religious groups will use the defeat as an

example and will be more active. Turkey will lose its chance to be a regional actor with a global influence.

E. THE CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS

The break-up of the Soviet Union led to the establishment of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. The long dispute and animosity between Azeris and Armenians led to open confrontation in Nagorno Karabagh. Nagorno Karabagh is a land strip within Azerbaijan which was granted an autonomous situation by the Soviets as they separated Nahcevan from Azerbaijan by giving the territory between Azerbaijan and Nahcevan to Armenia.¹⁹¹ The dispute between the Azeris and Armenians may be a new subject for the Western world which had a sympathy for Armenians, however, it is almost two century long.*

The problems began with the Russian and British plans to weaken the Ottoman Empire and establish their puppet regimes in eastern Anatolia. Their tool was the Armenians. The

*Armenian actions against Turks began during the Russian advance to the Eastern Caucasus in 1796. The conquest of the region by the Russians was ended with the mass massacres of the Turks by Armenians and Russians. To reward the Armenian support, the Russians granted them the lands of Turks who were massacred by the Armenians. The Azeris also were among the massacred Turkish population.

For more information: *Turks and Armenians: A Manual on The Armenian Question*, Justin and Carol McCarthy, 1989, pg:22.

Armenian irregulars, armed and backed by the Russians, began their massacre of the Turkish population in the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia as early as 1880s. The population exchange occurred under the Russian administrations to establish a Christian majority in the Muslim enclaves. The Turkish people were either forced to flee or were simply killed, and their lands were distributed to Armenians, Georgians, and Russians.

In 1918, Nagorno Karabagh, Nahcevan, Erevan, and Zangebur were the main disputed areas in which Armenian irregulars constantly attacked the Azeri populations. In one event, between March 30 and April 1 1918, the Armenian irregulars killed between 8,000 to 12,000 Azeris in the provinces of Baku with the support of the Red Army.¹⁹²

The recent dispute between Azeris and Armenians began in 1989. The movement of the Armenians during the Soviet rule let them to concentrate in Nagorno Karabagh. The Armenian armed groups began to seek for annexation of Nagorno Karabagh to Armenia by using a claim for an independence as a guise. The dispute began by with a propaganda campaign by the Armenians in 1987 to annex Nagorno Karabagh and Nahcevan to Armenia.¹⁹³

The first violence occurred in Sumgait in 1988 with the attack of Armenians. The Soviet troops were sent to Sumgait. Several Azeris were arrested for anti-Armenian activity and

tried in the Soviet courts. However none of the Armenians were arrested at the end of the violence which resulted in thirty-two deaths among the Armenians and Azeris.¹⁹⁴

In the following months the situation became worse, and violent Armenian activities forced the Azeris who were living in Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh to flee to Azerbaijan. In 1988, the predominantly Armenian administration of the Autonomous Republic unilaterally declared its independence. Although the Supreme Soviet refused the declaration, it acted in favor of Armenians, thus angered the Azeris. The Armenians openly established armed groups and massacred the Azeri population in Nagorno Karabagh. Armenia put an embargo on Nahcevan and isolated the region. Armenia unilaterally declared the annexation of Nagorno Karabagh in 1989.¹⁹⁵

The dispute and the lack of firmness of the administration which became a puppet of the Soviets sped up the political and national awareness of the Azeris. The Moscow oriented administration refused to establish national defense forces and establish strong control over the activities of armed groups in the region. The hundreds of thousands of Azeri refugees and their increasing death toll, and the increasing trend to the participation of Azerbaijan let the Azeris to create an underground nationalist parties, such as the

Azerbaijan People's Front (APF), the Birlik (Unity), the Dirilish (Azerbaijan Resurgence Party), the Kizilbash's People's Front, and the Social Democratic Organization of Azerbaijan.¹⁹⁶

The national awareness of the Azeris might be lost at the official level under Soviet rule, however, the people kept it in their hearts. Mass demonstrations occurred in Azerbaijan and in Nahcevan over the question of Nagorno Karabagh and the APF became popular during this era. The calls of the Azeri intellectuals to use the Azeri language and adoption of the Latin Alphabet instead of Russian and Cyrillic Alphabet were evidence of the growing national awareness.

Meantime the Azeri people remembered their brothers living in Iran. In fact, the Azeris were divided by Russia and Iran in 1828. As a result of the 1828 Turkmenchai agreement, the Turkic-speaking southern Caucasus was divided and the Aras river became a border of Iran and Russia. As much as 12-20 million Azeris live in Iran, most of them are settled near the border.¹⁹⁷

Following the Russian and Iranian occupation, the Azeris looked forward to the Ottomans for their independence. The nationalist movements established their organizations as early as 1906. With the help of the Ottomans, they were able to

establish an independent state in 1918. The independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was invaded by the Red Army in 1920. The Azerbaijan republic was demolished and Azerbaijan became another Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union. However, the Azeri rebellion continued in the countryside, and lasted almost a decade. Nahcevan was invaded in 1920, and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Nahcevan was created by the Soviets.

The era between 1920-1941 was called a "Great Terror" because of the Soviet oppression and asimilation at the expense of the wealth of Azerbaijan and the lives of the Azeris. Even the ones who worked as agents of the Soviets to establish communist rule in Azerbaijan were executed.¹⁹⁸

The agreement with Kemalist Turkey and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow in 1921. The similar agreement was signed with the Caucasus Republics in Kars in the same year. In these agreements, Nahcevan's separate status and close ties with Azerbaijan were confirmed and Nahcevan received protection from Kemalist Turkey.¹⁹⁹

By the end of World War Two, Stalin tried to establish Soviet rule in northern Iran. For this reason, Azeri nationalism was used by Stalin in 1946 to dictate his claims to Iran. The establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party

(*Firqah-i Democrat*) was the first step to rally the Azeri people of Iran. The party, which was led by Jafar Pishevari, was determined to unite all Azeris under Soviet rule. Under Soviet tutelage, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party supporters overthrew the Iranian provincial government and declared an independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in 1945.²⁰⁰

As soon as the Soviets received extensive oil privileges, the Soviet army left northern Iran. Without Soviet support, the Azeris could not stand long against the Iranian army. Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam granted extensive rights to Azeris in the negotiations while the Iranian army were gradually recapturing the territory. The independent Azeri Republic collapsed in December, 1946.²⁰¹

The growing nationalism in Azerbaijan received public support by the end of 1980s. An increased number of intellectuals addressed their historical, cultural, and ethnic ground as a Turk. They published nationalist articles and poems regarding to the Azeri culture and heritage. In December, 1989, along the Nahcevan borders with Iran and Turkey, residents dismantled frontier fortifications, cutting barbed wire and burning guard towers. They reclaimed their land which was declared a military zone, and wanted to visit

cemeteries and shrines in this zone. They asked to visit and trade freely with their brothers in Iran.

The incident in Baku in January, 1990 increased the anger of the Azeris and the power of the nationalist movement, mainly the APF. The events broke out with the killing of an Azeri by an Armenian with an axe in Baku. This event led to clashes of the Azeris and Armenians in Baku between 13-14 January. As usual, only the death toll of Armenians, which was 32, was counted, but the number of wounded or dead among Azeris was not published by the Soviets.

A week after the incident, the Soviet troops invaded Baku while Armenians were attacking Azeri villages in the Lachin and Nahcevan area. Soviet troops opened fire on any civilian and moving vehicle on the streets, and any windows where lights were burning. On 20 January, they ordered people to stay at their homes while wounded Azeris were crying for help and dead bodies were lying on the streets. The ages of the killed male and female Azeris varied between 13 and 70. The number of Azeris dead was between 69 (the Soviet military figure including 14 Soviet military personnel) and 200 (the APF declaration, which might be true because the Sheikh ul-Islam declared that he buried 180 bodies). The number of wounded Azeris was between 700 and 36,000. The arrest of

nationalists, especially the APF leaders followed the invasion of undefended Baku.²⁰²

Although the Western media was silent, and President Bush understood Gorbachev's "need to maintain order", the Supreme Soviet labeled the action of Gorbachev "an act of aggression against the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR" and "a crime against the Azerbaijani people".²⁰³

Following this event, Nahcevan declared its independence on 20 January and appealed to the United Nations to recognize its right to self determination. In Ganje, the people demanded the establishment of national defense forces and the evacuation of the Soviet troops. Many parties were established, and new publications appeared. The APF movement increased its supporter base despite the losses in its leadership.²⁰⁴

The break-up of the Soviet Union led to the declaration of the independence of Azerbaijan in 1991. In the first free elections in 1992, the APF won the elections, and Abulfaz Elcibey, the leader of the APF, became President. Under his Presidency, Azerbaijan tried to establish a nation state, with a national economy and defense.

The conflict in Nagorno Karabagh escalated to an undeclared war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite the overt involvement of the Armenian troops, Armenia consistently

followed the tactic of Serbia, and claimed that the Armenians who were fighting in Nagorno Karabagh were "irregulars" who were out of its control. The Armenian forces gradually forced the Azeris to retreat and captured Azeri territories. The Armenian victories weakened the authority of the APF.

Azerbaijan understood that Russia was the protector of Armenia in this conflict. The APF administration tried to remove the Russian influence over Azerbaijan. They refused to join to the CIS, and preferred other countries for cooperation. They looked for the protection of Turkey in the dispute and its economic and political support to establish a strong state.

The relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey rapidly increased, and economic, cultural, and diplomatic links were established. Visits of high level officials occurred. Turkey and Azerbaijan signed many bilateral cooperation agreements. One of them was about the construction of the pipeline which will carry Azeri and Kazakh oil to the Meditterrean. Azerbaijan declared that it will adopt the Latin alphabet. Turkey also provided limited military aid and assistance to establish a national defense force.

Azerbaijan is very important for the Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia. Because of the historical,

cultural, and ethnic links, Azerbaijan is a friendly state to Turkey. However, Armenians with their deep hate against Turks, their miserable actions against Turks in history, and their territorial claims over eastern Anatolia, it is hard to believe that Armenia will follow friendly policies against Turkey.

Most of all, Azerbaijan can provide the door for Turkey to Central Asia. The most important resource of the Central Asian countries is their hydrocarbon resources. Turkey, if can construct pipelines that will carry this resource to the Mediterrean via Turkey, may became a middleman in the hydrocarbon market. The hard currency that the Central Asian states get, will increase their purchasing capacity. Thus, Turkish exports will increase. The choice of Turkey, instead of Russia and Iran, will increase the political power of Turkey.

However, all of these scenarios depend on how stable Azerbaijan is. The Nagorno Karabagh war is not only a war between Armenians and Azeris, but also an impetus to dismember Azerbaijan and hit the Turkish influence in Central Asia. The Armenian victories may cause other ethnic groups in Azerbaijan to carry-out similar activities. For example, the Lezghis, a Caucasian people whose population straddles Russia and

Azerbaijan, are under the pressure of Armenian propoganda to revolt against Azerbaijan.²⁰⁵

Another example is the Caucasian Kurds, who were actively fighting along with Armenians. The leader of the Caucasian Kurds, Rachman Mustafayev, unilaterally declared an independent Republic of Kurdistan.²⁰⁶ As noted before, the PKK and Armenian alliance, which is evident by the captured Armenians in the PKK squads in southern Anatolia, pushes Turkey to be against Armenia in the dispute. This also gives another dimension to the conflict in the Caucaus.

This dispute is also probing the capacity of Turkey as a candidate for a regional power. If Turkey unilaterally can not dictate the outcome of the dispute, and empower the situation of Azerbaijan, then its credibility will vanish in the region.

Iran, on the other hand, is watching the situation closely. Although dismembering Azerbaijan will create an unstable and uncertain situation in the Caucasus, Iran would not enjoy a Pan-Turkist Azerbaijan and the emergence of the nationalism among the Azeris. A strong and nationalist Azerbaijan, at least, would be an example or a focus of attraction for the Azeris who are living in Iran, even if it does not seek for the unification of the Azeris.

So, Iran followed dual policies to contain the Azeri nationalism. On the one hand, Iran seeks for close links with Azerbaijan to establish its influence over it. Iran addressed the common religion and cultural links with the Azeris based on the Shia history.^y Iran welcomed the establishment of the pro-Iranian Islamic Party of Azerbaijan.²⁰⁷ To gain the hearts of public, Iran sent shipments of food, oil, and coal to Nahcevan which was under the blockade of Armenia. Additionally, Iran agreed to build a railway link between Azerbaijan and Nahcevan via its territory. In the diplomatic arena, Iran offered the membership of Azerbaijan to the OIC. Iran enjoyed the participation of Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea Cooperation Council which was established by its initiative.

These efforts were fruitful and established close links with Azerbaijan. Visits of top level officials occurred. During these visits, declarations of goodwill and neighborliness were given and agreements on bilateral cooperation in different fields were signed.

^yOne of the main actors of the Shia was Shah Ismail who established the Shia state in Iran. Shah Ismail settled in Ardebil which was in Azerbaijan, so he also occupies an important place in Azeri history.

On the other hand, Iran seeks the establishment of close links with Armenia. Iran used Armenia to weaken the APF administration, and thus nationalism in Azerbaijan. Also the role of Armenia as a buffer between Turkey and the Turks of the Caucasus and Central Asia was an important factor in the flirt of Iran and Armenia. Historically, Armenians and Iranians were close to each other. An important number of Armenians who were rich and influential lived in Iran for a long time. They were granted seats in the Majlis during the Pahlavi era and in the Islamic Republic. They were politically active in Iran.²⁰⁸ Armenia also looked to Iran for economic ties and political support, and these were provided by Iran. Iran and Armenia established both economic and political ties, and the two countries agreed on the creation of a balance (against Turkey-because there is no other powerful actor in the area) in the region.²⁰⁹

The victories of Armenians led to a coup d'etat in Azerbaijan, and Elcibey, the APF leader and President, was overthrew by Surat Guseynov without any fighting. Geydar Aliyev, who was a former Politburo member of CPSU and pro-Russian, became President. During his position as a Chairman of Parliament of Nahcevan, Aliyev, despite of the Azerbaijan protest, signed a border agreement with Armenia on normalizing

relations, developing communications, and avoiding armed clashes.²¹⁰ During his Presidency, Aliyev tried to get the Russian support instead of active Turkish involvement.

Many parties offered good offices to parties to solve the dispute peacefully including the UN, Kazakhstan, the CIS, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Iran, and Turkey.

Turkey hosted the Armenian and Azeri Presidents, and tried to help them to find a peaceful and honourable solution to the problem. To improve its position as a mediator, Turkey tried to normalize diplomatic relations and establish economic links with Armenia. Besides, Turkey actively participated to humanitarian efforts and shipped food and medicine to Armenia.

One of the proposals of Turkey was the exchange of territories which would create a pure Armenian state by annexing some part of Nagorno Karabagh to Armenia. At the same time, this proposal would create a pure Azeri state by annexing territory between Nahcevan and Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan, thus uniting Nahcevan and Azerbaijan.²¹¹

Turkey also tried to force the parties to find a peaceful solution to the problem in the multinational organizations. The Security Council issued Resolution 882. The Turkish officials prepared another peace plan with the participation

of Russia and the support of the U.S. in 1993. While the talks were going on, Armenian troops invaded a huge part of the territory of Azerbaijan.

The Turkish reaction was swift. Troops were positioned near the Armenian border. Turkish planes began reconnaissance and patrolling flights in the region. The 1921 agreements were addressed, and any attack on Nahcevan was declared as a reason for war. Ozal called for outright intervention, however, Prime Minister Demirel preferred diplomatic measures rather than military intervention.²¹² So, Turkey did not act militarily.

In the following months, Armenian attacks continued. This time Prime Minister Ciller asked Parliament to authorize her to declare war against Armenia in case of necessity. Again, Demirel, as President and a veteran politician with a great experience, was reluctant to intervene militarily.

F. THE EXTENSIVE MILITARY BUILD-UP OF IRAN

Each sovereign country has a right to raise its own defense force, and seek for the means of protection for itself. However, the nature of its policies, ideologies and military power may be defensive or offensive. If the present military build-up of Iran is examined, it will be noticed that it has more offensive character rather than defensive. This

raises the question of the justification of the offensive military power, and the question of offensive against whom?

It was known that during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran suffered heavy damage to its military. Iran lost much of its arms that it purchased from the People's Republic of China (PCR) and the Eastern bloc in the 1988 offensive of Iraq. According to some estimates, Iran lost over 40 % of its major weapon systems.²¹³

Iran began to implement a military build-up program as soon as there was a cease-fire and spent \$ 9.7 billion between 1988 and 1991. In the following years, Iran allocated \$10 billion to acquire weapons in a five year period. To date, Iran is in the third year of a 5-year billion dollar annual purchasing program with Russia. Iran was purchased three Kilo-class diesel electric submarines, 28 MIG 27s and 29s, 24 Su-24 and 27 fighter bombers, 18 fighters and 2 modern Ilyushin-76s fitted with aerial reconnaissance and EW equipment, missile launchers and long-range guns, 250 T-72 tanks. Iran planned to spend \$14.5 billion to buy arms, including high-technology computers from the United States. Other systems that Iran is planning to buy could enable it to interdict the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, wage armored warfare, and construct powerful air and air defense systems.²¹⁴

Iran received \$ 6.9 billion of arms deliveries during 1988-1991, included \$ 2.1 billion from the Soviet Union, \$2.0 billion from the PRC, \$0.3 billion from Western Europe, \$1.0 billion from Eastern Europe, and \$1.5 billion from other sources.²¹⁵ Iran received large numbers of 122mm weapons and M-46 130mm guns as well as large numbers of rocket launchers.²¹⁶

According to some Iranian Mojaheddin reports, Russia will provide Iran a T-72 assembly plant, 122mm and 130mm guns, 100 MIG-21 fighters, a MIG-29 assembly plant, 48 MIG-31 air defense fighters, 24 Su-24 strike fighters, and 2 IL-76s²¹⁷. Additional reports from the People's Mojaheddin indicate that Iran is importing three more batteries of SA-5, an undefined number of SA-10 or SA-12 surface-to-air/anti-tactical ballistic missile systems, and a next generation warning and command and control system including radars from Russia.²¹⁸

Iran purchased two or three 27-ton midget submarines from North Korea in addition to three Kilo type submarines. Iran also increased its anti-ship missile inventory by acquiring 60-100 C-801 or YF-6 missiles from the PRC. Iran also sought more advanced anti-ship missiles from North Korea and the PRC, 8-12 missile patrol boats, and possibly frigates.²¹⁹

Le Monde reported a deal of 110 planes worth \$11 billion that includes 12 TU-22Ms, 48 MIG-29s, 24 MIG-31s, a variant of the AN-72 that serves as a maritime reconnaissance aircraft, two IL-76 early warning aircrafts, a variety of air defense missile batteries (the long-range fixed site SA-5, and the SA-11 or SA-13 mobile systems).²²⁰

In addition to Russia, Ukraine also signed a four year barter deal with Iran worth about \$7 billion. In exchange for Iranian oil and natural gas, Ukraine will provide an unspecified number of weapons and some industrial equipment.²²¹

Another country that helped Iran in its military build-up program was Iraq. Iraq, the long-time enemy of Iran, sent its most modern aircraft to Iran during the Desert Storm. Iraq hoped to get these aircraft back at the end of the conflict, however, Iran preferred to accept them as a payment for the war damage. As a result, Iran received 24 Mirage F-1s, 24 the SU-24s, 40 the SU-22s, 4 the SU-20s, 7 the SU-25s, 12 the MIG-23s, 4 the MIG-29s, 1 ADNAN early warning aircraft, and 33 civil aircraft.²²²

Iran's desire to acquire missiles led it to purchase more advanced Silkworm and M-11 missiles from the PRC and Scud missiles from North Korea.²²³ A senior North Korean delegation traveled to Tehran to close the deal on November 29, 1990.

Iran purchased 20-30 advanced, long-range North Korean missiles. Iran and Syria are cooperating with North Korea in the development and co-production of Scud Cs and another North Korean missile, called the No-Dong-1 with a range of 1,000 kilometers.²²⁴ Besides, Iran is trying to modify these missiles capable enough to carry nuclear and chemical warheads with increased range and more accuracy.²²⁵

Iran also concentrated on mass destruction weapons, such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. To pursue this desire they received assistance from the PRC, North Korea, Argentina, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, and several undefined third parties. Iranians are operating in the same manner the Iraqis did in the 1980s; undercover activity, spreading sites, concealment of installations, creating a network of agents abroad, recruitment of foreign experts, and persuading exiled Iranian scientists and technicians to return. Iran's covert actions to acquire the necessary technologies for mass destruction weapons led to some success.

Iran's nuclear program was first initiated by the Shah, however the Revolution halted the program. During the 1960s Iran purchased a nuclear research reactor from the United States. After the 1973 war in the Middle East and 1973 oil crises, the Shah began construction of twenty-three nuclear

energy plants. Construction began on two plants in Bushehr by German companies. Another plant was begun by French companies at Darkhouin. Under the same program, Iran sought to acquire laser separation and plutonium enrichment technology. Iran received four lasers operating in the critical 16 micron bands. Iran also purchased important amounts of yellow cake from South Africa.²²⁶

The nuclear program of Iran was halted when the Revolution occurred in 1979. Iran continued its nuclear efforts only after the Iran-Iraq war. In 1983, Iran revitalized its laser isotope separation program. In 1984, it opened a new research center in Isfahan. In 1985, Iran placed ads in international newspapers asking Iranian scientists to participate in a conference on nuclear research at Bushehr. Iran continued the construction of two reactors at Bushehr with the help of the Argentina nuclear power agency which works closely with West Germany's Kraftwerke Union. Argentina also reached an agreement with Iran on the sale of enriched uranium.²²⁷ Iraqi air raids halted the construction on these sites in 1987. Iran also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan in 1987.²²⁸

Iran also sought nuclear reactors from other sources. Iran's approach to the Western countries was refused. However,

Iran negotiated with the USSR for two 440 megawatt nuclear power plants in 1990. In 1990, Iran signed a broad research cooperation agreement with the PRC including the establishment of a 27 kilowatt research reactor at Isfahan. It was reported that the PRC agreed on the sale of a 300 megawatt power reactor. In the same year, Iran approached a Spanish firm to conclude the work on the reactor at Bushehr. South Korea also showed interest in the project and sent survey teams to Bushehr. In 1992, Iran negotiated with India to purchase a 10 megawatt research reactor.^{229z}

There are reports that Iran planned to construct a yellow cake plant in Yazd, and another uranium enrichment and ore processing plant close to its Shaghand uranium mine with foreign assistance.²³⁰ It is also reported that Iran has an uranium processing center at Karaj.²³¹

Iran also approached the former Soviet Republics to acquire nuclear technology, weapons, and to hire nuclear scientists. According to some reports of the People's Mojaheddin, Iran negotiated with Kazakhstan to purchase nuclear warheads that it can fit to Chinese made Silkworm and

^zThe involvement of Russia and the PRC in the sale of nuclear reactors was also addressed in Ref.:90, pg: 52, and in Ref.:95, pg:28-30. The agreements with India and Pakistan were also addressed in Ref.:95, pg:24-26

other capable missiles. Some unconfirmed reports even suggests that Iran has two warheads that were purchased from Kazakhstan.²³²

Iran also increased its efforts to produce biological weapons. Iran's activities in this field date back to 1982. Iran tried to produce mycotoxins in 1982, and tried to buy two new strains of fungus from Canada and the Netherlands in 1989. It is also reported that Iran conducted extensive research on more lethal active agents like anthrax and on biotoxins. Some reports identified a facility at Damghan and another one near Tehran as working on research and production of biological weapons. However, little is known about the state of the Iranian effort and its capacity.²³³

Iran was also very active developing chemical weapons in the late 1980s. Iran sought foreign assistance to acquire the technology to produce chemical weapons. European firms, such as Lurgi, were used to obtain pesticide plants and the needed feedstocks. In 1987, Iran received 75 tons of thiodiglycol, a key precursor of mustard gas, from the U.S. firm Alcolac International. Iran also used the German firms of Colimex and Rotexchemie International, the Greek firm of Cy Savas Oikonomidis, and the Singaporean firm of Hallet Enterprises in

its efforts. By using these firms, Iran obtained 120 tons of sodium cyanide.²³⁴

Iran also received South Korean support in building two chemical weapon plants which were sold under the cover of being pesticide plants. Another poison gas plant was constructed with the aid of Bayer and Lurgi at Qazvin. Iran has a major poison gas plant at Damghan.²³⁵

Iran began to use its chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran used mustard gas and blood agents in its attacks and delivered them in bombs and artillery shells. Iran also tested Scuds with chemical war heads.²³⁶

It is unclear that Iran is capable of producing a nuclear weapon. It is also unclear that Iran has extensive offensive chemical or biological war capabilities. However, it is very certain that Iran is determined to have mass destruction weapons including nuclear weapons, chemical and biological war heads and delivery systems.

With regard to the determination of Iran to acquire chemical and biological weapons, Rafsancani described them as:

poor man's atomic bombs (that) can easily be produced. We should consider them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper.²³⁷

Rafsanjani also declared the determination of Iran to acquire weapons of mass destruction in another speech:

With regard to...radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the war that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed on the battlefield.

We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of...radiological weapons. From now on, you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.²³⁸

Iran accepts that acquiring mass destruction weapons will provide added prestige and power in the region. Iran also views possession of mass destruction weapons as a hedge against the great powers and as a counter-weight against Israel. Iran's Vice President Ayatollah Mohajerani states this dimension of the justification of the Iranian nuclear program as follows:

...because of the superiority of nuclear arms, every Islamic state should seek to obtain them. In other words, the nuclear capabilities of Israel and Muslim states must be equalized. If Israel is allowed to have a nuclear capacity, then Islamic states, too, should be given the same right.²³⁹

Iran also acquired the necessary platforms to deliver mass destruction weapons. The Iranian purchases of long range artillery and missiles are one way to deliver chemical,

biological and tactical nuclear war heads. The SU-24s (which is equivalent of the F-111) with its range of 1,600 kilometers (LO-HI-LO profile) and the TU-22 Backfires with a range of 4,000 kilometers can hit any target in the region with mass destruction weapons in addition to other fixed-wing Iranian aircraft.

IV. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES

A. POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES

1. Ideologies of The Two Countries

a. Iran

As noted before, Iran is an Islamic Republic based on the teachings of religion. Iran claims that its ideology is generated from the religion, and Islamic Republic of Iran is implementing the Shia ideology in the political and social life.

The ideology that was basically shaped by Khomeini has several important dimensions. First, it is a *tawhidi* concept; which means its followers accept only the dominance of God. In other words, the word of God is the sole source of the deeds of the government. In this concept, because the Book (Quran) addressed every need of man, and God delivered the Book to believers, human beings are not authorized to create decisions on every aspect of the life. Governments are the part of daily life of the people, so, governments are also subject to the laws of the Book. Only the knowledgeable people (Faqih) on the Book may interpret the words of the Book.

It is the Western world that opened an ideologic war against Islam that created defective and alien ideas, such as secularism, nationalism, communism, and democracy. By using their military power, they dictated their terms to the Muslim countries. Khomeini explains this as follows:

...These new groups(imperialists- Western powers) began their imperialist penetration of the Muslim countries about three hundred years ago, and they regarded it as necessary to work for the expiration of Islam in order to attain their ultimate goals. It was not their aim to alianete the people from Islam in order to promote Christianity among them, for the imperialists really have no religious belief, Christian or Islamic. Rather, throughout this long historical period, and going back to the Crusades, they felt that the major obstacle in the path of their materialistic ambitions and the chief threat to their political power was nothing but Islam and its ordinances, and the belief of people in Islam. They therefore plotted and campaigned against Islam by various means.²⁴⁰

Another way to establish their control over the Muslim world was to divide the Muslims and weaken them. So, the imperialist powers formed a conspiracy to crush the Muslims. They sought to create conflict in the Muslim world through political conspiracies which aimed to bring about seperation among the brothers under various pretexts. They sought to control the Muslim countries by their agents and puppets.

The imperialists created artificial disputes among the Muslims. Thus, they were able to divide the Muslim world.

These divisions between the Muslims are enabling the imperialists to meddle in the internal affairs of the Muslims and to keep them in a constant state of disunity. The imperialist powers had thus established their supremacy over the Muslim world. As a result, they were able to enjoy the control of the vast resources of the Muslim countries.²⁴¹

For this reason, it is essential to create unity of the believers throughout the world. This is explained by the *Umma* (the community of believers) dimension of the ideology. Without unity between Muslims revolutions can not succeed.

Khomeini explained this as follows:

We see, too, that together, the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic umma from each other and artificially created separate nations. There once existed the great Ottoman State, and that, too, the imperialists divided...Therefore, after numerous prior wars, the imperialists at the end of World War One divided the Ottoman State, creating in its territories about ten or fifteen petty states. Then each of these was entrusted to one of their servants or a group of their servants.

...In order to assure the unity of the Islamic umma,... in order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people. The formation of such a government will serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the

Muslims; just as Fatimat az-Zahra^{aa} (upon whom be peace) said in her address: 'The Imamate exists for the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and replacing their disunity with unity.'²⁴²

The establishment of such a unity among the Muslims will prevent the imperialist powers from dividing the Muslims and plundering the wealth of the Muslims.

Another result of the plundering of the wealth of the Muslim world, the rule of tyrannies, and the imperialist's control over the Muslims is the division of the Muslims as oppressed and oppressor. The Muslim societies thus divided as the *mostazafeen* (oppressed) and the *mostekbrin* (oppressor) according to their possession of power and wealth.

The Mostazafeen dimension of the ideology focused on the economic exploitation and political oppression of the masses of the Muslim world. Khomeini delivers his ideas on this dimension of the ideology as follows:

The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by the oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in opulence.

...It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression

^{aa}Fatimat az-Zahra was the daughter of the Prophet and wife of Ali.

and, for the sake of the well-being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow these governments and form an Islamic government.²⁴³

How the Muslim world could get rid of imperialist hegemony and establish an Islamic government is explained by the *Jihadic* dimension of the ideology. The Jihadic dimension is a revolutionary one, encouraging both the Muslim masses and the Ulema to engage in political action.

It accepts that the people are the most important source of political power and they should arise with alertness, attention and curtail those corrupts hands which seek to put Islamic states under the domination of the great powers. Before the people, the powers, no matter how great they may be, can accomplish nothing because it is impossible to impose something upon people. The people who want to resist against the great powers seek to have no compromise with them and also intend to neither eastern nor western and wish to follow the right path of humanity and Islam, should preapare themselves for everything. The people must sacrifice themselves for this struggle.²⁴⁴

This can only be understood by knowing the concept of the *Shahadet* (martyrdom). The *Shahadet* is a sacred act in the path of God, it shows the power of the blood over the sword.

Combined with the Shia doctrine, it is the way to unfold the power of Islam over tyranny as Imam Husayn did in Karbela.

As quoted before, the Islam that Khomeini understands is,

Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism.²⁴⁵

In other words, all Muslims must train to be revolutionaries that they can become the catalysts of change in their non-Islamic societies.

The leaders of the Jihad are the Ulema, who should "...put an end to this injustice and to seek to bring happiness to millions of people... through destroying and eliminating the unjust governments and through establishing a sincere and active Muslim government."²⁴⁶

The Islamic government is a prerequisite to establish these dimensions of the ideology. The ideologues of the thought address the form of Islamic government in the times of the Prophet and its first Caliphs(or Imams) when the law of Islam, divine command, had absolute authority over individuals, and the government. Under the leadership of the Prophet or Imams, Islamic government was ruled according to the Book that has been revealed by God.

Islamic government has the sense of adherence to law, which is the Sheriat. It is the law of the Book that will rule over society. So, it is the main aim of Islamic government to establish the just rule over the society based on the laws of the Book. Islamic government is not an end of the ideology, it is a tool to establish unity, happiness and security of the believers in the just society.

Islamic government will adjust the society and remove the oppressors by controlling the concentration of wealth through the implementation of the Islamic tax systems. This would not only narrow the gap between the rich and the poor but would also ensure that wealth was not acquired by the exploitation.

The jurists, through parliament and judiciary, will supervise such work and ensure that the executive efficiently carries out its responsibilities and does not exceed its powers. The jurists also should check the executive that the executive does not exploit the resources of the ruled and acquire wealth which would lead to the corruption. The judiciary that consist of the jurists whose knowledge of the law are essential factor in their role will oversee the work of the legislature and the executive.

The Parliament had to be elected by the people. However, such an election is subject to certain limitations. Besides,

the role of the Parliament and the legislature are different from their meanings in the West. The Parliament does not engage in the legislation, on the contrary, it acts as a conflict management arena and creates necessary programs for the implementation of the Islamic laws. In Islamic government no one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator(God).

The ideologues of the thought use the verses of the Quran to empower the idea. Such as "obey the Messenger" (Quran 4:59), and "obey the holders of the authority among you" (Quran, 4:59) were used to explain that, it is the duty of all Muslims to obey the Prophet and the leaders of the Islamic government.

On the other hand, it is the duty of the most knowledgeable to ensure that these organs of the Islamic government are functioning properly. What it means that the institutions of the Islamic government and government itself are obeying the rules of the Book.

This is another important idea that Khomeini introduced as the concept of the Velayet-e Faqih (religious jurisprudent). The Faqih should be the most knowledgeable person on the laws of God, because Islamic government is the rule of the laws. He is also trustworthy, excellent in his

belief and morals, and just. Khomeini addresses several reasons to indicate the necessity of a ruler. For example, Khomeini explains:

...One is that men have been set upon a certain well-defined path and commanded not to stray from it, nor to transgress against the established limits and norms, for if they were to stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God's laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the rights of others. If no such restraining individual or power were appointed, nobody would voluntarily abandon any pleasure or interest of his own that might result in harm or corruption to the others; everybody would engage in oppressing and harming others for the sake of their own pleasures and interests.²⁴⁷

According to Khomeini, the Faqih is over all of the institutions of the government, he is the one who will guide the rulers of the government to act according to Islam. If the rulers of the government adhere to Islam, they must necessarily submit to the Faqih, asking him about the laws and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them.

Another reason of the necessity of the Faqih is the absence of the Imam according to Khomeini. Because the twelfth Imam is in the occultation, and Islam and the Imamate must be protected, a guardian is necessary. In the absence of Imam, it

is the duty of the Faqih to be guardian of Islam by the name of Imam. The Faqih will perform the duties of the Imam and his authority should be equal to the same authority that the Prophet and the Imams had, not in terms of status but in terms of function.²⁴⁸

b. Turkey

The foundation of the ideology in Turkey is established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk was a great soldier, statesman, reformist, ideologue, and leader. He was strongly nationalist, and devoted his life to the Turkish nation. He had a great vision on the politics and on the society. In his youth, he studied many Western authors and ideologues. He also had a great knowledge on the history and literature of both the Western world, and on the Turkish world.

At the final days of the Ottoman Empire, there were three main ideas among the intellectuals, the Pan Ottomanism, the Pan Turkism, and the Pan Islamism. As addressed before, the Pan Ottomanism was based on the concept of gathering different nationals of the Empire under the same flag by allowing them to be a part of the system. The Pan Islamism, on the other hand, was concentrated on the concept of gathering all of the Muslim world under the flag of the Caliph by creating more developed Islamist structure in the Empire.

Both ideas were experienced during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Pan Ottomanism was tested by the leaders of Tanzimat movement and Young Turks during the First and Second Meshrutiyet (Constitutional) periods. (1876-1877, 1908-1918). Contrary to the expectations of the Young Turks, it did not work. None of the Christian nationals of the Empire devoted themselves to the well-being of the Empire. As a response, Abdulhamit dissolved the Parliament and tried to implement the Pan Islamism. As noted before, none of the Moslem nationals favored the idea.

The remaining option, the Pan Turkism, had different interpretations. In one school of thought, it was the idea of gathering all of the Turkish people in the world under the same flag and establishing "Turan", a great Turkish Empire of the times. One of its supporters, Enver, followed this idea, and spent his life without any succses. Besides, his ambitions caused the disintegration of the Empire.

On the other hand, according to Ataturk, the Pan Turkism was a nationalist movement in which the creation of a nation state based on the national boundries was accepted as an ultimate goal. The boundries of this nation state were defined as "Misak-i Milli", instead of Turan. So, instead of running

unrealistic goals, Ataturk was determined to follow more reachable goals in his policies.

Ataturk set twin goals for his ideology: creation of independent self-preservation within the national boundaries, and modernization of the society. These goals put a fundemantal imprint on the future course of Turkey. Externally, they implied distant but peaceful relations with foreign powers. Internally, they were interpreted as a search for development along the lines of the contemporary civilization of the West.

Ataturk transformed Turkish nation from being undeveloped and forgotten soldiers of the Ottoman Empire to the contemporary nation with a democratic administration. Thus, Ataturk instilled a new sense of pride and honor among the demorilized Turkish nation. He created the Republic of Turkey, a nation state with democratic institutions, from the debris of history.

The establishment of a nation state was managed by several reforms. These reforms were based on the ideological foundation called "Kemalism". Its main points were popularly known as the Six Arrows. These are republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and reformism.

The principle of republicanism declares that the regime of Turkey is a republic. The representative system of republics allow the people to shape their futures. It is the most honorable solution to the dispute between the ruler and the ruled. In the republics, the people itself is the ruler and ruled. It is the best form of regime that allows people to increase their well-being. In the republics, the people will find solutions to their problems by discussion, thus the harmony in the nation will increase. The republics is the form of regime in which democracy can work. Ataturk believed that the people has a right to determine their future.

Even in 1923, when the National Grand Assembly was first established, it was written in the Assembly that "sovereignty is vested in the nation without any restrictions". This is the just explanation of the Ataturk's republicanism. It is the nation that has sovereignty, neither dynasties nor clergy.

Ataturk also emphasized the nationalism in order to create strong nation state. To establish a common will of the nation to protect and develop the country, the nationalism is a right tool. The nationalism also will increase the harmony, cooperation, and respect among the citizens of the nation.

Ataturk replaced the universalism of the Ottoman Empire with a realistic version of the nationalism. He encouraged the

studies on the Turkish identity of the people, especially on the pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic eras of the Turkish history.

One of his mottos was "Turk: pride, work, trust". In his motto, he told the Turkish nation that there are many things to be proud of as a Turk. But we must work hard to catch up the contemporary civilization. After then, we can trust on ourselves and our future.

The nationalism that Ataturk interprets is neither racist nor unrealistic. He accepted that there may be minorities or different ethnic grounds in Turkey. The crucial thing is not to be purely, ethnically Turk, it is a feeling oneself as a Turk, as a member of this great nation. It is to share same happiness or same pain with others. It is to share the common will of developing and protecting the country.^{bb} Another motto, "Happy is the one who calls himself as a Turk.", may explain the anti-racist form of the Ataturk's nationalism.

As mentioned, the Ataturk's nationalism is not seeking for the creation of great Turkish Empire, or Turan, in which all of the Turks in the world would gather. The relations with

^{bb}An example of the patriotism in the United States will be helpful to many readers. As it is observed, the vast majority of the citizens in the United States are proud of being American, although there are no ethnically American people, except the native Americans. So, instead of looking for pure ethnic Turk, Ataturk emphasized a common feeling of being a member of Turkish nation.

other Turkish peoples living in other parts of the world is encouraged because of existing close ties. However, the approach to the Turks in abroad is limited with cultural, linguistic, and social relations. To rally for such an idea (Turan) would destroy all of the resources of Turkey. In this case, Turkey would spend all of its energy to reach an unrealistic goal. Turkey must use its resources and energy to increase the well-being of its citizens and catch up with the contemporary civilization.

With the principle of populism, Ataturk removed the bases for class struggle among the citizens. Populism ensured that each citizen has the same rights and duties under the law. The citizens of Turkey are equal. The sovereignty can not be given to any class, group, or person. The discrimination based on the class, wealth, race or any means are removed. Each citizen has basic and fundamental rights which can not be abolished and transferred. The rights of citizens are under the protection of the law. Populism is not a socialism, it is an equal and just treatment of the citizens. Populism also requires that the administration must work for the well-being of its citizens and the country. So, it is the principle of being "for the people, by the people".

Etatism emphasized the central role of the state in directing the nation's economic activities. Ataturk understood that independence is not only being independent as a sovereignty, it requires being independent on every aspects of life, in the economic field, in the justice, and so on. If a nation is under the foreign influence on any area, then we can not speak about independence. To achieve full independence, Turkey has to remove foreign influence on every field.

As a witness of the burden of capitulations, Ataturk gave great importance to economic development. Etatism is a principle to guide the economic development of Turkey. It is a mixed system, both the private sector and the state are active in the development of economy.

To understand better, one should know the situation of Anatolia, and newly born Turkey in the 1920s. There were no industrial complex, no accumulated wealth, no infrastructure, and no know-how to establish national economy and industry. The people was hit by the ongoing wars of decades. The invasion of Anatolia, especially the well-implemented Greek efforts, destroyed what was on hand. The country needed everything, hospitals, roads, energy, food, and so on. The small amount of the existed industries were under the foreign

control. The primitive industry and home based production were not capable of producing the needs of the country.

Besides, there are some areas that although not profitable for the private sector, the country needs desperately, such as, infrastructure. In some areas, the investment is essential to establish national industry, such as strategic minerals. The first goal of the economic activities is to reach the self-reliant status to remove the influence of foreigners.^{cc}

So, the state assumed the duty of establishing national industry and regulating the economy. The first industrial complexes were build in the 1930s. From then on, etatism became a guideline for the Turkish economy. The state planned the economic activities and invested on those areas that private sectors either is not capable or not willing to do so. Thus, the state enterprises were established. Under the guideliness of etatism, Turkey achieved rapid development.

Ataturk believed that the seperation of church from state allowed rationalism and science to emerge as leading planks of Western civilization. As addressed before, the corruption of

^{cc}It should be noted that, Ataturk is not against foreign investment if and only if it is beneficial to Turkey. What Ataturk is strongly opposing is the dominance of foreigners or the dependency on foreign powers.

clergy and their dominance on the administration of the Ottoman Empire led to the underdevelopment of the Empire in science and technology.^{dd} The resistance of the clergy undermined many reform movements.^{ee} As a result the overwhelming superiority of the West which was accumulated basically after the separation of church and state eventually led to the participation of the Empire.

So, Ataturk separated clergy and state in the modern Turkey that aimed to catch up the Western civilization. Ataturk sought to disengage religion from the condition of being political instrument. Ataturk did not attack the religion, or oppress individuals because of the religion. It was the dominance of the corrupted clergy that he demolished.

Besides, secularism granted more freedom to the individual. The individual is free in his religion, it is his

^{dd}The clergy resisted everything from the West even it was a technological innovation. This resulted in the lack of modern technology. For example, the first press came to the Empire two centuries after its establishment in the West. The reason was very clear, because the clergy established their hegemony on the knowledge of the book, if the press were accepted, many people would have an access to the Book. The hattats (people who were writing books by hand) and clergy refused the press because it would decrease the cost of books and could produce more. This would increase the education level of the people and could argue what the clergy was saying.

^{ee}One of the events was the revolt of the 31 March 1909 in which clergy and Abdulhamit were encouraged a revolt against the Parliament and tried to demolish the constitutional regime. Ataturk was one of the staff officers of the army, called the liberation army, that established the constitutional regime after the revolt.

decision to believe in any religion or not. Nobody can be forced to express his religious beliefs or to accept a certain one. Secularism removed the discrimination among the people based on the religion. It also removed the clergy that interrupts the relation between the individual and God. The role of religion was reduced to the individual, and the role of the clergy is defined as a guide to the needed. This role is the sole responsibility of clergy, not to interfere the politics of state. Secularism, by this means, established more tolerant and positive acceptance of religion, thus increased the harmony among the citizens.

The final principle of reformism gives a dynamic structure to the ideology. Ataturk was against dogmatic ideas. If the ideology is static and persistent, then will eventually be obsolete. Because, the situations are constantly changing, so are the forces that shape the interaction of the people within the society. Globally speaking, the power balances are constantly changing. Under dynamic change of nature, the future is always unclear and uncertain. In order to cope with the uncertainty, to answer the challenges of the future, Ataturk came up with reformism. Reformism allows future generations to adjust the tools of the ideology according to the situations. What is suitable today to achieve the goals of

the ideology may not be suitable for tomorrow. Reformism dictates constant improvement of the policies or tools of the ideology in order to lead the Turkish nation to the contemporary civilization.

These principles are fundamental and unchanging principles of modern Turkey. Even so, these principles were written in each constitution (the 1961 and the 1982). In the 1982 Constitution, the type of the regime and its specifications are based on these principles.

Such as, the very first Article of the Constitution says: "The State of Turkey is a Republic". In the second Article, "The Republic of Turkey, is a democratic, secular, law-abiding, and social republic that is respectful to human rights, based on harmony of the society, the national unity, and justice, which is loyal to Ataturk's nationalism and its principles."

In the third Article it is stated that the State of Turkey is undividable with its nation and its territory. The fourth Article declares that the regime (Article one), and its specifications (Article two and three) can not be changed, or even be proposed to be changed.

Article six declares the same motto that was written in the first Grand National Assembly which explains the

republicanism; "The sovereignty is vested on the nation without any restrictions".

Article ten is the declaration of populism: "Everybody, without a discrimination based on the language, race, color, sex, political idea, philosophic belief, religion, sect, and etc. are equal... No privileges can be given to any body, any family, any group or any class within the society."

Article twenty-four is the explanation of secularism: "Every body has a freedom of conscience, religion and conviction... No body can be forced to worship, to participate in religious prayers and ceremonies, to be forced to express religious belief and convictions, and be blamed or punished."²⁴⁹

To transfer the society from its east-orientation to the contemporary one, Ataturk implemented several reforms. His reforms were basically aimed to replace traditional value systems, modes of behaviour and their institutional and organizational manifestations with their modern counterparts through the application of western rationality, science and technology.

2. Political Structure of the Two Countries

In this section, the examination of the political structures of the two countries will be based on the main elements of the political structure. These main elements consist of structure of the government, political institutions- basically political parties, and political opposition groups.

a. Iran

The government structure of Iran is based on the 1980 Constitution and has been in the process of consolidation since then. The Constitution later revised in 1989. As addressed before, the structure is shaped by the Islamic ideology. The rulers of the government claim that they govern the Muslim people of Iran as the representatives of the divine being and successors of the Imams.

The Faqih is the ultimate decision maker at the top of the structure. The role of the Faqih is to be a policy guide, an arbiter, and a guardian of the faith. The Faqih is the just and pious jurist and most knowledgeable on the Book. The Faqih should also be accepted as best qualified to lead the nation.

The Faqih controls the administration. He appoints the jurists to the Council of Guardians, the chief judges of the

judicial branch, the chief of staff of the armed forces, the commander of the Pasdaran, members of the Supreme Defense Council, and the commanders of the army, air force, and navy. The Faqih approves the candidates for presidential elections, dismisses a president who has been impeached by the Majlis or found by the Supreme Court to be negligent in his duties.

Articles five and 107 of the Constitution provide procedures for succession of Faqih and revised in 1989. The Faqih will be selected as the most expert jurist. If a single religious leader can not be found, then religious experts elected by the people are to choose from among themselves three to five equally distinguished jurists who then will constitute a collective Faqih, or Leadership Council.²⁵⁰

The head of the administration is the President who has the highest official power next to the office of the Faqih. The President must be a Shia Muslim and man of political and religious distinction. The President is elected for a four-year term on the basis of absolute majority vote of the electorate. He may be reelected for one additional term.

The President deals with the policies of the State. He establishes his cabinet which is subject to the approval of the Majlis. He signs laws to enforce. Following the amendments of 1989, the President became sole power that controls the

executive branch. He shapes the economic and political decisions of the administration.

The legislative branch of the government is the Majlis. It is also an arena for the debates on the policies of the executive branch. The Majlis not only approves the cabinet, but also questions their performance. The Majlis can question any individual minister or any member of the government on the policies of the administration.

The Majlis consists of 270 deputies. Each deputy represents a geographic constituency and is elected for a four-year term. Every one who is older than fifteen years of age may participate in the elections. Five of the seats of the Majlis are reserved for non-Muslims, one each for Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, and two for Armenians. The Majlis has its speaker, deputy speakers and committees.

The Council of Guardians are responsible to examine the laws that passed by the Majlis to ensure that they are consistent with Islamic laws. The six members of the Council are selected by the Faqih or the Leadership Council among the just and pious Ulema. Another six members are chosen among the Muslim lawyers who were nominated by the High Council of the Justice and approved by a majority vote of the Majlis. The

members of the Council serve six-year terms, with half of them being changed every three years.

The highest office of the Judiciary is the High Council of Justice. Its five members serve five-year terms and may be reelected. The Council consist of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the attorney general, and three other clergy chosen by religious jurists. All of them must be distinguished in their religious interpretations. The Council is responsible of establishing appropriate departments within the Ministry of Justice to deal with civil and criminal offenses, preaparing draft bills related to the judiciary, and supervising the appointment of judges.

The Minister of Justice is chosen by the Priesident among the candidates that recommanded by the High Council of Justice. The Minister of Justice is responsible for all courts throughout the country.

Other important office of the judiciary is the Supreme Court which reviews the decisions of the lower courts to ensure the conformity and uniformity of them with existing judicial policies.

The administraction of the country is also divided into twenty-three provinces. Each of them also subdivided into several counties, and so on. These provinces headed by the

governor-in-general who was appointed by the Minister of Interior. Besides the governors, the representatives of the Faqih, called as *Imam Jomehs*, share the political authority.

The most important political institution of the revolution was the IRP. This party was established in 1964. Although Khoemeini was not a party official, this party had close connections with him. This privilege increased its popularity and dominated the early years of the post-revolution era. Either by using the prestige of the effective clergy or using the intimidation tactics and terror, the IRP became the main actor of the revolution.

The IRP consolidated its power in the 1980s and dominated the Majlis. The gangs, called Hezbollahis, that were organized by the IRP suppressed the opposition by terror. A good example of this was the challenge of Bani Sadr. Bani Sadr challenged the Majlis which was dominated by the IRP and its Prime Minister Racai. At the end, Bani Sadr left the Presidency and escaped from being killed by fleeing to abroad. Following this event, the IRP suppressed the political and religious opposition.

However, the IRP could not be a party of masses. It was a tool of the revolution and the Ulema to establish their goals. At both national and local level, the official of the

IRP perceived themselves as responsible for enforcing uniform Islamic behaviour and thought. The IRP lost its functionality in the late 1980s because of debates on the power distribution and economic policies. As a result, its leadership decided to dissolve the party in 1987. Khomeini approved the decision, thus closed the era of the IRP. No other party was established after the dissolution of the IRP.

Despite the fact that there are eighteen licensed parties, none of them is comparable with the former IRP. The existing major parties are Tehran Militant Clergy Association (TMCA), led by Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-Kani, and Militant Clerics Association(MCA), led by Mehdi Mahdavi-Karubi and Mohammed Asqar Musavi-Khoiniha. The son(Ahmad Khoemeini) and daughter(Zahra Mostafavi) of Khoemeini also supported the MCA.

The two parties are rival each other and they represent moderate and radical groups. The 1992 elections marked this rivalry. Rafsancani elected again in 1992, however, the MCA gained important position in the Majlis. The MCA criticized the policies of Rafsancani by calling it as "Islami-ye sarmayehdari(capitalist Islam)", as opposed to their version, "Islami-ye Nabi-ye Mohammedi(pure Islam of the Prophet Mohammed)". The MCA also questioned the Khamenehi's legitimacy as Faqih. However, the coalition of pragmatic and

conservatives against radicals enabled Rafsancani to pass the bills necessary to implement his policies.

Other important political groups are: the Hezbollah, Hojjatiyeh Society, Mojaheddin of the Islamic Revolution (not the same of Mojaheddin-e Khalq), Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam.

The Islamic Republic did not satisfy many groups in Iran and they continued to resist the Islamic government. The most important of them was the Mojaheddin. The Mojaheddin has more liberal or sometimes radical interpretation of the Shiism. The Mojaheddin began as a radical party, supporting a Marxist religious ideology in the 1960s.

The ideological conflict of the two parties increased because of the refusal of the idea of the Velayet-e Faqih by the Mojaheddin. The IRP attacked this party as it did to other groups. However, the Mojaheddin proved its determination and continued its power struggle by violent armed struggle. The Mojaheddin supported Bani Sadr, and following his impeachment, rose in armed rebellion against the IRP dominated government.

Some of the opposition parties, the Paykar (a pre-revolutionary Marxist splinter from the Mojaheddin), and the Fadayan Minority (a splinter from the Fadayan after the majority of the Fadayan voted to support the government). The

IRP, by using its advantage of controlling the government resources, was able to suppress the rebellion. Most of the members of the rebel parties were killed or arrested. Mojaheddin managed to survive by transferring its leadership to abroad and reorganizing.

Even though communist Tudeh and Marxist Fadayan were supported the IRP in this struggle, the IRP also attacked these parties because of their Marxist and communist doctrines. Besides, the leaders of the IRP were suspicious of the Soviet connections of these parties. In any case, in a sudden operation, most of the leaders of the Tudeh and Fadayan were arrested in 1982. The remainders of these parties were either killed or arrested during their armed resistance in the countryside.

The remaining opposition party was a non-religious the IFM. Its prominent members included the former prime minister, Bazargan, and the foreign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi. The IFM opposed the IRP and criticized its excesses. The IRP-backed gangs also attacked the IFM, including its leadership. Bazargan was not allowed to be a candidate for the Presidency in 1985 and 1992. In the following years, the IFM was forced to be a silent opposition.

As a result of the dominance of the IRP, the opposition parties transferred their organizations to abroad. There are four categories of the political opposition groups: Monarchists, Secular-Democratic groups, Islamic groups, and Marxists.

The monarchists are rallying for the restoration of the monarchy in Iran. Although the future concept of the monarchy varies among the monarchist parties, they accept that Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, the eldest son of the last shah, as legitimate ruler of Iran. The most active party of this line is the Paris-based National Resistance Movement, led by the former royalist prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar. However, Bakhtiar was assassinated in 1991. It is very hard for the monarchists to seize the power in Iran without significant leadership.

Although these groups are not very active politically and militarily, less known cells are launching terrorist activities within Iran. For example, the Babak Khorramdin (BKO), whose name derives from an Iranian who fought against the Arab invaders in the 6th century, attacks Iranian officials and clergy. The BKO even attempted to assassinate Rafsancani in February, 1993. The motorcade of Rafsancani was ambushed at a crossroads in Tehran by members of the BKO. They used rockets and machine guns, however, the presidential

guards were able to capture them. A couple days later, the BKO assassinated five Revolutionary guard officials as a retaliation for the savage assassination.²⁵¹

The secular-democratic groups support one form of the republic. Main parties of this group are National Democratic Front, led by Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, and National Front, led by Karim Sancabi. Both parties are headquartered in Paris and have little political activities in Iran. Some of the parties of this group joined the Mojaheddin-dominated National Council of Resistance.

The Islamic opposition groups basically differ from the administration because of their different interpretations of the ideology. They basically refuse the concept of Velayet-e Faqih. Some of them also inspired from Marxist ideology. The main element of this group is the Mojaheddin-e Khalq (People's struggle). The party was actively participated in the Revolution, however, the ideologic rivalry with the IRP let the armed struggle of the Mojaheddin. Its leader, Rajavi reorganized the Mojaheddin in France. He and Bani Sadr established the National Council of Resistance, which was open to non-monarchist parties. The Mojaheddin opened dialogue with Iraq, and established its bases in Iraq. Thus, the Mojahedin was able to launch offenses against the Pasdaran units in

Iran. In 1987, the Mojaheddin declared the establishment of the National Army of Liberation.

The Mojaheddin is the politically and militarily most active opposition group. It constantly attacked to the administration and launched terrorist actions within Iran. The Mojaheddin blow up oil pipelines in southern Iran in May, 1993.²⁵² It attacked the Iranian government offices, officials and clergy.²⁵³

The Mojaheddin tried to gather the attention of international organizations to the human rights issue in Iran. The Mojaheddin also became a source of intelligence for the world regarding the covert activities of Iran. It has supporters among different sections of the society.

The Marxist groups are also active in Iran, however, they lost the initial momentum. The main organization of this group is the communist Tudeh. The Tudeh reorganized in the late 1980s. Its headquarters were established in East Germany in 1983. The Tudeh was able to organize its cells in Iran, but suffers from a lack of broad support. Another Marxist group, the Fadayan Majority joined to the Tudeh because of the losses of the party after the government operations. The Marxsist Fadayan Minority joined to the Mojaheddin and established its offices in abroad. The Paykar, another Marxist organization,

was also largely destroyed. However, the Paykar was able to organize secret cells in Iran.

b. Turkey

The Republic of Turkey is a representative, parliamentary, democratic, and secular republic. Its organizations and balance of power are based on the Constitution that serves as a main guide and protector of the Kemalist ideology.

According to the Constitution, the exercise of the executive power is vested in the President and the Council of Ministers. The President is the head of State, he represents the Republic of Turkey and the Unity of the Turkish nation. The President oversees the workings of the Constitution and ensures that the organs of the state function in an orderly and harmonious manner. He is elected for a seven-year term among the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) or among the Turkish citizens who are over 40 years of age and eligible to be a member of the TGNA.

The President can veto laws that the TGNA proposed. The President decides renewal of parliamentary elections, appoints the Prime Minister or accepts his or her resignation, appoints or removes Ministers upon the recommendation of Prime Minister. The President also ratifies international

agreements, appoints accredited envoys to represent the Turkish State in foreign countries, and receives the representatives of foreign states to the Republic of Turkey. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish armed forces, and decides upon the use of the Turkish armed forces. In other words, he has the authority to perform such Presidential duties in order to ensure the well-being of the Turkish nation.

The President is over-parties, he is non-aligned with any party or group in order to perform his duties objectively. The President is not the source of policies, but has to oversee these policies regarding their accommodation to the principles of the Constitution.

The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are the policy-makers. The Prime Minister is selected by the President, and the Prime Minister selects the Ministers. However, they must be approved by the President. To form an administration, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet must get the vote of confidence from the Parliament. Any time, the Parliament may vote for the confidence for an individual Minister or for the Cabinet as a whole.

The Prime Minister is responsible to ensure that his or her Cabinet is performing in a harmonious manner and

implementing the policies he or she declared as a program of his or her administration. The Ministers are responsible to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister may ask from the President to dismiss any of his Ministers. The Council of Ministers bear collective responsibility for the general policies of the administration and also individually responsible for action within the domain of their jurisdictions and for the acts of their subordinates.

The legislative branch of the Turkey is the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The TGNA performs this function on behalf of the Turkish nation. TGNA represents the people. So, the power of legislation of the TGNA may not be delegated, or transferred to any individual, class, or group.

The TGNA is responsible to enact, amend, and abrogate laws, to monitor the actions of the Council of Ministers and Ministers, and to delegate to the Council of Ministers the authority to issue "Decrees with power of Law". The TGNA has an authority to ratify international agreements and the declaration of war. The TGNA debates the Budget and the Bills for Final Accounts.

The TGNA exercises its parliamentary control functions by means of parliamentary questions, investigations, general debates, ministerial questioning and inquiries. The Assembly

takes its decision by the absolute majority of those present which may not be less than one fourth. The TGNA has its own speaker, deputy speakers, and other administrative officials.

Judicial power is exercised by independent courts functioning on behalf of the Turkish nation. Judges, who are independent in discharging their duties, rule on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution, the laws, jurisprudence and their personal convictions. No organ, office, authority, and individual may attempt to intimidate, instruct or order, make suggestions or recommendations to any judge concerning how they should exercise their powers in the courts. The legislative and executive organs and the administration must comply with the rulings of the courts, and they may not change or delay the application of these rulings.

The Constitution provides safeguards for Judicial system. The Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors wields the sole authority to make decisions related to the careers of judges and the public prosecutors of the administrative and criminal courts.

The Judiciary consists of Judicial, Military, and Administrative courts. These courts render their verdicts in the first instance, and if necessary, the superior courts examine their decisions. The superior courts are: the

Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Military Tribunal of Appeals, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Court of Jurisdictional Dispute, the Court of Accounts, and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutor.

The administration of country based on the centralized as well as local administration concepts. The country is divided into provinces which are also subdivided among themselves into smaller fractions. These provinces are administrated by governors appointed by the Council of Ministers with the approval of the President. The governors function as the principal agents of the central government and reports to the Ministry of Interior. The civil servants in the province reports to the governor. The governor is supported by the provincial assembly. The members of the provincial assemblies are elected by the local people.

To ensure the local development of districts, local administrations, headed by the mayors, are established. Municipal administrations are public corporate entities that are aimed to provide the common regional and civic needs of the people in their areas. The mayor is supported by the municipal councils. All of the members of the local administrations are elected by the people for a five-year

term.

All citizens of Turkey, with the exception of civil servants and members of the Armed Forces who are over twenty years of age may form and become members of political parties provided that they conform with and meet the related procedures in this regard. Prior permission for the formation of a political party is not required. The parties are allowed to function freely in accordance with the provisions of the related laws and the Constitution. In the democratic system of Turkey, the political parties are considered to be major and indispensable political institution of the system.

The latest general elections were held in October 1991 in which six political party and 63 independent candidates contested. After the general election, some alliances were disintegrated, some new parties were established, and some deputies resigned from their parties. At the end of 1993, the party presentations in the Parliament were as follows: The True Path Party (182), the Motherland Party (94), the Social Democratic Populist Party (52), the Prosperity Party (40), the Republican People's Party (21), the People's Work Party (18), the Nationalist Labour Party (13), the Great Unity Party (7), the Democratic Left Party (3), the Nation Party (2), and independents (18).

It must be noted that to ensure the efficiency of the administration, the Constitution puts a barrier of ten percent of the valid votes of the whole and local levels to get a seat in the Parliament. So, some parties which could not get more than ten percent of the total votes could not get a seat in the Parliament.

The ruling administration of Tansu Ciller is composed of the two parties, the Truth Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP).

The Truth Path Party was established in 1983. Because of the ban on the political activities of the former political leadership of the Justice Party, the first leader of the party was Husamettin Cindoruk. As soon as the ban was lifted, Suleyman Demirel became its leader. The leadership of the party was assumed by Tansu Ciller when Demirel was elected as President.

The party has a pro-Western ideology and represents broad spectrum of the right-wing electorate. According to the party program, the economic system must achieve the goal of strengthening the liberal democratic regime enabling the individual to prosper in freedom. In the foreign policy area, the party follows a foreign policy that will be conducting on the basis of securing continuous security for the country

through peaceful coexistence, contributing to world peace, developing foreign relations in line with the general principles of the United Nations Charter. The foreign policy should ensure equality of rights and treatment and a balance of interests in bilateral relations and develop economic and social relations with Turkey's immediate neighbours in particular.

The party lost some of its votes in the local elections after the 1993 because of its inability to cope with the economic problems of the country. Although the party received highest percentage of the votes (22 %) in recent local elections, there was a slight difference with the following parties.

Another member of the coalition, the Social Democratic Populist Party is a merger of two parties in the mid 1980s. The two left-of-center parties, the Social Democracy Party and the Populist Party, merged to form a single party in 1985. The leadership of the party held by Erdal Inonu until 1994. In 1994, Erdal Inonu declared his retirement, and former mayor of Ankara, Murat Karayalcin, became the new leader of the SDPP.

The party believes that the economic and social development of the country should be achieved through a democratic and planned approach. Liberal economic policies

that increase the gap between the poor and rich should be replaced by planned economic policies.

In the foreign policy area, the party believes that whilst national security must be placed on sound foundations, the Ataturk's principle of "peace at home, peace in the world". Despite extreme socialists, the party favors the role of the NATO and the membership efforts of Turkey into the European Community. The party considers essential protection of the basic rights and freedoms within a state where rule of law prevails. The party favors a national, democratic, secular and social country.

Despite its high percentages in the mid 1980s, the party is losing credit because of its lack of initiative. In the recent municipal elections, the SDDP votes dropped to less than fourteen percentage.

The dominant party of the 1980s was the Motherland Party (ANAP). It was founded under the leadership of Turgut Ozal in 1983. Turgut Ozal was a high level bureaucrat of Demirel who had shaped the economic policies of the Demirel administration of 1980. Ozal was also former NSP candidate in the elections. Following the 1980 operation, Ozal became Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs in the Bulent Ulusu cabinet.

The MP tried to gather votes of the center-right, center-left, Islamic and nationalist electorate. The MP had members of the JP, the RPP, the NSP, and the NAP. The success of the MP to gather these groups was because of its dynamic economic and social policies. This also attracted many supporters, and the MP won the elections from 1983 to 1991. Ozal became Prime Minister in 1983. He kept this post until 1989. In 1989, he was elected as President. Mesut Yilmaz, former Foreign Minister of the MP administration, assumed the leadership of the party.

The MP represented the strongest commitment to liberal economy and opened the boundaries of the economy for entrepreneurs. The MP believed that entrepreneurial initiatives of individuals form the basis of development. State intervention and restrictions should be minimized so as to set up a free market economy dominated by competition. In the MP era, Turkey launched a huge drive of exporting and privatization.

In the foreign policy area, the party runs dual policies. In the Western world, it favors the membership of the NATO and the EC. Besides the West, the MP looks for close relations with the Middle Eastern and Moslem states.

The MP lost its momentum in the mid 1980s. In this period, economic and social problems of Turkey increased. Ozal's reluctance to counter fundamentalist Islamic groups was another factor. Besides, his family and close associates were criticized heavily because of misbehaviour and certain privileges. In 1991, the MP lost the elections. In the recent municipal elections, the MP received twenty percent of the total votes and became second party.

Another interesting event of the early 1990s was the emerge of the Prosperity Party (RP). The PR was established in 1983. Its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was also the leader of the NSP. Both parties are Islamic parties and share same ideology. The PR is against the pro-Western concepts. As addressed before, the PR runs a campaign that is similar to other fundementalist Islamic groups. Although it does not attack directly to the principles of Ataturk and secular and democratic structure of Turkey, it follows an ideology that refuses these principles.

The PR's political life began with attracting few percentages of the total votes in 1984. In the 1991 elections, the PR attracted 17 percent of the total votes. In the 1994 municipal elections, they hit the nineteen percentage. This shows a major increase, because there is only two percent

difference with the leading TPP. Besides, they managed to win the elections in the important cities, such as Istanbul and Ankara.

Besides these four major parties, there are total of twenty-two parties in Turkey. These parties represent wide spectrum. For example, there are four socialist parties that represent ultra-left wing. There are equal number of parties that represent ultra-right or fundamentalist Islamic electorate. Turkey also has its enviromentalist party, the Greens Party of Turkey.

The basic political pressure groups are students, workers, businessmen, professionals, farmers, and religious groups. Each of these groups are organized in one form or another.

The student groups were became active by the beginning of the 1960s. In the 1970s, the student activities became increasingly violent. The 1980 operation suspended any student activity. Although the student groups lost their momentum of the 1970s, they are still active.

The labor organized as unions that represent different political ideologies. For example, the Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) represents the left-wing ideology. The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) represents

politically moderate center. The confederation of HAK labour unions (HAK-IS) has more Islamic favor in its political ideology.

The main organizations of businessmen, industrialists, and merchants are the National Union of Chambers of Commerce, Chambers of Industry, and Commodities Exchanges (TOB), the Turkish Confederation of Employers (TISK), and the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association. These organizations have different political viewpoints concerning the interests of businessmen, industrialist, and merchants.

Many of the professionals in Turkey joined in one of the professional organizations. These organizations aimed to increase the well-being of their members. In addition to their activities in their fields, these organizations are also active to gather public attention on certain problems, and are able to put political pressure to the administration.

The farmers established several cooperatives that aimed to protect their rights and increase their productivity. These organizations are established by farmers who are producing same crops. These organizations try to influence the administration on the agricultural policies. However, most of the farmers are not member of big scale organization capable

enough to shape the agricultural policies of the administration.

The religious groups, especially sects became increasingly active in the last decades. As addressed before, the multi-party system led the relaxation in the strict secular policies of the government. The resurgence of voluntary religious organizations increased their political power. The parties were enthusiastic to these organizations because of their vote power. Several sects also increased their activities in this period.

The opposition groups in Turkey can be classified as divisive elements, destructive elements, extreme religious elements and extreme racist elements. The attention to divisive elements will be given in the following sections.

The destructive elements are basically communist and Marxist groups which aim to destroy the democratic structure of Turkey by revolution in order to create a supremacy of one class over others. These groups were established in the late 1950s and were very active in the 1970s.

There are two groups in the destructive movements: First group established its strategy to gain political power by means of present political free structure. Some of the present socialist parties can be classified in this group. Second group, on the other hand, has a strategy to reach the goal by

people's war. For this reason, destructive organizations in the second group use terrorism as a main tactic.

There are forty destructive organizations which are the fractions of five main organizations. The five main organizations are the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO), the Front of People's Liberation Party of Turkey (THKP/C), the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Turkey (TKP/M-L), the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Party of Turkey (TIKP). All of them once supported by the Soviet Union, and other Eastern countries. Now, they have contact with Russia, Syria, Greece and Bulgaria. The 1980 operation crushed these groups, and destroyed all of them. However, because of the weakness of following administrations, they found enough time to rebuild their organizations. The Dev-Sol and Dev-yol were among the ones that were reorganized and launched terrorist campaign in the late 1980s. They made robberies, assassinations, and attacked government offices. Despite their actions, their capabilities are far away from causing a threat to the state.

As addressed before, the excessive religious elements are threat for secular structure of Turkey. They want to have a regime where it is governed according to the religious rules. They want to apply all of the rules of religion to the society

and instituties of government. Their strategy is gaining power by using all of the opportunities of present political structure, and then making revolution. As a first step, they want to get the control of the present government. Later they want to establish an religious state where all of the Muslims get together.

There are three main groups and many subgroups of excessive religious movement. The 1980 operation hit these groups and destroyed their capabilities. However, they were able to gather their supporter base and to reorganize. The best known organization of this group is the Hezbollah of Turkey. The Hezbollah is active in southeastern part of Turkey, especially in Batman and Nusaybin. It has been reported that the Hezbollah assasinated people in this area. Another unknown group or groups assasinated several prominent figures of secularism. However, there is not much evidence about these cases.

The racist movement has an ideology to get all of the Turks in one empire. They based their propoganda to the banner of anti-communist ideology. They want to establish a totaliter government and to change the concept of citizen of Ataturk that accepts everyone who identifies himself as a Turkish citizen.

The 1980 operation destroyed their organizations. However, the increase of the Kurdish divisive movements that caused many victims among the Turks besides Kurds, let them to establish their organizations as a response to the Kurdish divisive movement. The collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of Turkish states in Central Asia also increased their potential. However, there is no active group that can be threat to the State.

3. Leadership of the Two Countries

a. Iran

The charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution was Khomeini. He dominated all of the institutions and process of decision-making in his era. He was the only real revolutionary among the elements of the Revolution. He was the one who held the pieces of the revolution together. He acted as mediator to settle disputes among the parties. He did not favor any party for a length of time and tried to keep the internal balances of the Revolution.

On the other hand, the ideological discrepancies among the elements of the Revolution affected the leadership. The ideological discrepancies were enhanced as various elements within the leadership were reacted differently to the

experience of governing and dealing with the outside world. Despite the leadership of Khomeini, these discrepancies were increased over the time.

In broad terms, the main schools of thought can be categorized as the moderates and the radicals. It is certain that the split within the leadership sometimes had overtones of both moderation and radicalism and the paradigm of the moderatism or radicalism is not enough to explain the situation. Nevertheless, in its essentials, the moderate-radical rivalry explains the division within the leadership.

The moderates, led by predominant figures such as Rafsancani, have more traditional interpretation of Islam. They favor a free enterprise economic system, stressing Islam's sanctioning of private property. Although committed to maintaining the character of the Revolution, they are more flexible and soft policy of enforcing it. In foreign affairs, they favor the balance with both Eastern and Western bloc. They are suspicious about Russia because of its uncertain future policies and the proximity of it to Iran. They are willing to establish closer ties with the West and to open the dialogue with the United States. The moderates seem as if they are pragmatic and ready to adapt to new realities. They also prefer the national interests of Iran versus vague ideological

aspirations. The moderates are strongly supported by the bazaar, middle classes, professionals, and the bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the radicals, also known as the line of Imam, have more ideological interpretation of Islam. They are led by Hodjat-al-Islam Mohtashami and Ayetollah Sadeq Khalkali. The radicals emphasize the egalitarian dimensions and admonitions of Islam against the undue accumulation of wealth. They favor a centralized and statist economy, massive land reforms, and large-scale control of foreign trade. They insist on the strict application of the Islamic code. In foreign affairs, the radicals are against any reapproachment to the West and especially to the United States. They are more tolerant against Russia, North Korea, and the PRC.

The death of Khomeini caused a change in the leadership. According to the constitution the new religious leader will be elected by the Assembly of Experts among its members. The amendments of 1989 in the Constitution changed the qualifications of the members of the Assembly of Experts. Thus, some of the candidates, such as Ayetollah Mehdi Karubi and Ayetollah Sadeq Khalkhali, were lost their chance. The disqualification of radical leaders for the membership of the Assembly of Experts let the election of Ayetollah Khameni.

The new Faqih, Ayetollah Khameni, assumed more religious leadership than the role of ruling the government. He is accepted as a moderate person, however his position as a guardian of the Revolution forces him to act in between of the two ends. Khamenei and Rafsancani established cooperation in the affairs of Iran.

President Rafsancani was elected this post first in 1989. In 1989, the amendments to the Constitution empowered the office of the President by appointing him as a head of executive. Rafsancani consolidated his authority and his list of cabinet was accepted by the Parliament in the early 1990s. The commitment of Rafsancani to follow more pragmatic approach can be understood from his cabinet. Among the twenty-two members of his cabinet, twelve of them were known as their moderate policies and who were educated in the West. The Parliament's endorsement of his cabinet was in reality an effective mandate for Rafsancani to pursue his pragmatist policies. Thus, Rafsancani was able to purge the former Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashami, a radicalist, from the administration.

Rafsancani established close links with several pressure groups of the society, such as merchants and bureaucrats, to ensure a broad support base for his policies. He also secured

the support of Khamenei by compromising. Since then, the moderates gradually developed their internal political position through carefully constructed alliances with other religious and political leaders. As a result of these efforts, Rafsanjani was elected again to this post in 1993.

Despite the success of the moderates, the radicals hold significant influence over the politics of Iran. The radicals frequently criticized the policies of the Rafsanjani and even slowed down many of the government's reform measures. The 130 radical deputies of the Parliament interrupts the progress of the administration. However, the growing weakness of the radicals in the institutional level and insulation from crucial organs of the system, their lack of control over armed forces and reduced influence over the Revolutionary Guards significantly reduce their ability to seize the power.

The clerical rivalries also became a source of inconsistency in the leadership. The most likely contenders for power within the clerical establishment are two extremes of radical hard-liners and conservatives if the moderates fails. However, the sudden change in the internal balances of the clergy seems as if impossible.

b. Turkey

Most colorful leader of Turkey in the 1980s and early 1990s was Turgut Ozal. His background as a high level bureauacrat, an engineer, and economist enabled him to implement economic and social reforms for development easily. Under his leadership, the MP administration implemented several economic and social measures which affected the Turkish economic and social structure deeply.

His liberal economic policies shifted the structure of the economy to more liberal one. He forced producers to compete with the Western counterparts by lowering the duty rates and removing restrictions on imports. The Turkish Lira was declared as convertible. He removed restrictions on the foreign currency. The state enterprises were accepted as a burden on the economy, and the privatization movement gained momentum.

In foreign affairs he accepted the policy what can be called as the neo-Ottomanism. He moved outside the limits of the Kemalist ideology by actively supporting the coalition in the Gulf Crises. He accepted that Turkey's area of influence should be the boundries of the Ottoman Empire. He was looking for a way to be a member of the EC. Besides, he tried to empower the position of Turkey in the Muslim world.

In the social policies, he was reluctant to growing extreme religious movement. He also opened the pandora's box by demanding radical changes in the policy of Turkey towards the Kurdish problem. He insisted on the more liberal role of government. To ensure this, he lifted the ban on the communist and extreme religious movements. He also lifted the ban on speaking Kurdish in Turkey.

He challenged the role of the armed forces as a protector of the Kemalist Turkey by attacking its traditional mechanisms. His attempts to diminish the role of military in the decision-making process were less succsesful then his interruptions to the top positions of the armed forces.

Despite the initial success of the economic reforms, Turkey could not enjoyed the economic recovery. His attempts to follow a leading role in the regional politics were limited by the scarcity of resources.

Another important figure of the politics in Turkey was Suleyman Demirel. Demirel became Prime Minister of Turkey seven times. Demirel became President after the death of Ozal in 1993. His political career began with the JP in the 1960s. He was ousted from office twice because of military operations. Maybe because of this, he approved stricter measures against terrorism then Ozal.

He is very experienced in the affairs of the administration. He follows the pro-Western policy in foreign affairs. Demirel is more conservative than being reformist in his policies. He favors a realistic approach to the problems because of the scarcity of resources of Turkey.

Tansu Ciller is the first female Prime Minister of Turkey. She is a scholar of economy prior to her leadership of the TPP. She was elected as a party leader after the Demirel's Presidency. Tansu Ciller favors a liberal economy, swifter privatization, and less state control of the economy. In foreign policy, she is willing to implement more active policy. Ciller favors the pro-Western foreign policy.

Ciller has a support of the scholars and Istanbul media who prefer the leadership of younger generation versus discredited old-style politicians. However, she was not very successful in handling the economic and social problems of Turkey. Because of her lack of experience with the party politics, she does not have much room for maneuver. The party is only a few points ahead of its closest rival, the Motherland Party. Also, the limited success of the Truth Path Party in the municipal elections and a crisis in the economy reduced her control over the party.

The proposed tax reform is the example of her weakness. The Ciller's tax reform, which was going to reduce the tax burden of fixed-salary personnel and poor by increasing the taxes on the rich, was changed heavily. The resulting package was not a tax reform, but a replica of the old system. The involvement of the pressure groups of the businessmen and industrialists forced the party to modify the package of Prime Minister.

Ciller is going to face a challenge in the party congress in November. Besides, if her measures to correct the economic situation in Turkey fail, she may be forced to early general elections. It is believed that she may survive in the party congress, but the expectations about the result of the next general elections are not so positive for Ciller.

The growing possibility of the PR victory in the elections, which means the grasp of the power by the extreme religious groups within the democratic system, may force the alliance of the two center-of-right parties, the MP and the TPP, in the future.

B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES

1. Economy -Overview

a. Iran

Iran's economy is a mixture of central planning, state ownership of oil and large enterprises, village agriculture, and small scale private trading and service ventures. The economy of the post-revolutionary Iran has experienced four cycles: a deep recession immediately after the revolution, a strong revival between 1981 and 1986, a mild recession between 1987 and 1989, and a respectable recovery since the cease-fire with Iraq.²⁵⁴

The analysis of several economic indicators and statistics explains the shortcomings of the Iranian economy after the Revolution. Iran's gross domestic product (GDP) at constant prices declined by some 1.5 percent a year on average between 1978 and 1989. In the postwar period of 1989-1991, the GDP registered average of the 7.2 percent annual growth. Real output at the end of decade was still below that of 1978. The rapid increase of the population affected the situation adversely. Private per capita consumption in real terms dropped from 153,000 rials to 125,000 rials in 1991. The share of aggregate consumption in GDP rose from 62 percent in 1978 to 77 percent in 1991 while that of total investment fell from

33 percent to 12 percent during the same period, with public investment outlays down to seven percent from eighteen percent of GDP.²⁵⁵

The central government has experienced a budget deficit every year since the revolution. The gap ranged from a maximum of fifteen percent of GDP in 1981 to three percent of GDP in 1992, with an average of about seven percent. Since the deficit was compensated by credit from the central bank, the money supply was increased ten times in this period. So, the increase in the inflation was unresistable. According to official statistics, the consumer price index rose by 637.5 percent, or at an average annual rate of eighteen percent in this period. It is obvious that unofficial figures are much higher than this; some sources claim a figure between annual of 50-60 percent.²⁵⁶

The affect of economic burden on the people was huge. According to some indicators, the fixed-salary personel received an increase of 142 percent in their salaries and bonuses in this period. Thus, more than 90 percent of public servants's income became under the poverty line. This situation was common for the rest of the population. In one study, it was stated that in 1972 some 44 percent of the population were living under the substistence poverty line.

The absolute poverty increased by 43 percent during the 1979-1985 period. At the end of 1988, the absolute poverty increased to 65-75 percent of the population.²⁵⁷

The gap between rich and poor also increased in this period. Rafsancani was quoted as saying that twenty percent of the population controls 50 percent of the country's wealth. However, some sources indicates much higher figure of the ten percent of the population controlling 75 percent of the wealth.²⁵⁸

During 1990 and 1991, Iran accrued \$12 billion in short-term foreign debt to pay for its imports. In 1991, the consumer products imports were placed at \$21 billion, and \$6 billion worth of weapon was received from Russia. The central bank of Iran had signed agreements for the amount of \$10.6 billion of foreign debt, but it secured only \$1.5 billion of it. In order to implement the second five-year plan, Iran needs a figure between \$26 billion to \$40 billion additional foreign financing.²⁵⁹

Although Iran did never experienced a famine, it can not produce enough food to feed its population. Despite the government efforts to increase the performance of agriculture, the dependence on imported food items increased. Imports of cereals and grains, which amounted to less than 2.7 million

tons in 1978, increased to 8.2 million tons in 1990. The imports of other food items also increased.²⁶⁰

The unsatisfactory socio-economic situation resulted with a mass demonstrations in Iran. In May and June 1992, the mass demonstrations in Arak, Tehran, Khoramabad, Shiraz and Mashhad resulted with clashes with the police. The response of the Islamic Iran was swift: the administration hung four people in Mashhad, and another four was hung in Shiraz. Another five people was condemned to death. Ayetollah Khamenei characterized the riots as the work of "bullies and ruffians", "riff-raff" who should be dealt with in a revolutionary way and pulled up and thrown away "like weeds".²⁶¹

The collapse of the economy was due to some internal and external factors. Its assets abroad was freezed and Iran faced a trade embargo just after the revolution. The Iraq-Iran war destroyed many cities and put a great burden on Iran. A total of 52 cities have been damaged. Many industrial complexes also hit by Iraq. Total of 4,000 villages were destroyed. Total damage of the war to the economy is estimated to amount to \$592 billion.²⁶²

The massive exodus of experienced businessmen and managers, and professionals just after the Revolution. The capital flight was followed the exodus. The reign of terror of

the early years resulted with a chaos in the economy. The regime's economic policies which were shaped by the ideology caused malfunction of the economic system. The choice of statist economy led the administration to resort to public ownership, price control, extensive subsidies, industrial regulation, and overall economic regimentation designed to produce an elusive self-sufficiency.

The administration used the war as an excuse to economic problems and increase the government control. The administration's ambitious foreign policy put an extra burden on the economy.

In a major shift, Rafsancani changed the economic policy to a more moderate one that encourages the private sector to participate in the economic activities. The new strategy of economic adjustment and reforms aims at the establishment of a market mechanism for determining the prices of goods, foreign exchange, and money. In addition to these goals, Rafsancani emphasized the privatization of non-strategic industries, deregulation of bureaucratic rules, reorganization of state machinery in the service of marketization. Rafsancani administration began to adjust the tax laws, import-export regulations, accounting procedures, exchange system, and monetary and banking guidelines.

Despite the commitment of Rafsancani to correct the economic system, the success of his program requires peaceful resolution of internal and external conflicts thus improving the image of Iran. This is crucial for the success of the reform because of the need to attract and encourage internal entrepreneurs and foreign investors and financial institutions to participate in the reform.

b. Turkey

Turkey showed a great success in changing its mixed economic structure to greatly liberal one since 1981. Many regulations changed and the role of government reduced. State intervention in the prices of goods and services was reduced. A realistic and flexible exchange rate policy taking into consideration of supply and demand in foreign exchange markets was implemented. Imports were liberalized to great extent and export-promoting incentives were introduced. A certain amount of freedom was accorded to the State Economic Enterprises in their decisions about pricing and production. Some of the state controlled enterprises privatized.

The economic reforms were supported with the administrative reforms. The level of bureaucracy was reduced. The regulations and bureaucratic processes were simplified. Radical amendments were made to the legislation on the

protection of Turkish Lira as well as the foreign exchange system. As a result of these amendments, Turkish Lira became convertible. The tax system was changed to achieve efficiency and full coverage.

Turkey also improved its infrastructure during this era. Many big-ticket items were financed by the "build-operate-turn over" formula in which investor builds up the infrastructure. The state grants him a term to operate the facility or the infrastructure. At the end of this term, the state assumes the ownership of the facility or infrastructure. Turkey is building up twenty two dams which are the essential parts of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). The project aimed to irrigate the vast plains of southeastern Anatolia and produce electricity. When the project is completed, Turkey will boost its agriculture production.

However, the impressive stream of benefits from the economic reforms that Turkey launched in 1980 have begun to peter out. Although its annual growth rate has oscillated between six and eight percent-which is the highest rate for any member of the OECD, recent economic performance has fallen substantially.²⁶³

The main problems are high inflation, high interest rates, and large budget deficit. The inflation rate was ranged

between 65% to 80% in the last five years. Especially 1994 was a big hit for the Turkish economy, for the first time in its economic history, some of large companies suspended their activities and sent their labor force on vacation. Sudden increases in the prices caused some socio-economic problems. The middle class of the society hit heavily during last five years. The fixed salary earners, especially civil servants, received a wage increases that were well below the inflation.

High inflation pushes the interest rates up in Turkey. On the other hand, higher interest rates mean higher cost of credit. The prohibitively high cost of credit- 150-200 percent a year, as well as the intrinsic weakness of the national investment capital, among other factors, limits productive investments. One of the side effects of this is the creation of fewer jobs in the economy. However, the steady increase in the population raises the rate of unemployment which can not be paced with the new job fields in the economy. The crucial problem of unemployment, the loss of purchasing power of the wage earners and the erosion of the currency caused deep socio-economic problems in Turkey.

The chronic and constantly increasing budget deficit, which is over the 14 percent of the GDP, and the foreign trade deficit forces the administration to borrow money. The

implementation of several large-scale projects are another factor in this process. Nevertheless, Turkey became the eighth largest debtor nation in the world with its national debt of \$60 billion.

The Gulf war and following sanctions to Iraq also caused a burden to Turkish economy. Despite the expectations of Ozal, Turkey was forgotten in the postwar era and received unimportant amount of an economic and military aid. The limited trade level with Iraq and the loss of income from the pipeline put a barrier to the economic recovery program of Ciller. Ciller already has begun to force the West to smooth or lift the economic sanctions against Iraq. As explained, the sanctions against Iraq also punishing Turkey by not subsidizing its losses.

2. Industry and Technology

a. Iran

The main industries of Iran are petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating (steel and copper) industries. All of these industries were affected adversely in the post revolution period.

The political climate of the post-revolutionary era caused a massive exodus. Most of industrial entrepreneurs, managers, technicians, and skilled labor were among the people who fled the country. The freezing of Iranian assets abroad, Western economic sanctions, and negative government policies toward multinational corporations resulted in the departure of foreign specialists.

The nationalization of the industrial complexes, including the privately owned ones, also became a negative factor. Inexperienced new managers, labor disputes and disruptive meddling by members of revolutionary committees further reduced output. The rapidly increasing state control and lack of cooperation among government ministries and agencies halted any recovery in the industry. The devastating affect of the war on the existing facilities was another factor.

Reductions in the oil revenues and economic chaos sharply cut into the import of industrial parts, raw materials, and processed goods. Uncertainty of the policies, the limited profitability of short-term commercial transactions discouraged new long-term investment. As a result of combined effects of these factors, in six of the thirteen years in the post-revolutionary period, the industrial sector experienced

negative growth. Capacity utilization was below 40 percent in many industries during the war.²⁶⁴ As a result, the Iranian industry was far away from supplying domestic demand and supporting the economy with a significant export opportunities.

The Rafsancani administration emphasized a need to reform in industry. The reform plan based on the privatization of the non-strategic industries offered an important number of incentives. Although the plan did not cause a significant boom in the industry, it increased the capacity utilization of the sector.

The administration gave top priority to industrial expansion, the effective exploitation and utilization of the country's mineral resources and power generation. The steel industry, because of its strategic importance, is another major area of development. The copper and aluminium industries are the other areas of interest.

Iran also signed joint ventures with foreign corporations which show the change in the policy. Recently, Iran and French car maker Peugeot reached a ten-year agreement to produce cars, buses, and vans. Iran also negotiating with Renault and Italy's Fiat. Negotiations with Fiat have included the production of trucks, tractors, road-building machinery and

passenger cars. Cement, sugar, and paper products are other favored areas of industrial activity. Brazil and Finland are favored partners in the latter two sectors.²⁶⁵

The sanctions of the West decreased the technological capabilities of Iran. The exodus of scientists, technicians, and elite academicians halted many technological development plans of the post-revolutionary Iran. The ideological reform in the high level educational institutions, such as universities, affected the technological developments adversely. The lack of high technology is much evident in the industrial areas.

The reform movement of Rafsancani also increased the activities in this field. The responsibility to oversee research and development programs in the country was given to the National Research Council. The Industrial and Scientific Research Organization is the principal technological organization in Iran. The main aim of the development program is to gain technological self-sufficiency.

Despite of these reforms in the industry and technology, Iran has huge problems to overcome which will definitely need time, harmony and stability in the nation, and resources. Besides, Iran has to seek for foreign cooperation to improve its situation. The success of these reforms depend on the

availability of technological and financial support of the West, the commitment of the regime on these policies, and internal and external harmony.

b. Turkey

Turkey has a variety of industrial sectors: textiles, food processing, mining(coal, chromite, copper, boron minerals), petroleum, petrochemicals, chemicals, cement, construction, lumber, paper, manufacturing; consumer goods, intermediate goods, and investment goods. Besides these areas, some industries that require high technology, such as aircraft industry, communications and electronics are developing rapidly.

The state controlled enterprises dominated the early period of Turkish industry. The large-scale and strategic industries were handled with the state controlled enterprises, while the light industry was received private investment. However, the private sector was depended at large on the goods that the state controlled enterprises were producing.

Along with the liberal reform program of the 1980s, Turkey shifted towards more liberal industry. The essential goals of the new policy can be explained as upgrading the role of market signals in decision-making, increasing manufacturing

exports, enlarging private sector share in manufacturing, and reducing inefficiency in the state controlled enterprises.²⁶⁶

The administration implemented several measures to change the structure of the industry and reach these goals. Such as, sharp currency devaluation, introduction of export subsidies and reductions in export formalities; thus forcing the industry into competition and efficiency, the administration removed import quotas and liberalized imports. Finally, foreign investment and the transfer of technology encouraged.

As a result of the reform package, Turkey experienced huge increase in the industrial production qualitatively and quantitatively. Both the private sector and the state controlled enterprises improved the quality of their products and reduced inefficiency. This let them also increase their production with existing plants.

Industrial production increased at an average of seven percent. Industry grew 30 percent of the GDP. The share of industrial products in the exports increased significantly. It quadrupled, and now constitute 80 percent of total exports, compared to 35 percent ten years ago. The manufacturing industry production, which consist of consumer goods, intermediary goods, and investment goods, showed a growth of

seven percent during 1991-1993. The manufacturing industry exports grew 8.6 percent during the same period.²⁶⁷

Another positive indicator is the shift to investment goods in the manufacturing industry. The investment goods (metalware, machinery, measuring instruments, electronics, road vehicles, railway rolling stock, ship building, and aircraft manufacture) increased its share in the total manufacturing industry production and export.²⁶⁸

Turkey increased its technological capabilities during this period. Many institutions, including universities, government agencies, and private sector invested on research and development. The transfer of the know-how is encouraged, and results are clear: Turkey achieved the production of modern aircraft, equipment, and machinery. Its electronic industry can compete globally. The exports of communication equipment is an example of this progress. The telecommunication system of Turkey is superior to those in Eastern and Central Europe, and the Middle East. Another example is the Ataturk dam. It is the largest of its class in Turkey and one of the largest dams of the world, and has been constructed with Turkish technology and work force.

However, industry reached the capacity utilization of 80 percent. Henceforth, Turkey needs to increase investment in

order to maintain high growth in the industry. Besides, the technological improvement in the industry requires a large scale investment on the research and development. On the other hand, the high cost of capital in Turkey limits the ability of the private sector to invest. In 1994, economic crisis hit the industry at large.

3. Natural Resources

a. Iran

The most important natural resources of Iran are its oil and natural gas reserves. Its crude oil reserves of 48.5 billion barrels ranked behind only those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The petroleum industry of Iran, which dated from 1908, is one of the oldest in the world. Iran made strides in the development of the gas industry as well, with efforts dating back to the 1960s. This industry was bolstered by the discovery of several natural gas fields in 1973. Reserves of natural gas amounted 13.8 trillion cubic meters, which makes Iran second in the world.²⁶⁹

Performance and growth in the oil and gas sector were severely affected by the war. Many petroleum complexes were hit by Iraq. Crude oil production fell to low of 1.46 million barrels a day (b/d) in 1981 compared to 5.6 million b/d in

1976. the production ranged between 2.2-2.9 million b/d for the rest of decade. After the cease-fire, the production increased to some 3.2-3.4 million b/d. As a result the share of the oil sector in GDP declined from 30-40 percent to 9-17 percent.²⁷⁰

Several diverse factors affected this decline in the oil production, exports, and revenues: the initial chaos of the revolution, damage suffered from the war, gyrations in world prices of crude oil, and poor maintenance of oil wells because of capital, skilled personnel, and other shortages.

Although Iran tried to increase the weight of non-oil industry in its economy, the oil industry is still the main industry of Iran. The fluctuations in the production, export, and revenues of the oil industry have devastating impact on the economy. Oil income accounts for about 90 percent of total foreign exchange receipts each year.

The Rafsanjani administration understood the need to recovery of the petroleum industry. Despite its occasional rhetoric, they understood that Iran relies heavily on oil income. So, the administration tried to implement a rehabilitation program which includes the attraction of foreign technology and capital. It has been reported that Iran is once again negotiating with Western oil companies about investing

on the petroleum industry of Iran. The new plan, outlined by Oil Minister Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, was stunning in the sense that it meant the Rafsanjani administration was changing the ideological course of the economy to a moderate one. The government's basic priority has been to rebuild and repair Iran's major oil terminals and facilities. At the same time, the government is committed to replacing oil with gas in the domestic consumption.²⁷¹

Remaining natural resources of Iran besides oil and gas includes chromite, lead, zinc, copper, coal, gold, iron, tin, manganese, ferrous oxide, and tungsten. Commercial extraction of significant reserves of turquoise, fireclay, and kaolin is also possible. Iran also discovered uranium deposits in 1986.²⁷²

Industrialization increased the need for steel, which in turn boosted demand for coal, iron ore, and limestone. Copper industry also received the attention of the government policies which aimed to make it rival to the oil industry. Iranian copper deposits are among the world's largest. The reserves of chromite are on a large scale.

The same problems that affected overall industry and economy had also hit the mining industry. The efforts of the

Rafsancani administration did not produce significant recovery, but was a right step to recovery.

b. Turkey

Turkey's most important mineral products are chrome, boron, iron, lignite, copper, manganese, zinc, antimony, bauxite, asbestos, pyrites, sulfur, mercury, and magnasite. The production of barite, natural graphite, meerschaut, salt, cement, clay, pebbles, marble, onyx are also important. The limited reserves of oil, natural gas, uranium, thorium, and gold were found in Turkey.

The most important source of energy is hydroelectric energy. Turkey is trying to optimize its hydroelectric potential by constructing new dams and improving the capacity of the existing ones. The hydroelectric production of Turkey increased from 13,426 gigawatt-hours (Gwh) in 1984 to 28,928 Gwh in 1988. It is planned to reach 34,500 Gwh in 1994.²⁷³

Turkey's estimated petroleum stocks are amount to sixteen million tons, and the enhanced oil-recovery techniques might allow extraction of another 30 million tons. The petroleum reserves of Turkey are only equivalent to three years of consumption. Proven reserves of natural gas are about 12.4 billion cubic meters.²⁷⁴

Turkey's oil fields are mostly located in southeastern Anatolia. It is also estimated that the Aegean shelf contained a considerable amount of oil reserves, however, the dispute with Greece restricts the exploration of these reserves. The reserves of natural gas were found in Thrace in the 1980s.

Oil production is held by the state oil company (the Turkish Petroleum Corporation), Shell and Mobil. The production reached the peak of 3.6 million tons in the 1970s, but declined to 2.1 million tons in the late 1980s.²⁷⁵

Lignite is the second important potential source of energy. Turkey has a large amount of lignite reserves. However, Turkish lignite, containing high amounts of water and sulfur, is hard to burn and causes air pollution. The lignite production increased rapidly, from 7.9 million tons in the 1970s to 34 million tons in 1988. It was planned to reach 66.3 million tons in 1994.²⁷⁶

Despite the efforts of the administration to improve the natural resources and their share in the GDP, Turkey could not improve significantly. Mining contributed only two percent of GDP in the 1980s. The exports of minerals accounted an average of four percent of the total exports in this era.

The structure of the sector also did not change significantly. The state enterprises still dominate the mining

sector. Private-sector mining enterprises were generally small scale. Although the administration provided incentives for private and foreign investors, there was not any important change in the structure. The incentives of 1,365 billion Turkish Lira were granted during 1989-1991 to the sector. However, this amount represents the 3.5 percent of the total incentives that were granted by the government.²⁷⁷

The inefficiency of the operations of the state enterprises did not decrease significantly. For example, the hard coal production decreased from 6.5 million tons in 1976 to 3.8 million tons in the 1980s. The government-owned Turkish Coal Company came close to the bankruptcy in the 1990s. The poor management and outmoded technology became main factors of the collapse. As a result, the unit cost of coal that was produced exceeded the cost of imported coal.

C. SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES

1. Demographic Structure

a. Iran

The recent national census, which was conducted in July, 1992, showed a total population of 61,183,138. This number shows a 27 percent increase in the population since 1986. The

official growth rate is 3.5 percent. It is estimated that the population will reach 100 million in the early 2000s.

The population increase is a compound result of increase in the birth rate, decrease in the death rate and infant mortality rate, and increase in the life expectancy at birth and fertility rates. The ideology and change in the government policies also major factors of the rapid increase in the population.

In 1976, Iran had a population of 33,704,744 that was growing at an average of 2.7 percent. The birth rate was 45 per 1,000 in 1975. It reached the peak of 63 in the early years of the revolution, and oscillated around 50 births per 1,000. The birth rate was 44 per 1,000 in 1992. The infant mortality rate was 112 per 1,000 births in 1976. It dropped to 64 deaths per 1,000 births in 1992. The life expectancy at birth was 55.1 and 56.3 years for males and females respectively. The life expectancy at birth increased to 64 years for male, and 66 years for females in 1992. The fertility level was 5 births per woman during their reproductive period. This was increased to 6.5 in 1992²⁷⁸

The already high population growth forced the Shah to implement and encourage the family programming. The government established many family centers in which the family

controlling was explained and neccessary aid was provided. However, the Islamic Republic totally abandoned this policy because of ideological factors. Besides, the marriages were encouraged. The formalities of marriage were reduced and a ban on the early marriage was lifted. The younger generation was encouraged to marry and establish families in their early age. Marriage, specifically early marriage was promoted as part of the revitalization of Islamic society and abolishment of the Western life style. The Islamic republic considered marriage as both an alternative and a barrier to the sexual needs of human beings.

The age structure of the population is also important. In 1986, the median age of the population was 16.5 years. In the same year, the government declared that 50 percent of the population was below fifteen years of age, 45 percent was between 15- 59 year of age, and only five percent was over 60 years of age.²⁷⁹ The same structure was existent in 1992.

The major social problems occurred as a result of demographic trends. The unemployment rate was 30 percent in 1992. The need for at least 500,000 new jobs each year was not consistent with the economic growth of Iran. The migration to the cities increased in the post-revolutionary Iran. Although the process of rural-urban migration is not a recent

development, however, the policies of the government caused an increase in this trend. Despite the promise of improvement of the situation of poor, the poor became poorer in the post-revolutionary period. The conditions in the slums of cities did not improve or the number of the slums did not decrease.

This much population also need more food, more cloths, and more housing. However, the resources of Iran are not enough to satisfy increasing demand of the population. The dissatisfaction of the poor increased and this let the Rafsancani administration to reactive family control programs silently.

b. Turkey

The recent national census, which was conducted in 1990, showed a total population of 59,640,143. This number shows a 16 percent increase in the population since 1985. The official growth rate is 2.1 percent. It is estimated that the population will reach 100 million in the 2025s.

Although the population increase is a compound result of increase in the birth rate, decrease in the death rate and infant mortality rate, and increase in the life expectancy at birth and fertility rates, it is offsetted by voluntary family planning.

The birth rate was 27 per 1,000 in 1992. The infant mortality was 55 deaths per 1,000 births in 1992. The life expectancy at birth was 68 and 72 years for males and females respectively in 1990. These results were achieved by progress in the social conditions including better living conditions and medical services.

On the other hand, the fertility level stood at 3.4 birth per woman during their reproductive period in 1990. The willingness of society to implement family planning is very high in the cities. The rural areas are also becoming more willing to implement family planning. However, it is not accepted by all sections of the population.

Turkey began to implement and encourage family planning since 1965. The government established the Family Planning Division within the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance in 1965. Abortion was liberalized to a large extent. New clinics opened in the country to provide the family planning service. In the mid-1980s, more than 200 clinics besides other health institutions were providing family planning service.²⁸⁰

The age structure of the population is also important. In 1985, it has been reported that 35 percent of the population was below fifteen years of age, 29 percent was between 15-29 years of age, 31 percent was between 30-64 years of age, and

only five percent was over 65 years of age.²⁸¹ The same structure was existent in 1990.

One of the major social problems of Turkey is rural-urban migration. Beginning of the 1960s, Turkey experienced a migration of labor force to the cities. The industrialization of the country, and the emerge of cities as a economic and industrial centers sped up this movement. During 1960-1980, the urban population increased by 7.2 percent while the annual population increase was a little more than 2 percent. In other words, the share of urban population in the total population was jumped from 22 percent to 44 percent. During 1980-1990, the rapid increase of the movement was reduced, but the increase continued. The portion of urban population in the total population increased from 44 percent in 1980 to 59 percent in 1990.²⁸²

This let the establishment of *Gecekonu* (night-shift) population centers around the cities(slums). The government could not cope with the huge increase in the city populations. The growth of cities showed all kind of problems of the unplanned growth. The people who came to seek for jobs became dissatisfissfied because of the scarcity of resources that were available for them. The housing drive of the Ozal administration in the mid-1980s could not produce satisfactory

results.

The economy also showed a lack of capacity to cope with moderate population growth. The unemployment causes a significant problem. The recent official information, which was declared by Ciller herself, on the unemployment shows the 10 percent unemployment rate.²⁸³ The unofficial employment rate is fifteen percent of the total population. It is estimated that the decrease in the investments in the economy will push the unemployment rate to higher levels in a few years.

2. Religious Groups

a. Iran

The overwhelming majority of Iranians are Muslims who adhere to Shia Islam. The 90 percent of the population are Shia. Of the several Shia sects, the believers of Twelve Imam- or Twelver are dominant. The Shia established deeply its organization over all of the society.

Beside Twelver Shia, the Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, has a long tradition in Iran. Sufis generally renounced materialism, which they believed supported and perpetuated political tyranny. The Shia clergy accepted Sufism as deviant. However, the Sufi brotherhoods, such as Nimatollahi, Dhahabi, Kharksar, established their supporter base in the society.

Besides these brotherhoods, the Naqshbandi and Qadiri brotherhoods are existed in Kordestan province. There is no evidence of persecution of Sufis in the post-revolutionary era, but the brotherhoods are regarded suspiciously and generally keep a low profile.²⁸⁴

Other Shia sects that the Twelver Shia clergy regard as heretical are exists in Iran. One of them is the Ismaili, a sect that has believers in Iran and abroad.

The Ismailis are also known as the Seveners. The name was derivated from the disagreement with other Shia over the identity of the seventh Imam. The Ismailis trace their origins to the son of Ismail who predeceased his father, the Sixth Imam. They are known in the history as the assassins because of their practice of killing political opponents. There are several thousands of believers in Iran but the majority of the several million Ismailis live outside Iran. Another Shia sect is the Ahl-e Haqq. The origins of the Ahl-e Haqq are believed to lie in one of the Sufi orders. There are few thousand followers of this sect. Both groups have been persecuted sporadically by Shias. After the Revolution, some of the sect leaders were imprisoned by the charge of religious deviance.²⁸⁵

Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 8 percent of the total population. A majority of Kurds, Baluchis, and

Turkomans, and a minority of Arabs are Sunnis. The Sunnis are accepted as half-believers and non-Tawhidi by Shia. There is a constant effort of Sha clergy to convert Sunni Muslims to Shia. Tensions between the Sunnis and Shias existed both before and after Revolution, and recently led to large scale protests, riots against government suppression in Meshed and other towns in eastern Iran. ²⁸⁶

There are non-Muslim minorities in Iran which consist of one percent of the population. They were accepted as an official minorities and granted political rights with the exception of the Bahais despite of the fact that the largest non-Muslim minority is the Bahais.

The Bahaism is a religion that originated in Iran during the nineteen century as a reformist movement within Shia Islam. The emigration of Bahais because of oppression began in the nineteenth century. The Bahai leader, who fled to Palestine in this period, continued to elaborate Bahai doctrines by incorporating beliefs from other religions. The situation of the remaining Bahais improved during the Pahlavi era. The Revolution removed the rights of Bahais and persecuted them. More than 700 of their religious leaders were arrested and several of them were executed. ²⁸⁷

However, Christians and Jews, as "peoples of the Book", were tolerated both under the Pahlavi and post-revolutionary era. The small minority of Christians consist of 250,000 Armenians, some 32,000 Assyrians, and an unimportant number of Catholic, Angelican, and Protestant Iranians who were converted by missioneries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Christians are entitled to elect their own representatives to Majlis, and are permitted to follow their religious laws. The Armenians are achieved a relatively high standard of living and maintained a large number of schools, hospitals, and other community organizations. Both Armenians and Assyrians are urbanized.²⁸⁸

Among the other non-Muslim communities, Jews are also recognized as a minority and granted with political participation and tolerance. There were an estimated 50,000 Jews in Iran in 1986. As usual, Jews of Iran are an wealthy minority, dealing with small-scale trading, financial activities, and jewelry. The overwhelming majority of Jews live in cities.²⁸⁹

Another non-Muslim group in Iran is Zoroastians. The Zoroastions, who were estimated as numbered 32,000. The religion is based on the struggle between the forces of Good

led by Ahura Mazda and the forces of evil. It was first preached by Zarathustra in the sixth century in Iran. Later, it became the official religion of the Sassanid Empire. The Zoroastrians are recognized as minority and granted with a seat in the Majlis.²⁹⁰

a. Turkey

The overwhelming majority of the population are Muslim(99.8 percent of the total population). The vast majority of Muslims in Turkey are Sunni. The predominant religious school of law and ritual in Turkey is Hanafi, founded by Abu Hanifa in the ninth century.

There are several sects among the Sunni population. Especially, Sufism established a supporter base in Turkey. Some of the Sufi brotherhoods, such as the Mevlevi dervishhood and the Bektashi dervishhood received limited acceptance and tolerance. However, some of the Sufi brotherhoods, such as the Ticanis, the Naqshbandi and Qadiri brotherhoods were deemed to be dangerous for the regime and subject to suspicion. Other clandestine sects, such as Suleymancilar, Nurcular, and Fettullahcilar are also subject to suspicion because of their attacks against the regime. None of these sects could not establish vast base of supporters. However, the Bektashi had a important position among the elite.

There are Shia Muslims in Turkey. They are called as Kizilbaslar or Alevis, although there are minor differences. The Kizilbaslar are the Turkomans who accepted Shia and living in Turkey. Alevis are also Shia Turks, who accepted mostly the Sevener branch of Shia Islam.

There are significant differences between the Twelver Shia and Sevener Shia. A Sunni believer asserts that "Mohammed is his Prophet(God)". A Twelver Shia add the phrase "and Ali is the Friend of God". An Alevi recite the phrase and says "Ali is my God". It has been said that because of this, they have been called as "Ali-Ilahis"(the believers of Ali as God) or simply "Alevis".

Besides, the Alevis reject four of five pillars. They accept Ali as a dominant figure, not Mohammed. They reject a five-times daily pray, and pray twice a year. Instead of thirty days of fasting in Ramadan, they accept twelve days for fasting in Moharram. They refuse the pillar of pilgrimage. In addition to emphasis on Ali, the Alevi belief idolizes Hasan and Husayn, sons and successors of Ali.²⁹¹ The Alevis also do not follow the traditions of Islam regarding the family life.

Alevi communities of varying size are located in most major cities, and significantly in southeastern Anotolia. Some of the Kurds are also Alevis. Because of the religious

discrepancies, there is a tension between Sunni Muslims and Alevis, as well as between the Twelver Shia and Alevis. For this reason, they are highly secretive about the tenets of their belief and their identities. Although it is impossible to have any valid data regarding the size of the Alevi community in Turkey, there are estimates varying from 4.5 million to 18 million.²⁹² The most plausible estimation is somewhere between five to seven million.

There are non-Muslim communities in Turkey, however they consist only small percent (0.2) of the total population. Among the non-Muslim communities of Turkey, there are Christians and Jews. The Christian community of Turkey consist of Greek Orthodox, Armenian orthodox, Catholic, Assyrian, and Protestant communities. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul is the central church authority for Greek Orthodox Christians.

These communities have been accepted as a part of Turkish nation and treated equally. There is no discrimination based on religion in Turkey. These communities have established their churches, schools, hospitals, and other community organizations. They are completely free to practise their religious beliefs. There is no privilege or certain political right that is granted to any religious groups in Turkey.

3. Ethnic Groups

a. Iran

Iran is composed of several ethnic groups who speak Persian as a common language besides their own language. The linguistic division is follows: Persian and its dialects account to 58 percent, Turkic and its dialects account to 26 percent, Kurdish nine percent, Luri two percent, Baluch one percent, Arabic one percent, Turkish one percent, and others two percent.

The Persian-speaking Iranians consist of 51 percent of the total population. They predominate in the major urban areas of central and eastern Iran. Both in the Pahlavi era and in the post-revolutionary era, Persian-speaking Iranians have filled the majority of government and clerical positions. Most of Persian-speaking Iranians are Shia, but a few of them believe in the Bahaism and Zoroastranism.²⁹³

The second largest ethnic group is the Azeris which consists 25 percent of the population. The Azeris are also the largest Turkic-speaking group in Iran. Most of the Azeris are concentrated in northwestern Iran, where they form the majority population in an area between the Caspian Sea and Lake Urmia and from the Azeri border south to the latitude of Tehran. Most of the Azeris are urban. Major Azeri cities are

Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil, Zanjan, Khoy, and Maragdeh. There are important number of Azeris in Tehran, Hamadan, Karaj, and Qazvin. The majority of Azeris are Shia Muslims.²⁹⁴

The third sizable ethnic group in Iran are the Kurds. The Kurds account for nine percent of the total population. They speak a variety of dialects of Kirmanji. The Kurds are concentrated in the Zagros Mountain area along the western frontiers with Turkey and Iraq. The Kurdish area of Iran includes some part of West Azerbaijan, all of Kordestan, much of Bakhtaran and Ilam, and parts of Lorestan. The Kurds are both urban and rural. Important Kurdish cities are Bakhtaran, Sanandaj, and Mahabad. They are mostly Sunni Muslim.²⁹⁵

The clandestine Kurdish groups are struggling against the regime to gain an authonomy for the Kurdish areas of Iran. The ethnic opposition parties of Kurds includes the KOMALA, the KDPI, and the split of the KDPI, the KDPI-RL.

The Bakhtiaris and the Lurs, who live in the central and southern Zagros, account to important percent (together 10 percent) of the total population. Both groups are closely associated to each other, however, they are considered both separate political and tribal entities. Both groups speak Luri, a language which is classified as a member of Indo-Iranian languages family.

The Bakhtiaris established a strong role in the politics of Iran prior to the Pahlavi era. During the 1900-1920s, they dominated the Iranian politics. Their resistance to the central authority was gradually broken by the Pahlavi Shahs in the following years. The central government forced them to settle which weakened their tribal structure and power. As a result, in the 1990s the Bakhtiaris became both rural and urban. The Bakhtiaris are Shia Muslims.²⁹⁶

On the other hand, the Lurs live in the Zagros to the northwest, west, and southeast of the Bakhtiaris. The Lurs were considered fiercest of tribes and their resistance to the central authority were finally broken in the 1940s. They were forced to settle down in urban areas and to give up their nomadic character. As a result, the Lurs were settled in villages, small towns and in Khorramabad, the provincial capital of Loreastan. The Lurs are Shia Muslims.²⁹⁷

The Baluchis are another group that speak an Indo-Iranian language that is close to Pashtu, one of the major languages of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are also part of the Baluchis who are living in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Baluchis account to one percent of the total population. They are concentrated in the Makran highlands, an area that stretches eastward along the Gulf of Oman coast to

the Pakistan border. This area is the most desolate part of Iran for several reasons. Equal part of the Baluchis are seminomadic, nomadic, and settled farmers and townsmen. The Baluchis kept their tribal organizations and the control of the central authority is weak. They are Sunni Muslims and there is a constant tension between the Baluchis and Persian-speaking Iranians.²⁹⁸

The Qashqais are the second largest Turkic group in Iran. They live at the higher elevations of the Zagros south of Shiraz and at the low elevations north Shiraz. They speak a dialect of Turkish. The Qashqai confederation emerged in the eighteenth century and kept its organization until 1930s. The Qashais resisted central authority and revolted several times because of the forcibly settlement policy of the government. In the post-revolutionary era, the control of the central government was also weak. The important part of Qashqais are Shia Muslims.

Other Turkic groups are consist of the Ilsavan confederation, the Qajars, the Turkoman confederation, the Afshars, the Qarapakhs and Uzbeks. Most of these tribes are nomadic or seminomadic. These groups are scattered throughout Iran, but mainly northern tier of provinces. Many of the

Turkic tribes are Sunni. The Turkic groups together account to two percent of the total population.²⁹⁹

There are important number of Arabs living in Iran which account for one percent of total population. A majority of the Arabs live in Khuzestan, but some of them scattered along the Persian Gulf coastal plains, central and eastern Iran. The urban Arabs are concentrated in the cities of Abadan, Ahvaz, and Khorramshahr. Other half of the Arabs kept their tribal structure and became rural and seminomadic. While the Khuzestan Arabs are Shia Muslims, remaining of the Arabs are Sunni.³⁰⁰

Despite of the intermingling of Arabs with other groups, the Arabs tend to regard themselves as separate than others. This resulted with opposition and revolts of the Arabs against regime. During the post-revolutionary era, the Khuzestan Arabs revolted against the regime. However, the Arabs did not opt with Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war despite the expectations and claims of the Iraqis.

b. Turkey

Turkey is much homogeneous than Iran ethnically and linguistically. Obviously, one may observe different customs, dress, dialectal particularities in different parts of Turkey. However, none of the differences among the people indicate

ethnic differences. These differences are reflections of variations in historical and ecological circumstances. Besides, it must be noted that the Turkic groups form one of the largest ethnic groups in history.

In the modern Turkey, the Turks account to 89 percent of the population. Some of the major Turkish groups are, Yoruks, Turkomans, Anatolian Turks, and Rumelian Turks. There are other Caucasus Turks: Circassians, Lazs, Azeris. Besides, there are some number of Central Asian Turks: Crimean Tatars, Abazahs, Chechens, Uzbeks, Krygyz, Kazakhs.^{ff} Most of them are Sunni Muslim with the exception of the Turkomans. The sizeable number of the Turkomans are Shia Muslims.

If the unsettled argument on the ethnic roots of Kurds is left out of the subject of this section,^{gg} the Kurds account for ten percent of the population. Some of them are concentrated in southeastern Anatolia. However, many Kurds scattered throughout Turkey. The sizable Kurdish people may be found in the major cities of Turkey who were migrated to these

^{ff}It must be repeated that, these classifications do not show any separation or division of these groups as ethnic groups. The classification is made to explain that the minor differences are because of different historical background and ecological environment of these groups.

^{gg}It is the view of the author that the Kurds are indispensable part of the Turkish ethnic family.

cities because of the economic reasons as were addressed before.

The separatist and divisive movement established its roots among the Kurdish population after the 1970s. As addressed before, the major divisive group is the PKK. It has a goal of dividing the Turkish nation and establishing a Kurdish state on the territories of Turkey, specifically, in southeastern Anatolia. Besides the clandestine terrorist group, one of the legal political parties that is represented in the Parliament is advocating divisive propaganda among the Kurds. Instead of operating for the well-being of the Kurds who are the part of the Turkish nation in the parliamentary system, the HEP (or with the new name of the DEP) is paying lip service to the PKK.

Another group is Arab speaking people who were preferred to stay in Hatay during its joining to Turkey. Later on, some of them moved to other parts of Turkey. The Arabs are both rural and urban. They are Sunni Muslims. The Arab population in Turkey adopted themselves quickly and became members of the Turkish nation.

The Arabs, Greeks, Armenians and Jews account for total of one percent of the population. Each of these groups are

living in a peace and harmony with others as members of the Turkish nation.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES

1. Foreign Relations

a. Iran

The foreign policy of Iran showed changes in the post-revolutionary era. The major policy change of recent times was due to shift in the internal politic balances. As it has affected other areas, the victory of the moderate administration made major shift in foreign affairs.

Among the fundamental factors that shaped the foreign policy of Iran, two of them seem more important: its geostrategic position as an arena for great power rivalry, and the control of the country by foreign actors for centuries. Both experiences have affected the self-image of Iran and their perception of the outside world.

The Islamic Republic of Iran changed the foreign policies of Iran. It accepted the ideological framework in the foreign policy. As addressed before, the spread of the revolution and safeguarding the regime in Iran were main objectives of this

era. The export of revolution also would have a side effect of safeguarding the regime against hostile movements.

As a tool for foreign policy, the administration accepted "people-to-people" approach rather than government-to-government. This approach was derived from the ideology that declares either Muslim or non-Muslim governments as an illegitimate or hostile. With close approach to the people of different nations, Islamic Republic could explain its ideology. This policy derives from a naive faith in the superiority of the Revolution's ideas and the belief that they would be embraced by others if they could be adequately exposed to them.

Besides, the imperialist powers of East(the Soviet Union) and the West(western countries and the United States) who were attacking against Islam require awareness of the Islamic Republic. So, Iran followed so called "neither East nor West" that required non-alignment with any power. The United States was labeled as "Great Satan" and the Soviet Union was "Lesser Satan" by Khoemeini.

The continuation of the war and Iran's inability to reach a settlement either by means of force or by negotiating forced Iran to develop better foreign policies. The absence of the

international support for Iran during the war with Iraq forced it to establish better connections in the international arena.

The people-to-people approach was abandoned gradually in 1984. Khoemeini made a speech and encouraged the administration to establish government-to-government relations besides the people-to-people approach. Iran began to follow so-called "open-door policy" in its foreign relations after this speech. Iranian leaders visited Japan, China, East Asia, Africa, East and Southwest European countries³⁰¹

The confrontation with the United States Navy had an important impact on the policy makers. The loss of important part of their Navy and downing of a civilian airliner of Iran showed them that Iran was not ready by any means to confront a super power in a open confrontation.

One of the major decisions of Iran was the acceptance of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 598. This led to declaration of the cease-fire with Iraq. The decision also showed a major split with early radical foreign policy orientation of Iran. The radicals, who were asking of continuation of war with Iraq untill Iraq became Islamic Republic, were dissatisfied.

The death of Khoemeini led to change in the leadership. The Rafsancani government accepted a need of change in the

foreign policy. The pragmatic approach of the Rafsancani government gave up most of the ideological policies. The administration accepted the realities of the global arena as an important factors of decision-process. Besides, Iran pursued a policy of opening up toward the West. Although there were major obstacles in the rapprochement policy of Iran, Iran tried to open dialogue with other countries including "Great and Lesser Satans", the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave a chance to Iran to obtain their demands from Iraq that were refused before. Iraq accepted all of the demands of Iran and the two countries signed a peace. The following defeat of Iraq also relieved a pressure on Iran. The regional balance of power had shifted significantly, and the new situation provided an opportunity for Iran to reassert its influence.

Another significant event was the break-up of the Soviet Union. For centuries, the northern border of Iran was controlled by a strong, centralized state that was alternately hostile and friendly, but always a threat. Now, this threat was relieved, and was replaced by several relatively small and weak states.

In their assesment of the situation in the north and south, the Rafsancani administration concluded that the

national security of the country in the 1990s would depend crucially on the maintenance of political stability and cooperation in these two surrounding areas: the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.

Both of these areas are problematic for Iran. In the north, the problem in the Caucasus, the Azeri nationalism, and the civil war in Turkmenistan and in Afghanistan are some of the concerns of Iran. In the south, the power balance with Iraq, the security of shipping in Persian Gulf, and the vulnerability of important facilities of the country from the south are among the major concerns of Iran.

In order to secure the well being and stability of Iran, the administration understood a need to contain the instability of region. So, the Rafsancani administration emphasized the diplomacy in order to broadening and strengthening of cooperative relations in the foreign relations.

The declarations of goodwill and good neighbourliness are aimed to change the image of Iran. For example, Rafsancani declared that the main precept of the foreign policy of Iran is "respect for territorial integrity as well as social and religious values of other peoples." Rafsancani stated that:

We should all cooperate to build our region. The Persian Gulf area should become like an area around a home, like a common farmland.³⁰²

Iran's most vital security interests are focused on the Persian Gulf, a waterway that lets Iran to transit all of its oil exports and majority of imports through it. It is thus essential for Iran that no hostile power controls access to it. The negative affect of restrictions on the shipping in the Gulf have been observed during the Iran-Iraq war. Even the limited Iraqi attacks were enough to cause big damage on the oil exports and imports of Iran. Besides, during these attacks, Iran learned the extensive vulnerability of its major facilities in the region.

Since Iran has the longest coastline of the eight countries bordering the Persian Gulf, it is well positioned to project its own power. However, the existence of other countries and strategic importance of the region requires the cooperation of Iran with these powers in order to create security in the region. On the other hand, the relations with other Gulf countries can be better characterized by conflict rather than cooperation. The establishment of the GCC and the participation of Syria and Egypt in the operations of the GCC are aimed to create balance against Iran or Iraq and to secure the region. The rejection of Iranian participation to the

organization is due to the acceptance of Iran as a threat rather than an ally.

Iran saw the GCC as a tool for other powers to control the region. The intensification of the United States and the GCC relations portended a semi-permanent American military presence in the Gulf. So, one of the important goals of Iranian policy to diminish the influence of the GCC in the region. In order to achieve this goal, Iran increased its efforts to increase bilateral relations with the member states while ignoring the GCC as a regional organization. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, do their best to counter the activities of Iran to influence other relatively small Gulf countries. Yet, Iran has pursued a naval build-up in the Gulf and continues new provocations over Tumbs and Abu Musa, driving the UAE and GCC into the arms of the U.S.

Besides Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Iraq is another rival of Iran. The contest for regional power and influence has been especially intense with Iraq for a long time. The Rafsancani administration gave the top priority to maintaining a balance with Iraq and to pursue the containment of Iraq. Following the Iran-Iraq war, and the peace treaty, the present situation still may be defined as a state of "no peace no war". So, the principal objective of Iran's security policy in the south is

the containment of Iraq. The continuing concerns about Iraq's power have prompted Iran to provide covert assistance to regional anti-government forces. The covert efforts of Iran are aimed to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and establish a friendly regime in Iraq.

The Rafsancani government accepted the north (the Caucasus and Central Asia) as secondary strategic area where political instability threatens Iran's security. The fragile situation in Central Asia, the war in the Caucasus, and the chaos in Afghanistan and Tajikistan receive the attention of Iran.

The chaos in Afghanistan preoccupied Iran for a long time. The existence of 2.5 million refugees in Iran and the presence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan were the main factors in the Iranian involvement. The export of ideology and establishing a similar regime in Afghanistan by using the resistance groups were other goals. In any case, Iran assumed that the existence of the Shia population in Afghanistan may let Iran to exercise its influence in the post-war era.

Throughout the nine-year Soviet occupation, Iran backed the mojaheddin(resistance) groups. Iran tried to gather the Shia groups under one organization, but failed. Iran supported the Jamathi Islami, an organization modelled on a combination

of the IRP and Tudeh, in the early stages of the problem. However, the radicals supported the Hizb-i Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After the evacuation of the Soviets in 1989, and the fall of the Najibullah administration in Kabul in 1992, Iran switched sides again. Iran supported Ahmad Shah Masood, the charismatic and popular Tajik leader, after the fall of Kabul.³⁰³ One of the reasons of this might be the influence of Masood on the Tajiks and his moderate policies.

As addressed before, the containment of the Azeri nationalism and prevention of the spillover of the Armenian-Azeri conflict shaped the policies of Iran towards the Caucasus. Tehran fears that the escalating tension in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh may result with foreign intervention and prompt a major refugee flow to Iran. Other concern of Iran is the change in the balance of power in the region. One of the possible results of this kind of change is the attempts of the Azeris to establish a Great Azerbaijan. This is a potential threat to the security of northern Iran and also a threat to Iran's territorial integrity.

The civil war in Tajikistan also a concern of Iran. Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia that Iran can establish its influence by using common linguistic ties. There

are also only a few Twelver Shias in Tajikistan. However, the ongoing war between groups halts any advance of the Iranian efforts. Besides, a fragile ethnic and political structure of Central Asia may cause a threat to stability of the region.

The Rafsancani administration understood that the north presents not only potential threats, but also potential opportunities. In order to contain the instability in the region, Iran increased its diplomatic efforts both on the bilateral and multinational level. The regional organizations, such as the ECO, became important platforms for Iran to pursue its policies. The Caspian Sea grouping is another incentive that Iran is aiming to increase the cooperation in the region.

As a result, the Rafsancani administration removed the radical interpretations of ideology from the foreign policy area. Once a popular motto of "Neither East nor West" became "Both South and North" for the foreign policy of Iran.

b. Turkey

Historically, Turkish security concerns have been focused on the perceived threat from the north- from the Slavs under the form of Tzarist Russia or the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, the threat of the Soviet Union and communism dominated the foreign policy and security arrangements of Turkey. The perceived threat of the Soviet Union led to Turkey

to abandon its non-aligned policies and opted with the West. Turkey joined the NATO and later attempted to enter the European Community.

The end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have radically changed the security policies of Turkey. Turkey faced new opportunities and challenges of the uncertainty in the region. The Turkish approach to the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia is a result of a drive to create a regional cooperation and security. Turkey adopted a cautious policy towards the CIS countries, balancing its relations with Slav and Turkish nations, and concentrating on building economic and cultural ties with the Turkish nations. The sympathy of the people in Turkey towards the Turkish nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia is in common, but the idea of Pan-Turanism is a only distant dream of the few ultranationalists in Turkey.

Many foreign policy makers in Turkey accept that the future course of Turkey will be towards the West. The emergence of Europe as a power center in the future is clear. Turkey decided to be a part of European political and economic system as a necessary step to catch up with the contemporary civilization. Turkey views the economic and political integration with the West as crucial to protect the national

interests of Turkey. The willingness of Turkey for the full status membership of the EC has an aim to secure the unity with the West. To achieve a full status membership of the EC is one of the major goals of the Turkish foreign policy.

So-called the "new order" in the global politics proved itself to be a disorder. The shift to regional sub-systems in the global politics is a result of the end of cold war. In this era, Turkey faced challenges from unexpected actors. The security dimension shifted from the north to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia; besides the north. The response of Turkey to the conflicts is based on the principle of the priority of regional security and cooperation. In any case, Turkey tried to come up with regional solutions to the regional problems which was a guideline of Ataturk. The initiatives of establishing regional organizations that will increase the cooperation and stability is because of this policy. Following Kemalist principles, Turkey participated actively in regional organizations, such as the Balkan Pacts, the Sa'dabad Pact, CENTO, RCD, ECO. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization is also an example of this principle.

The conflict and potential of new conflicts in the Balkans required Turkey to react. The conflict in the former

Yugoslavia has a threat to the stability of the Balkans. This conflict has its roots in the history and it is proven by the history that any change in the balance of power in the Balkans will result with a greater conflict that involves remaining actors of the region.

For this reason, Turkey offered a solution to the problem based on the regional solution. Turkey proposed to the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all parties, negotiations on the new structure, and removal of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey is declared that any form of aggression must be stopped by the parties. Turkey favored the establishment of a power balance between the parties which will keep them out of each other's territories. Turkey also concentrated its efforts to create an open diplomacy with other Balkan countries.

Another problematic area is the Caucasus. Turkey can ill afford the defeat of Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia. The possible results of the conflict on Nagorno-Karabagh consist of a regional war which may involve Turkey, Iran, Russia besides Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish efforts to solve the problem before it reaches the level of a threat to region itself included offering good offices to the parties

and mediating with the parties to solve the problem peacefully.

The Middle East also occupied an important place in the Turkish foreign policy. The disputes with Syria, Iraq, and Iran because of different reasons, and extensive military build up of these countries under the aggressive and sometimes hostile leaderships require Turkey to take necessary precautions. The preservation of the balance and increasing the cooperation in the region became a major goal of the Turkish foreign policy.

On the other hand, the opportunities of a good relations with the Middle Eastern countries and a need to improve the situation of Turkey in the international arena forced Turkey to establish close ties with the Middle eastern countries. The economic opportunities in a stable Middle East is high for Turkey. The Gulf crises proved Turkey's strategic importance, and Ankara attempted to play an important role in helping to build a more stable, prosperous and secure region.

2. Military Capabilities of the Two Countries

a. Iran

Iran's current military capabilities are heavily influenced by its demographics. It is the most heavily populated of the Gulf states which gives a major potential

advantage in building its military forces. However, Iran's ability to transform it into effective military power is severely limited by economic problems and its image which limits access to arms imports.

The defense structure of Iran consists of regular and revolutionary units under the new single General Staff.^{hh} The total of its active forces numbered 473,000 men. This includes the professionals and conscripts. The reserves are numbered 350,000. The regular armed forces consist of three branches: army, navy, and air force. The revolutionary groups has mainly ground forces but also have naval forces and marine units.³⁰⁴

The army has a total strength of 320,000 men of which 250,000 are conscripts. It is estimated that the army have three army headquarters. It has four armored divisions each with a strength of three brigades of nine armored and eighteen mechanized battalions, seven infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, and one special forces division with three to four brigades.^{305,ii}

^{hh}In the Rafsancani Administration, the same person was appointed as the head of the armed forces and the General Staff in order to combine two different structures under the single leadership.

ⁱⁱThe data on the military arsenal in this section are generally taken from the Military Balance 1993-1994 edition.

Iran has a total of 1000 main battle tanks consisting of T-72, T-62, T-54/55, Ch T-59, Chieftain Mk 3/5, M-47/48, and M-60A1. Iran has roughly 1100 light tanks and personnel carriers consisting of 40 Scorpions, 200 BMP-1, 700 BTR-50/60, 250 M-113, 130 EE-9 Cascaval and some Urutu personnel carriers. The anti-tank systems are consist of TOW, Dragon, and AT-3 Sagger systems.

Iran is heavily dependent on Russian, the PRC, and North Korean artillery. It has a total of 2,500 artillery pieces. Iran has M-107 self-propelled 175mm guns, M-101 105mm howitzers, Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, M-109A1 155mm howitzers, M-110 203mm howitzers. Iran has a total of 1,200 mortars including 81mm, 107mm, and 120mm mortars.

Iran has 40 Chinese-made Type-63 12x107mm multiple rocket launchers and 65 Russian made BM-21 40x122mm multiple rocket launchers. It has 230 mm Oghab, 333mm Shahin 2, 355mm Nazeat, and Iran-130 rockets. Iran's surface-to-surface missile inventory consists of Frog-7, Scud-B and Scud-C missiles.

The air defense weapons of Iran total 1,500 ZU-23 23mm towed, ZSU-23-4 23mm self-propelled, 35mm towed, 37mm towed, and ZSU-57-2 57mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. It has SA-7, and HN-5 surface-to-air missile systems.

The Iranian army has 100 AH-1J Cobra attack, 31 CH-47C heavy transport, 100 Bell 214A, 20 AB-205A, 50 AB-206 light helicopters. It also has total of 40 light aircraft for different purposes.

The Iranian navy was the strongest navy in the Gulf during the Shah era. However, the war and the confrontation with the United States caused very heavy damage. The Iranian navy has 18,000 men and is headquartered at Bandar Abbas. Other bases are located at Bushehr, Kharg, Bandar-e Anzelli (on the Caspian Sea), Bandar-e Khoemeini, and Chah Bahar (on the Arabian Sea).

The Iranian navy has eight principal surface combatants including 3 destroyers (UK Battle and US Sumner classes) and five frigates (UK Vosper Mk 5 and US PF-103 classes). Iran has ten Kaman (Fr Combattante II class) missile ships loaded with Harpoon SSM, 23 patrol inshore boats, and 13 hovercraft. It has five mine warfare ships. Its amphibious inventory includes ten LSTs, three LCTs, twelve LCUs, and fifty small patrol craft. Iran can deploy about 800 to 1,200 troops and 25-30 tanks in an amphibious assault.³⁰⁶ Iran has total of 22 support ships of different size and type. Iran has two Kilo type submarines.

The Iranian navy has two P-3F Orion aircraft, twelve Sikorsky SH-3D ASW helicopters, two RH-53D mine laying helicopters, seven Augusta-Bell AB-212 helicopters. The navy adapted Hercules C-130 and Fokker Friendship aircraft for mine laying and patrol missions.

The Iranian air force had 85,000 men and 447 highly modern combat aircraft during the Shah era. Although it is hard to estimate current power of the Iranian airforce, it is well below of that level. The Iranian air bases are located at Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Ghaleh-Marghi, Isfahan, Kharg, Khatami, Mehrabad, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Tehran. These bases have excellent shelters and air defense. It has 15,000 men, 8 to 12 squadrons and total of 293 combat aircraft. This number does not include the Iraqi deliveries.

Iran has nine squadron for fighter and ground attack which include four squadrons with 60 F-4 D/E, one squadron with 20 Su-24, four squadrons with 60 F-5 E/F. It has seven squadrons for fighter interception which include four squadrons with 60 F-14, one squadron with 25 F-7, two squadrons with 30 MIG-29. Iran uses five RF-5 and three RF-4 for air reconnaissance. It has also four Boeing-707 tanker aircraft. The Iranian airforce has nine Boeing 747F, eleven Boeing 707, one Boeing 727, twenty C-130 E/H, three Commander

690, fifteen F-27, five Falcon 20 in its five transportation squadrons.

The Iranian airforce has total of 46 helicopters consist of 2 AB-206A, 39 Bell 214C, and five CH-47. It has 26 Beech F-33, ten EMB-312, 45 PC-7, seven T-33, five MIG-29B, five FT-7, and twenty F-5B in its training squadrons.

The Iranian airforce has AGM-65A Maverick, AS-10, AS-11 air-to-ground missiles, AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder, AIM-54 Phoenix, AA-10, and AA-11 air-to-air missiles. Its air defense forces have twelve battalions with 150 Improved Hawk, five squadrons with 30 Rapier, 15 Tigercat, 45 HQ-2J, and SA-5 surface-to-air missile systems.

The Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were established after the revolution as a counter-balance to the armed forces. The Iran-Iraq war let the government to increase the strenght of this paramilitary organization and establish similar ones. The IRGC had 300,000-500,000 men, organized into eleven regional commands. The IRGC had eight divisions and many independent regiments and brigades. The IRGC was organized into border, infantry, armored, special forces, and partatroop units. Besides, the IRGC had its own engineering, artillery, air defense support units. However, the strength of the IRGC was reduced after the cease-fire to 100,000 men in its ground

forces, and 20,000 men in its naval units and largely integrated into the regular forces.

The IRGC was supported by the popular mobilization army (Basij) units. The Basij units were organized into 500 lightly equipped battalions which had an effective strength of 130,000. The strength of Basij units were reduced to 30,000 men after the cease-fire. Iran has 45,000 men in its gendarmerie, and 12,000 in an Iranian-trained and funded Kurdish Democratic Party militia. The internal security forces were reorganized as the Security Force (Niru-ye entezami).³⁰⁷

The Iranian armed forces have major problems that reduce its war capabilities. Most of the Western arsenal is not fully operative both qualitatively and quantitatively. The lack of spare parts, technicians and facilities caused lesser maintenance and limited overhaul repairs. The western embargo forced Iran to acquire weapons from the third world countries and the Eastern bloc. As a result, the military arsenal became strange combination of weapons. This caused logistic and operational problems. The relatively low capacity of these weapons are also generally accepted.

The lack of training also reduced the readiness of the armed forces. It is also generally accepted that the training level of the professional groups are below than their

counterparts in the western armies. Besides, several large-scale purges among the professional units of the armed forces during the postrevolutionary era resulted with the lack of skills in the command. The Iranian armed forces have less skill in the so-called C³ systems (command-control-communications) which limits their military capabilities.

The military build-up program of Iran has aimed to recover the situation. The program, with a huge acquisition of the equipment and weapons, may improve the qualitative side of the problem.

b. Turkey

The fighting qualities of the Turkish soldiers are legendary, as history testify. In terms of size, modern Turkey has the second largest armed forces in NATO, after the United States. The total men power of the armed forces amount to 480,000 of which 390,000 are conscripts. Its reserves total 1,104,000 men.³⁰⁸ However, the Turkish armed foces suffer from the lack of modern arsenal and equipment.^{jj}

The Turkish army is by far the largest and most developed of the three service components. Its active strength total 370,000 men of which 320,000 are conscripts. The army consist

^{jj}The data on the military arsenal in this section are generally taken from the Military Balance 1993-1994 edition.

of four army headquarters and nine corps. The major tactical units of the army include one infantry division, one mechanized division, fifteen armored brigades (each of them formed by two armored, two mechanized infantry, and two artillery battalions), eighteen mechanized brigades (each of them are formed by one armored, two mechanized infantry, and one artillery battalions and one reconnaissance squadron), nine infantry brigades (each of them are formed by four infantry and one artillery battalions), three commando brigades (each of them are formed by three commando and one artillery battalions), one Presidential Guard regiment, five coastal defense regiments and ten coastal defense battalions.

The First Army, with headquarters in Istanbul, is stationed in Thrace. It was organized for mobile operations in the rolling terrain near the Bulgarian border and along the coast of the Black Sea. Its mission is to protect Turkey, specifically the Turkish Straits, against a threat from the North. The Second Army, with headquarters in Malatya, was deployed in southeastern Anatolia with a defensive mission facing Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Third Army, headquartered at Erzincan, covered the Transcaucasian border and the historical invasion routes from the east with a defensive mission. The Aegean Army, headquartered at Izmir, was established as a

response to the threat from Greece. The Aegean Army has a defensive mission with a sector of responsibility stretching from the Canakkale Strait in the north, to the south edge of the Aegean coast of Turkey.

The Turkish army has some 4,000 main battle tanks consisting of 748 M-48A2C, 2,303 M-48T5/AST1/AST2, 706 M-60, and 312 Leopard 1A3. It has 2,896 armored personnel carriers consist of 125 IAPC, 2,412 M-113/A1/A2, 300 BTR-60 and 59 UR-416. The Turkish artillery total 4,571 pieces of which 1,788 are towed artillery, 696 self-propelled artillery, and 2,035 mortars. There are 32 multirocket launchers and 20 240mm guns that are used as coastal artillery.

The towed artillery is consist of 810 105mm M-101A1, 128 150mm Skoda, 517 155mm M-114A1/A2, 171 M-59, 162 203mm M-115. The self-propelled artillery is consist of 364 105mm M-52A1, 26 M-108, 168 155mm M-44, 36 175mm M-107, 9 203mm M-55 and 93 M-110. The mortars include 1,457 107mm M-30, M-106 SP, 578 120mm mortars. Besides, there are 1,500 81mm semi-propelled mortars. The army has 20 227mm MLRS and 12 RA-7040 40-tube towed multi rocket launchers.

The army has 182 Cobra, 300 SS-11, 365 TOW self-propelled and 392 Milan anti-tank missiles. Its air defense guns are 577 20mm GAI-DO1, 224 35mm GDF-003, 877 40mm L60/70, and 192 40mm

M-42A1. The army has 12 Rapier, 108 Stinger, and 789 Redeye surface-to-air missiles.

The army has 538 helicopters that are consist of 40 S-70A, 21 AH-1W/P, 214 AB-204, 64 AB-205, 20 AB-212, 29 H-300C, 30 OH-13H, 3 OH-58, 70 TH-55, 45 UH-1D/H. It has 269 different type light aircraft.

The Turkish Navy is responsible for the defense of the country against a seaborne attack, for safeguarding the Turkish Straits, for protecting the Turkish shipping, and for patrol and coast guard functions along the extensive coastline of Turkey. The navy has headquarters in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, and Eregli. It has 50,000 men including 40,000 conscripts.

The Turkish Navy has 15 submarines including six Atilay (Turkish-build Ge Type 209/1200), seven Canakkale (US Guppy), and 2 Hizirreis (US Tang) classes. The navy has 19 principal surface combatants including eleven destroyers and eight frigates. The destroyers are consist of 8 Yucetepe (US Gearing-ASW/ASUW), 2 Alcitepe (US Carpenter), one Zafer (US Sumner) classes. The frigates are consist of four Yavuz (Turkish-build Ge MEKO 200 ASW/OTHT/ASUW), two Gelibolu (Ge T-120 Koln), two Berk classes.

The Turkish navy has total of 45 patrol and coastal combatants including 16 missile, 29 patrol, 7 coastal craft. The missile craft consist of eight Dogan (Ge Lurssen) with Harpoon SSM, and eight Kartal (Ge Jaguar) with Penguin 2 SSM. The navy also has 22 inshore boats. The navy has four minelayers, and 32 mine countermeasures crafts for mine warfare missions. The navy has 27 support ships.

Turkey has one of the largest amphibious fleets of the world. The navy has seven LST, 35 LCT, 2 LCU, 22 LCM. The navy landed 30,000 troops in two days to Cyprus (65 miles of waterway) in the 1974 crises. The LSTs alone can land 2,800 troops and 100 tanks. The marine troops total 4,000 men and have artillery.

The operations of the navy are supported by 21 S-2a/e/ts-2a Tracker aircraft and 3 AB-204AS, 12 AB-212 ASW helicopters.

The Turkish air force is the youngest of the three branches of the armed forces. The air force has 60,000 men including 30,000 conscripts. It is headquartered in Ankara, and includes two tactical air forces, one transportation, and one air training command. The First Tactical Air Force, with its headquarters in Eskisehir, has a responsibility to defend the west of the 35th longitude. It will support the operations of the First and Aegean Armies. The Second Tactical Air Force,

with its headquarters in Diyarbakir, has a responsibility to defend the east of the 35th longitude. It will support the missions of the Third and Second Armies.

The air force has 19 squadrons for fighter and ground attack missions, two squadrons for fighter interception, six squadrons for transportation, three squadrons for training and some reconnaissance units. Its fighter and ground attack squadrons are composed of three squadrons with F-5 A/B, eight squadrons with F-4E, six squadrons with F-16, and two squadrons with F/TF-104. Its fighter interception squadrons are deployed with F/TF-104.

It has total of 539 combat aircraft and 174 reserve combat aircraft. The combat aircraft inventory includes 126 F-16 C/D, 137 F-5 (44 more in store), 155 F-4E (30 more in store), 88 F-104 G/TF-104/F-104S (100 more in store). Its reconnaissance squadrons are deployed with 20 RF-5A and 20 RF-4. The air force has 13 C-130, 19 C-160, 25 C-47, four Citation-11, four CN-235, and one Viscount aircraft in the transportation squadrons. It has 75 T-33, 16 T-34, 63 T-37, 27 T-38, 28 T-41, and 21 SF-260D aircraft in the training squadrons. The air force has 128 Nike Hercules and 24 Rapier surface-to-air missiles. It has 21 UH-1H helicopters.

Turkey has paramilitary organizations operating under the authority of the Ministry of Interior in peace time. However, these organizations are cooperating closely with the armed forces and in the case of war, they will be under the command of the Ministry of Defense. These organizations are the gendarmerie and the coast guard. The gendarmerie has 70,000 active and 50,000 reserve men. The coast guard has 1,100 men and 36 patrol boats.

The Turkish defense arrangements still consider Russia as a main threat. However, the emerge of new conflict sources forced Turkey to reevaluate its security policies. The Gulf war also provided an example to Turkey a need to have a force that is highly mobile, well armored, projecting high fire power, able to operate day and night and has well developed C³ and electronic warfare systems, and reconnaissance capability.

As can be seen from the inventory, the Turkish armed forces have technologically backward sytems with the exception of a few. Most of the weapon systems of Turkey are the surplus of the NATO countries. Besides, the armed forces do not have a long-range power projection capability. Turkey is even behind of the capacities of its Middle Eastern neighbours. Neither it is ready to counter surface-to-surface missile threat that all of its southeastern neighbours may pose. Nor

it is ready to counter any long-lasting chemical or biological attack.

The modernization efforts began in the 1970s were constrained by the availability of funds and technologies. It has now gained in significance, and the administrations gave a high priority. Under the reorganization program, the armed forces reduced the quantity in order to increase quality of the forces. Many of the divisions were reorganized as brigades. The national industry was improved. The training became most important activity. Thus, the armed forces were able to increase its level of readiness and reaction capabilities.

V. SPECATULATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Both countries have a unique culture derivated from their long histories. The two nations are existing for thosuands of years. The part of Turkish nation has been living in Anatolia since 1071 while the Iranian nation has been residing in its homeland since the end of the second millenium. Throughout their history, the Turks are known to be established sixteen states or empires and have always lived as an independent nation. The Iranians also established great empires or regional states during the history. When the Iranians did live under the control of other nations, they always found ways and means to protect their national identity and culture.

Acceptance of Islam and its culture has not affected this result much. It was while under the Arab's rule that the Iranians widely adopted Islam. Although the conquerors of Iran tended to stress the primacy of Arabs, the Iranians were able to protect their culture and share the administrative posts. Later, they sided with the branch of the Shia who were struggling against the Umayyad dynasty. This was another way they found to protect their indentity. The Shia let them keep their uniqueness among the Muslims of the world. By doing so,

they were able to separate themselves from other Muslims, and keep their heritage alive.

The Turks, on the other hand, voluntarily accepted Islam. The Turks found many similarities between Islam and their own values and so did not view Islamic culture a threat to their national identity.

The Turkish domination of Iran lasted from 1055 to 1258. By 1639, the balance of power was finally established between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire and remained virtually unchanged. The frontiers that were set by the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639 were not changed except for some minor exchange of territory.

The basic factors influencing the balance were dictated by the external and internal situations affecting both countries. The Ottomans always looked towards the West as a major Ghazi state. They did not focus much attention on the territories of Iran. The major threat to the Ottomans always came from the West and Russia. Internal weakness within the Empire was a main reason the Ottomans could not reduce the threat from the West. Numerous foreign interventions, especially by Russia, Britain, France and to some extent Austria-Hungary, constituted the major threat to stability of the Empire. During the same time, foreigners, especially

Britain and Russia, dominated the politics of Iran. Russia soon became powerful enough to pose a major threat to both the Ottoman Empire and Iran. To cope with the threat of Russia both the Ottomans and the Iranians began to play off the intense rivalries between the great powers. Internal control and administrations of the two countries showed similar development and common problems. Thus it is clear that the balance of power between the two Ottomans and Safavids was dictated by the external and internal environment of the two countries, not their bilateral disputes regarding territory, ideology, or religion.

When the Shia posed a challenge for the two countries' bilateral relations, the Ottomans favored internal measures to cope with the threat. Propaganda of the Shia did not cause a war between the two countries.

Analysis of their modern history shows that their first priority was given to achieving full independence. Turkey continued its struggle to achieve economic and technological progress in order to remove its dependency on foreign powers. Iran also tried to remove the influence of Britain and the Soviet Union by implementing several reforms to improve its economy.

Under the threat of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran opted to side with the West, especially the United States, during the cold war. Turkey followed a more independent relationship in its alliance with the United States, whereas, the Shah became more dependent on the United States to protect his dynasty against external and internal threats.

Turkey was able to transform its structure to a more modern society. The Westernization of the country enabled it to become a democratic, secular, and contemporary state. On the other hand, the Shah was unable to transform the entrenched traditional structure of his country with a modern one. He was powerless to enforce his reforms and the people were not willing to accommodate with his policies because of the pressure of the Ulema.

The Revolution was a response of Islamic traditional society to the Shah's policies. The Revolution was the result of the alliance of different groups against the Shah, but the Islamic Republic of Iran was the result of the charisma of Khoemeini and the power of the Ulema to control the events. Acceptance of the Velayet-e Faqih principle by Islamic Iran is evidence of the dominating charisma of Khoemeini. Velayet-e Faqih was used as a tool by Khoemeini to dictate his will upon

the Islamic Republic. He institutionalized his role by this principle.

Analysis of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic may give confusing signals because of irregular implementation of often contradictory policies by the leadership. However, by keeping in mind that their internal power struggles remain unsettled, and recalling the severe political and ideological differences among the various groups sharing the power, these contradictory policies become more understandable.

Radical and moderate groups are predominant players in this struggle. However, the challenge of the Mojahheddin to the regime should not be ignored. By in large, the moderates have now established their dominance under the leadership of Rafsancani. This can quickly change as any dissatisfaction with the policies of the Rafsancani administration may result with in an attempt by the radicals to seize power.

Successes and failures of Rafsancani's economic and social policies have had most impact on the popularity of his administration. The severe economic conditions of Iran has decreased the prosperity of Iranians, especially those of the so-called the Mostafezan(oppressed). Revolution has not improved the conditions for these huge numbers of oppressed people despite propaganda proclaiming otherwise.

In order to achieve economic improvement, Rafsancani opted for limited liberalization of the policies by some extend. Pressure from the bazaar people (merchants) could, however, have affected this policy choice. In any case, the reform program may improve the situation in the country if given a chance to be fully implemented. The results of the reform program will take time to see.

The bilateral relations between the two countries have faced several challenges. Analysis of these problems shows that many of these problems are the results of changes in the regional and global power structure. These problems continue to have a devastating impact on other countries in the region. Both two countries can not endure any the unexpected consequences from these problems.

One of the scenarios proposed is a regional conflict arising from the present problem in the Caucasus. Armenia's apparent victory of its expansionist policies may spark extremely serious regional conflict. The internal power struggle (especially the pressure of the Dashnak party) of Armenia also may spark this conflict.

A victorious Armenia could decide to solve the problem quickly and definitively by attacking Azerbaijan. Armenia or "nationalist and patriotic irregulars that are out of the

government control" could launch an attack simultaneously against Nahcevan and Nagorno-Karabagh. Armenian's main objectives will be: avoiding any Turkish support with Azerbaijan, securing the land stripe between Nahcevan and Azerbaijan, and securing its corridor to Nagorno-Karabagh via south.

Meantime, Armenia or "Armenian irregulars" may be successful in the forming a coalition with the Lach and/or Lezghis people who are seeking freedom. This coalition would have the effect of dismembering Azerbaijan.

It is plausible that Azeri forces may not show strong resistance and enabling Armenian forces, regular or irregular, to quickly capture Nahcevan as the first step. An Armenian attack towards Nagorno-Karabagh will use two routes that already are established, to expand in Nagorno-Karabagh. Azeri resistance combined with the help of terrain may reduce their speed, however of advance. Slowed down Armenian troops with the help of other coalition members could still be able to expand the territory held. Within a short period of time, Armenia would achieve its goal of annexing Nagorno-Karabagh and Nahcevan.

In the next step, Armenian forces may turn north, towards Ganje. They may pass by or encircle the city, but the major

goal of this attack would be establishing a link between Russia and Armenia. Such a link is vital for Armenia, because Russian support will be crucial for Armenia to survive in the post-war era. Another benefit for Armenia would be the end of its isolation surrounded by the hostile nations; Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

In order to establish a Great Armenia on predominantly Armenian territories, planned massacres of Azeris may be useful for Armenians to achieve majority status. This is not a new tactic for Armenians, and during the chaos of a fast moving war, the international media will not have a chance to observe the situation. Anyhow, the Armenian propagandists later will provide the evidence of massacres of the Armenians in the liberated territories for the consumption of the international media. Evidence of any Azeri massacres will be signaled by huge exodus to neighbouring countries, especially Turkey and Iran. It is quite certain that Iran would receive huge numbers of the Azeri refugees.

On the other hand, in order to implement this plan, Armenia has to keep Turkey out of action. Armenia will use the international arena to deny any connection or control of the government over Armenian irregulars fighting for their right of self-determination and independence. The coalition of the

Armenians with the Lach and/the Lezghis peoples will bolster the justification of their actions to world opinion. So, under the pressure of the West and international media, Turkey may be forced not to intervene in the situation militarily. Meanwhile, Armenia call for mediation of the United Nations or any other international organization that practically will create no solution. This diplomatic strategy of Armenia will limit the reactions of Turkey.

However, Armenia is keenly aware of the fact that Turkey has important interests in the region; and pressuring the West or international organizations may not be enough. Armenia may ask for the active involvement of Russia as a counter balance to the challenge of Turkey for influence in the region.

Turkey, on the other hand, can not let Armenia destroy its interests in the region. Besides, a strong and expansionist Armenia in itself is an important threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey. Although many people in Turkey are aware of the possible results of involving this kind of conflict, with its outcome are unpredictable and dangerous, Turkey still may choose to secure its eastern borders. Turkey will use agreements signed in the 1920s to ensure the security of Nahcevan as a reason for intervention.

This possible Turkish military operation may have the aims of establishing a link with Azerbaijan via Nahcevan and capturing the land stripe between Nahcevan and Azerbaijan. This operation will cut the links between Armenia and Iran, but most of all it will create a corridor between Turkey and Azerbaijan opening further links between Turkey and Central Asia.

Should this happen, neither Russia nor Iran would accept a Turkish victory, shifting radically the balance of power in favor of Turkey, both in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Russian administration, under pressure from the growing power of the ultranationalist wing (even without that kind of pressure, Russians never accept any Turkish domination in the region), will side with Armenia and force Turkey to retreat. Although Russia does not field superior air power in the Caucasus, it could deploy significant number of forces to the region. Its long-range missiles and aircraft have enough power and capability to impose a significant threat to Turkey. It is quite sure that, because its survival is not at risk, Russia will have no justification to use its nuclear arsenal. The mere existence of such a threat plus pressure from the Turk-hating ultranationalists would be significant deterrence to thwart Turkey.

Iran too, could find itself in the middle of chaos. The exodus of huge numbers of Azeris will have negative effects. The problem would not be hosting these refugees but resulting instability to Iran that is the danger.

The nationalism among the Azeris in Iran will be affected by this event. They may seek the annexation of north and south Azerbaijan in order to survive as a nation. If Azerbaijan was ever defeated and dismembered, than the Azeri population in Iran try to reestablish Azerbaijan once again. On the other hand, if Turkey was successful in annexing the Nahcevan-Azerbaijan corridor, strengthening Azerbaijan, then the future leadership of Azerbaijan could call for the establishment of a Great Azerbaijan.

Iran, in order to prevent this, may invade the land strip between Azerbaijan and Nahcevan. Iran may also try to stop the exodus of Azeris into its territory. Iran would achieve this, by covertly siding with Armenia. Such a covert alliance could help ensure the return of the territory after the chaos. Protection of this land strip by Iran is not such a bad situation for Armenia. It would relieve the pressure on them.

However, this will bring Iran against Turkey causing a major rift between the two countries. Turkish armed forces may even engage Iranian armed forces implementing their war plans.

Another major conflict may be result of the situation of Iraq and the Kurdish problem. In this case Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria will be major actors. Although there could be differences, the conflict may occur either after an attempt by Saddam Hussein to reestablish full control of the government over northern Iraq or after an attempt to overthrow him.

Today, the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq enjoy a significant freedom of movement. Saddam Hussein may want to establish his control over them in absence of strong resistance from the world opinion. As a result of this action, the Kurds may declare the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq. In order to increase its strength and encourage the support of several foreign actors, the new Kurdistan may call other Kurds for unification with the new Kurdistan, "the heart and soul" of the Kurds.

As in the second scenario, such an attempt by unified opposition groups may cause chaos in Iraq. The ensuing disorder and uncertainty will led to the dismemberment of Iraq. Shia groups may then establish their state in the south while the Kurds declare their state in the north, further provoking Iran and other foreign actors. To ensure its survival and empower it, Iraqi Kurdish leadership may call for the unification of the Kurds under flag of the Kurdistan.

However, the establishment of any Kurdish state poses hidden dangers to the territorial integrity and national unity of Turkey. Even if the establishment of such a state is going to occur, that state should be under the patronage of Turkey in order to prevent the spill-over effect of Kurdish nationalism.

To ensure this, Turkey may use force against Kurdistan and invade northern Iraq. As justification, Turkey may use its historical rights over northern Iraq or the security of the Turkish people there. Control by Iran over northern Iraq, or over by a new hostile regime may be important reasons for Turkey to react. The oil reserves of northern Iraq may also provide an incentive for Turkey.

On the other hand Iran will not accept the Turkish occupation even if it removes the Kurdish threat to Iran. As a response Iran may invade Iraq from south and north. Iran will try to stop Turkey establishing its control over northern Iraq. As a result, the Turkish forces may engage Iranian armed as both parties implement their plans.

Another conflict may occur if the provocation of Iran becomes clear and evident to the Kurdish uprising in Turkey. Iran has its own Kurdish forces and have supported the PKK. If a Kurdish uprising should occur, Iran may use its forces to

support the uprising, forcing Turkey to declare a war against Iran.

The Kurdish terrorist movement poses the most immediate and dangerous threat to Turkey. The protection and the integrity of the country and nation is the vital and most important priority of the armed forces and government. As noted, it is *raison d'être* of the armed forces, and the cause for which the soldiers of this nation live and die for. As a guardian of the Kemalist Turkey, the armed forces will definitely not allow disintegration of the country and the nation.

So, any radical policies of Iran that support or provoke the uprising of Kurds in Turkey, the armed forces will move to clear the base of support for the uprising where ever it has roots, even they are found in Iran.

One of the scenarios considered is the direct involvement of Iran in the domestic problems of Turkey. Turkey may find itself in chaos should extreme religious groups come to power in democratic elections and then try to change the democratic and secular regime of Turkey by using the opportunities of their posts. There is no question that the armed forces of Turkey would not allow any such body or group destroy the secular and democratic regime of Turkey.

In this case, if Iran sided with the extreme groups actively, then the armed forces will act to remove any support to these groups, including any support from Iran.

Even limited support by Iran to extreme religious groups, who seem unlikely of posing significant threat could be a problem between the two countries. The export of regime or support by Iran to these extreme religious groups will limit the areas of cooperation between the two countries.

Any major dispute in the region will pose a threat to the stability of both countries. However, both countries desperately need stability and security in the region. There are many economic, social, and political burdens on the administrations of the two countries. In order to solve these problems, both countries need time and resources. The disstabilization of the region and overall weakening of security requires the devotion of many resources and skills the two countries can muster. This definitely reduces the chance for development and improvement in the well-being of the two countries.

So, what the best option for Turkey and Iran is to show mutual understanding of their common problems and cooperate together to increase regional stability and security. None of the two countries would pose a threat to each other if they

achieve economic and social development of their respective countries in a stable and secure region that comes from extensive cooperation.

They may also foster cooperation in the Southwest Asia by inviting other regional actors to participate. In the interdependent conditions of a global economy, each country may achieve economic development only in a stable and cooperative environment.

By increasing the activities of the regional organizations, Turkey and Iran can increase the level of cooperation in the region. The ECO is a great opportunity for the two countries to increase their cooperation. Wider intraregional cooperation would be fostered by the ECO. An enlarged regional grouping consisting of the Central Asian states and their neighbours, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan may lead to the establishment of so-called Southwest Asian common market.

In the view of the successes of the European Community, the ECO may eventually increase the economic and social conditions of the region. Turkey would then act as a key connector of three important regional economic groupings in future: the EC, the BSEC, and the ECO.

As the prosperity raises the wealth of people, they have less incentive to create conflicts which would destroy what they have just achieved. Only the mutual cooperation of Turkey and Iran provides a framework that allows them to enjoy the economic and social development of their respective countries. Their increased prosperity will help to create stability in one of the most problematic regions of the world.

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